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Vickers
THIS is the first book in a two-volume setthat traces the evolution of the LabourParty’s foreign policy throughout the
twentieth century and into the early years
of the new millennium.
This is the first comprehensive study of
the political ideology and history of the
Labour Party’s world-view and foreign
policy. It argues that the development of
Labour’s foreign policy perspective should
be seen not as the development of a
socialist foreign policy, but as an
application of the ideas of liberal
internationalism.
The first volume outlines and assesses the
early development and evolution of
Labour’s world-view. It then follows the
course of the Labour party’s foreign policy
during a tumultuous period on the
international stage, including the First
World War, the Russian Revolution, the
Spanish Civil War, the build up to and
violent reality of the Second World War,
and the start of the Cold War.
This highly readable book provides an
excellent analysis of Labour’s foreign
policy during the period in which Labour
experienced power for the first time. It is
essential reading for students of British
political history in the twentieth century,
international relations and British foreign
policy.
Rhiannon Vickers is a Lecturer in the Department 
of Politics at the University of Sheffield
COVER PHOTOGRAPH—New Yorkers cheer
progress down Broadway in an open car,
of British Foriegn Secretary, Ernest Bevin,
9 November 1946 
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Introduction
Labour’s election victory in May 1997 was closely followed by the new
Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, launching his department’s mission
statement in which he made a commitment to an ‘ethical dimension’
to British foreign policy. Cook declared that he was going to imple-
ment a new kind of foreign policy, which ‘recognises that the national
interest cannot be defined only by narrow realpolitik’. The aim was ‘to
make Britain once again a force for good in the world.’1 This sparked
a debate on the nature of Labour’s foreign policy, which has seen a
return to some of the arguments within the Labour Party from much
earlier in the twentieth century, such as whether a Labour government
should conduct foreign policy in the national interest or the interna-
tional interest. Indeed, according to Blair, ‘We are all internationalists
now, whether we like it or not.’ This is because ‘Interdependence is the
core reality of the modern world. It is revolutionising our idea of
national interest. It is forcing us to locate that interest in the wider
international community.’2 These ideas of a moral dimension to
foreign policy, of membership of an international community and of
the need to think of the international interest, are not new. Rather,
they reflect a particular world-view that has been prevalent throughout
the Labour Party’s history and which is the focus of this study.
Foreign policy under ‘New Labour’ has stimulated a renewed
interest in the nature of Labour’s approach to the world.3 Not since a
proliferation of studies of foreign policy under the Attlee governments
has so much been said and written about Labour and international
affairs.4 However, foreign policy is in general an under-researched area
of Labour Party policy and history. While there have been many studies
of British foreign policy in the twentieth century,5 remarkably little 
has been said about the development, formulation and nature of the
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Labour Party’s foreign policy. Studies of the Labour Party tend to
focus on domestic policy, in particular social and economic policy, both
in terms of policy-making and in terms of ideology.6 This is partly
because many academics who study the Labour Party come from a
domestic British politics or economics background, rather than from
an International Relations background, whereas International
Relations scholars tend to focus on the state as a unitary actor, rather
than unpacking it into constitutive parts. Undoubtedly, it is difficult to
identify the extent to which parties can have an impact on foreign
policy. States have to operate within the opportunities and constraints
provided by the international system and so governments do not
necessarily have much power to take a different policy stance, and
opposition parties have even less. There are also the constraints
provided by domestic state institutions, political culture, geographical
location and economic resources. In the case of Britain, foreign policy
is rarely made by bills passed through Parliament, and this tends to
isolate it from the kind of scrutiny and legislative control that other
policy areas are subject to. There is also a particular oblique British
style of conducting foreign policy, which mitigates against a radical
redrawing of foreign policy, that Kenneth Waltz described as:
To proceed by a sidling movement rather than to move directly toward an
object, to underplay one’s hand, to dampen conflicts and depreciate
dangers, to balance parties against each other, to compromise rather than
to fight, to postpone decisions, to obscure issues rather than confront
them, to move as it were by elision from one position of policy to another:
such habits, anciently engendered and long crystallized, form the style of
British foreign policy.7
In addition, foreign policy tends to be made in reaction to external
events rather than as a result of internal policy development. As a
result, Labour’s policy on Britain’s external relations is treated as a side
issue, used to demonstrate the tensions between the different factions
within the party,8 or as evidence of the failure of the left to produce a
foreign policy reflecting the ideological roots of the party,9 rather than
as a topic of interest in itself. Research that does focus on Labour’s
foreign policy, both published and unpublished, focuses on quite
specific time periods,10 on individual administrations – in particular the
1945 Labour government – or on particular issues.11 There has been
some work on Labour’s defence and security policy since the Second
World War, but this has not covered foreign policy as such.12 None of
the major studies of the Labour Party subject Labour’s foreign policy
2 THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE WORLD
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to sustained analysis. David Howell argues that both the Attlee and
Wilson governments emphasised bi-partisanship in foreign policy and
had an enduring attachment to nationalism and real-politik over a
socialist foreign policy or even liberal idealism, but his analysis is very
limited in depth.13 Research that does provide any kind of overview is
in desperate need of updating, for example Miller’s examination of
Labour’s foreign policy up to 1931, Naylor’s study of Labour’s inter-
national policy in the 1930s, Gordon’s analysis of Labour’s foreign
policy between 1914 and 1965 and Windrich’s study of Labour’s
foreign policy published in 1952.14 This dearth of material occurs
despite the fact that foreign policy has always been an area of
contention within the Labour Party, providing the arena for some of
its most intense tribal warfare. 
This dearth of material has also contributed to the myth that
Labour has been insular in its outlook, not much interested in inter-
national affairs and has made little contribution to British foreign
policy in terms of ideas or policies. Nye Bevan, while opposition
spokesman for foreign affairs, told the 1958 Labour Party annual
conference that,
When I first entered the House of Commons there was a myth, a preva-
lent myth. It was to the effect that although the Labour Members of
Parliament could reasonably be expected to know something about engi-
neering, or about mining, there were two subjects on which they were
completely ignorant: foreign affairs, and how to make war. It was always
understood that those were the special prerogatives of the Tories, and
their attitude has not changed very much. Despite an appalling series of
blunders, they still assume that it is altogether a good thing to be able to
talk international nonsense in several languages.15
This myth was promoted by the Labour Party’s political opponents
keen to emphasise that Labour was not fit to govern. Somewhat more
surprisingly, it has also been encouraged by writers on the left. Some
have argued that, in its early days, the Labour Party was insular and not
concerned with either international affairs or the fate of the working
class overseas. Kenneth O. Morgan has said that ‘The political labour
movement in Britain as it emerged in the later nineteenth century was
almost entirely insular in outlook.’16 James Hinton that ‘Socialism, as
it developed in Britain, had little distinctive contribution to make to
the formulation of foreign policy.’17 In particular, ‘The incapacity of
socialists to develop an independent position in foreign policy reflected
both theoretical weaknesses and the lack of interest in foreign affairs
shown by their predominantly working-class constituency.’18 This
INTRODUCTION 3
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study, therefore, seeks to rectify this gap in the literature on both the
political ideology and the history of the Labour Party’s foreign policy
and to demonstrate that the Labour Party has, from its very beginning,
been involved and interested in international policy and with Britain’s
relations with the rest of the world. International affairs have been a
major cause for concern for many in the Labour Party, not least
because of its fundamental understanding that domestic and interna-
tional politics were part of a whole that could not be treated as mutu-
ally exclusive. Indeed, the two Labour Party leaders who resigned
during the time period under consideration for this first volume,
namely Ramsay MacDonald in 1914 and George Lansbury in 1935,
both did so over foreign and security policy disagreements with the
party, demonstrating the great depth of passion aroused by foreign
affairs. 
This study provides an in-depth political history of the evolution
of Labour’s foreign policy in the twentieth century, with volume one
based on extensive archival research, using Labour Party, Trades Union
Congress (TUC), and government papers.19 While giving centre-stage
to Labour’s foreign policy, it also includes an assessment of certain
aspects of Labour’s defence policy. Studying foreign policy is itself no
easy task, given that definitions of foreign policy range in their scope.20
For certain issues and for certain time periods, foreign and defence
policy are inextricably linked and so any analysis of foreign policy
involves an analysis of defence policy also. 
In addition, this book does not simply seek to provide a narrative
of events, but to construct a framework through which Labour’s
foreign policy and its outlook on the world can be analysed and inter-
preted. To date, this has been done within the context of developing a
typology of a ‘socialist’ foreign policy. The most interesting attempts
to do this are by Michael Gordon in Conflict and Consensus in Labour’s
Foreign Policy: 1914–1965, which was published in 1969, and Eric
Shaw, who focused on the more limited time frame of 1945 to 1951.
Gordon’s typology of Labour’s ‘socialist’ foreign policy had the
following four main principles: internationalism, international
working-class solidarity, anti-capitalism and anti-militarism or antipa-
thy to power politics.21 Eric Shaw, in his unpublished thesis, outlined
two ideal types of socialist approach to foreign policy, a social-demo-
cratic Marxist doctrine and a radical democrat doctrine, based on the
following principles of a socialist foreign policy: the rejection of power
politics; liberal internationalism; socialist internationalism; social
democratic solidarity; and the facilitation of the building of socialism at
4 THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE WORLD
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home.22 Kenneth Miller, in Socialism and Foreign Policy, which was
published in 1967, set out to determine the influence of socialist ideol-
ogy on Labour’s foreign policy up to 1931, but ended up emphasising
the liberal influence on Labour’s perspective instead.
In contrast, this book does not seek to assess the extent to which
Labour’s perspective was socialist, or evaluate the extent to which
Labour has tried to apply socialist theories to foreign policy actions.
This is because the Labour Party did not offer a radically alternative
view in terms of providing a socialist foreign policy. Indeed, it has
never been self-evident as to what such a policy would look like. As far
as foreign policy was concerned, it is not clear that the Labour Party
ever had any socialist ideology as such. Labour did seek to offer an
alternative to the traditional, power politics or realist approach of
British foreign policy, which had stressed national self-interest, and 
to provide a version based on internationalism, which stressed co-
operation and interdependence, and a concern with the international
as well as the national interest. In this, by far the most important influ-
ence on Labour’s foreign policy were liberal views of international rela-
tions. While the Labour Party did at various times in its history call for
a socialist foreign policy, it never really explained how it would be
possible to implement a policy based on socialist ideology in a world
where the existing nation-states were capitalist nation-states.
Conversely, the Communist Party did appear to offer a particular
version of a ‘socialist’ foreign policy that could be implemented in the
existing international system. This was based on realist assumptions,
namely that a socialist policy should be in line with the interests of a
particular nation-state, the Soviet Union. This was one of the major
reasons why the Communists were so distrusted by the Labour Party,
because their position was seen to be not genuinely internationalist,
but another variant of power politics, in service to the national inter-
ests of the Soviet state rather than the British state. What the Labour
Party did not tend to fully comprehend was that for a socialist foreign
policy to be practicable, there first had to be a transformation of the
existing state form; to expect a capitalist state to pursue a socialist
foreign policy was never feasible.
While it is difficult to develop an overall analytical framework
within which to outline a typology of Labour’s foreign policy, there are
certain meta-principles, such as a belief in progress and an optimistic
view of human nature, which reflect an internationalist perspective.
This study argues that internationalism has been the underlying basis
of Labour’s world-view and foreign policy. Internationalism, broadly
INTRODUCTION 5
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defined, is the desire to transcend national boundaries in order to find
solutions to international issues. However, there are different strands
of internationalism and it is not a world-view that is the preserve of 
the Labour Party or of socialist or social democratic parties. Much 
of the party’s thinking on internationalism was shaped by radical 
liberal thinking as well as being influenced by a Christian-socialist,
Nonconformist streak amongst party members. The Labour Party’s
own particular brand of internationalism has emphasised certain
aspects of internationalist thought. These are first, that while states
operate within a system of international anarchy, reform of the system
is possible because states have common interests and values. This
change is only likely to be secured through the construction of inter-
national institutions with which to regulate economic, political and
military relations between states. Second, linked to this is a sense that
states belong to an international community and that each state has a
responsibility to work towards the common good of the international
system, to work in the ‘international’ interest rather than purely in
what it perceives to be its national interest. These two principles are
closely intertwined. It was the belief in internationalism and an inter-
national community that underpinned Labour’s demand in 1916 for
an ‘international authority to settle points of difference among the
nations by compulsory conciliation and arbitration, and to compel all
nations to maintain peace’.23 This led Labour to support the establish-
ment of the League of Nations following the First World War and to
pursue its ‘League of Nations’ policy under Ramsay MacDonald and
Arthur Henderson in the 1929–31 minority government, even if the
party was at times critical of the form that the League of Nations took
and the way that it operated. Belief in the international community was
even written into the Labour Party’s constitution, with the commit-
ment ‘for the establishment of suitable machinery for the adjustment
and settlement of international disputes by conciliation or judicial arbi-
tration and for such other international legislation as may be practica-
ble.’24 The Labour Party was the most wholehearted supporter
amongst the British political parties for the establishment of interna-
tional organisations to regulate and arbitrate world affairs, and it spent
the years during the First and Second World Wars thinking about the
post-war settlement and the maintenance of peace through interna-
tional institutions.
The third aspect of Labour’s internationalism was that interna-
tional policy and governance should be based on democratic principles
and universal moral norms. For Labour, domestic and foreign policy
6 THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE WORLD
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were seen as parts of a whole, as inextricably linked and as impacting
on each other. Arthur Henderson said that there is an ‘intimate’
connection between Labour’s home and foreign policy.25 Policies
pursued externally should help, or at least not hinder, the kind of
society being built domestically. In addition, principles valued domes-
tically, such as democracy and human rights, should be reflected exter-
nally and pursued in relations with other states. The key to
international peace was social justice at home and abroad. This was
strongly emphasised during the Second World War, with Attlee
arguing that ‘the world that must emerge from this war must be a
world attuned to our ideals.’26 Linked to the idea of universal moral
norms was a belief in a democratic foreign policy and a rejection of
secret diplomacy. This was an issue that was particularly popular within
the Labour Party in the years just before and after the First World War,
and Labour was strongly influenced in this through the involvement of
radical Liberals such as E. D. Morel. The war was seen as the result of
secret diplomacy, as ‘Instead of taking advantage of the marked growth
in the pacific inclinations of the peoples of the world’, statesmen ‘have
insisted on encouraging between the Governments of Europe the most
deadly and determined competition in preparation for war that the
world has ever known.’27 One of the achievements of the 1924 minor-
ity Labour government was that it fulfilled its manifesto pledge to end
secret diplomatic agreements by presenting all new treaties to
Parliament for ratification.
The fourth aspect of Labour’s internationalism was the belief that
collective security is better than balance of power politics, which is self-
defeating in terms of generating conflict. The League of Nations, it
was hoped, would by-pass the need for balance-of-power politics, and
Labour had envisaged a League that was ‘so strong in its representa-
tive character and so dignified by its powers and respect that questions
of national defence sink into the background of solved problems.’28
The belief in collective security was one of the reasons that Labour
tended to vote against the government’s defence estimates, preferring
a national military capability which formed part of an international
military force that could used for international intervention. Linked to
this was the fifth principle of Labour’s internationalism, its belief in
‘anti-militarism’. This has been manifested in many different ways,
including a commitment to collective security, arms control and disar-
mament, regulation of the arms industry, opposition to conscription,
support for arbitration and a suspicion of the use of force as a foreign
policy instrument. The annual conference regularly passed resolutions
INTRODUCTION 7
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condemning militarism and war, and many in the party believed that
war could be avoided through the avowed rejection of armaments and
the use of force. The preparation for war was seen as one of the major
causes of war, as this destabilised the international system by causing
suspicion between states. The Labour Party was strongly influenced by
the pacific outlook of the Independent Labour Party (ILP), who
believed that ‘War is the result of the preparation for war.’29 Labour’s
anti-militarist tendencies manifested themselves in a number of ways,
such as attempts to control the arms industry and implement tighter
regulations on the sale of arms. In particular, there was a commitment
to controlling the proliferation of weapons, especially weapons of mass
destruction, through multilateral negotiations. Labour supported the
organisation of disarmament conferences and presented itself as the
party able to reach disarmament agreements internationally because of
its moral leadership. 
In addition to these five principles was one further aspect of
Labour’s international thought that did develop more directly out of
its socialist ideology, and this has been a belief in international
working-class and socialist solidarity. This was expressed in Labour’s
early years through a commitment to the international socialist and
trade union movements and through Labour’s campaigns for labour
movements overseas. Feelings of kinship with workers overseas were
engendered not only from a socialist belief in the need for international
working-class solidarity, but also from the impact of Nonconformist
beliefs in the brotherhood of man. This led to a concern with imperi-
alism and of conditions in the British empire and, at times, support for
nationalist movements and for national self-determination, which was
often at odds with Labour’s belief in Britain’s continuing world and
imperial role. Indeed, Labour’s policy on colonial affairs was usually
confused and inconsistent. 
Within the Labour Party there have always been divisions over
how these internationalist principles should be interpreted, which of
these principles should be prioritised and which of these principles
were achievable in the real world. These divisions are at the heart of
this study, which argues that Labour never really came to an ideologi-
cal agreement over how to be internationalist within an international
system dominated by nation-states. Labour did not question the exis-
tence of a world of sovereign nation-states, but its internationalist
perspective led it to look for ways to control relations between states
and ameliorate the inherent conflict in the international system. The
tension between national sovereignty and internationalism lay behind
8 THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE WORLD
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many of the battles over Labour’s foreign policy, and the party often
found itself unable to transcend national barriers in order to meet its
commitment to internationalism. These are themes that are explored
throughout the following chapters and returned to more directly in the
conclusion. 
Outline of study
Due to the huge breadth and depth of material to be covered, this
study consists of two volumes. The first volume outlines and assesses
the early development and evolution of Labour’s foreign policy up to
and including the Attlee governments, and provides the analytical
framework for this study. The second volume examines Labour’s
foreign policy from its 1951 defeat to the present day and concludes
with an analysis of the importance of the party’s contribution to British
foreign policy.
The first two chapters of this volume introduce the analytical
framework within which we can understand Labour’s foreign policy.
Chapter 1 provides the context within which the Labour Party
emerged, that is, to represent the working class of the most powerful
nation in the world. This was to shape the way that the party thought
about foreign policy and Britain’s role in the world. It also outlines
how the party developed, namely as a loose federation of organisations
rather than a party with a specified ideology, and with a commitment
to internal democracy in its structure and ethos, and how this has given
rise to competing perspectives on foreign policy. Chapter 2 completes
the framework for this study by analysing the main influences on the
party’s attitudes towards international affairs, namely the ILP; the
trade union movement; the Social Democratic Federation and various
Marxist groups; the Fabian Society; and the radical Liberals, epito-
mised by the members of the Union of Democratic Control (UDC).
Each of these five main influences had their own particular impact on
the development of Labour’s foreign policy. The radical Liberals
contributed greatly to Labour’s liberal internationalism, while the
Marxists, the trade unions and the ILP each contributed to Labour’s
socialist internationalism. The Fabians provided in part the rationalist
underpinning of Labour’s views on international relations, while the
ILP provided the impulse towards common fellowship with other
states. The ILP and the radical Liberals reinforced each other in their
beliefs that militarism and secret diplomacy lead to war. Some of the
INTRODUCTION 9
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radical Liberals shared with the Marxists the assumption of the
economic basis of inter-capitalist rivalry. These different contributing
streams to Labour’s foreign policy also often pulled in opposing direc-
tions. Nothing revealed this more than the split over attitudes towards
pacifism and war, brought to a head with the outbreak of the First
World War in 1914, but it is also evident in the other major debates of
the time, over the Boer War and imperialism. What was agreed,
however, by all the contributing groups, was that foreign policy could
not be viewed in isolation, as domestic and international policies were
inter-related, and also because foreign policy was affected by economic
relations as well as political ones. Chapter 2 also begins the historical
narrative of Labour and the world, focusing on the response to the
Boer War and attitudes towards imperialism. 
The first major test of Labour’s developing world-view was over
the response to the outbreak of the First World War, and this is exam-
ined in Chapter 3. Internationally, the First World War demonstrated
that socialist parties had yet to find a way to overcome their national
perspectives, resulting in the collapse of the Second International. At
home, the war led to a widening gulf between the ILP and the Labour
Party. As the ILP declined in its importance within the Labour Party,
the UDC, established in opposition to the war, went on to have a
resounding impact on the development of the Labour Party’s views on
the need for a League of Nations, open diplomacy and arms control,
and a renewed optimism in internationalism. In addition to the First
World War and its aftermath, this time period was extremely influential
in the development of the Labour Party’s foreign policy because of the
events in Russia. The February and October 1917 revolutions in
Russia were to have a resounding impact on Labour, both in terms of
temporarily raising hopes for a future based on international socialist
solidarity and then in terms of deepening divisions between left and
right as the Soviet Union offered a competing world-view to that of
the British Labour Party.
Chapter 4 examines the post-war period and the two Labour
minority governments of 1924 and 1929–31, which saw a number of
foreign policy achievements. As a result, the Labour Party had some
considerable impact at this time on British views of internationalism,
the arms trade and the League of Nations. From the early 1920s to the
late 1930s, the internationalist, anti-war section of the party, strongly
influenced by the UDC, dominated Labour Party thinking on interna-
tional affairs. While this wing of the party had initially been highly 
critical of the League of Nations, they came to see it as the institution
10 THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE WORLD
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through which peace could be maintained. Despite, or possibly
because of, the trauma of the First World War, the post-war years saw
a period of remarkable optimism about the ability to banish war and
conflict through the rational application of international law and the
operation of the League of Nations. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the years 1931 to 1938. This period saw
significant transformations in Labour’s foreign policy, with the opti-
mism of the 1920s being replaced by the growing pessimism and fear
of fascism in the 1930s. The initial reaction to the perceived weakness
of the League of Nations due to its failure to prevent the use of force
by Japan in 1931 and then by Italy in 1935 was, paradoxically, to
increase support for the League in the short term, for there appeared
to be no alternative to this policy. However, this period then saw
Labour’s foreign policy shift from a fairly anti-militaristic and almost
pacifist stance in 1933, to support for rearmament and a policy of
strength in the face of the threat posed by fascism by 1937. This was
quite a remarkable shift in policy in a short space of time, resulting in
the resignation of George Lansbury as party leader and an increase in
the influence of the trade union movement over foreign policy through
the work of the TUC on the National Council of Labour. It meant that
when the Chamberlain government was replaced in 1940, the Labour
Party was ready to join forces with Churchill in a coalition government
to support Britain’s war effort, which is examined in Chapter 6.
Whereas other authors have seen the Attlee governments as marking a
turning point in Labour’s foreign policy,30 this study traces the shift to
the late 1930s and the fight against fascism. The Second World War
marked a decisive break with the past for the Labour Party, pointing to
the way that Labour governments in the future would approach
foreign and defence policy. Labour had rejected appeasement as it did
not think that there was any chance of a peaceful settlement with
Hitler, thus ending its flirtation of the 1930s with pacifism and its
traditional rejection of the use of force. The war also seemed to 
vindicate the necessity of policies that Labour had been advocating,
such as state planning. The Labour Party spent much of its time 
thinking about what would happen when victory was won, and the
party’s apparatus of committees focused on developing ideas about 
the future international order. Labour wanted nothing less than the
radical restructuring of British society and the radical restructuring 
of the international order that had brought about both the world wars. 
Their vision of a post-war international order was to be based on the
acceptance of the idea of subordinating national sovereignty to world
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institutions and obligations, and on the need for international
economic planning.
Chapter 7 examines foreign policy under the Attlee governments.
The central conundrum that Labour faced when gaining power in
1945 was how to cut back expenditure while continuing to have as
powerful a role in the world as possible. Labour was often just as reluc-
tant as its opponents to admit to Britain’s decline, or to be open about
its inability to afford a world-wide role in security issues. Its response
to its problems was to turn to the USA for support, as Britain could no
longer afford to maintain its world role unaided. Rather than subordi-
nating national sovereignty to international institutions in any substan-
tial way, the Labour government linked Britain’s national interest to
that of the USA. Ernest Bevin in particular predicated his foreign
policy on a close relationship with the USA, and America’s involve-
ment in Europe became institutionalised through the Marshall Plan
and NATO. To a certain extent the Labour government’s foreign
policy of 1945–51 was Bevin’s foreign policy, with Attlee allowing him
a remarkable degree of freedom. No other Labour foreign secretary
has had the impact that Ernest Bevin had, either on the party’s foreign
policy or Britain’s role in the world. However, while Bevin was imple-
menting what he saw as Labour’s foreign policy, his critics on the left
felt that the party had wasted its opportunity to change the nature of
British foreign policy. For many in the rank-and-file of the party, their
hopes for a post-war policy were based on a continuation of the
wartime alliance with the Soviet Union, and internationalism and
international solidarity meant working with Russia, not capitalist
America. The criticisms over the Labour government’s foreign policy
were muted by the onset of the Cold War, but they never really went
away, and this period saw the division between left and right of the
party on foreign policy solidify into a division between Atlanticists and
those suspicious of the USA, which continues to this day.
This volume concludes by outlining the principles underpinning
Labour’s foreign policy in order to construct a framework through
which the policy and the party’s outlook on the world can be analysed
and interpreted. These principles will be returned to in the second
volume of this study, which begins with Labour’s loss of power in the
1950s. At the core of this study is the conviction that the past is an
integral part of the study of the present, and that in order to under-
stand Labour’s foreign policy today, it is necessary to place it within the
historical context of both the history of the Labour Party and the
recent history of Britain’s role in the world. 
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Chapter 1
Context: the emergence 
of the British Labour Party
The Labour Party emerged in a very specific context, namely to repre-
sent the working class of the most powerful nation of its day. At the
beginning of the twentieth century, Britain’s dominant position in the
world, her economic, military and political power, were largely taken as
given, and Labour’s world-view and foreign policy developed within
this environment of Britain as global hegemon. This is not something
that the founders of the Labour Party necessarily appreciated, but they
and the party they created were marked by Britain’s position in the
world. Britain had been the first state to industrialise, and this too
affected Labour’s outlook and its perception of itself as a world player
in the international socialist and trade union movements. This chapter
starts by giving a brief introduction to the international context within
which the Labour Party emerged in terms of Britain’s role in the world,
before turning to the historical sociology of the development of the
Labour Party itself.
Britain’s role in the world
British foreign policy in the twentieth century is itself a story of change,
of Britain’s attempts to come to terms with the consequences of it rela-
tive decline in the world. In 1900, Britain possessed the largest empire
in history and ruled one-quarter of the world’s population.1 As the
global superpower of the time, many assumed that Britain’s destiny was
to be a world leader, with a vast imperial outreach. Britain had been the
world’s foremost trading nation during the nineteenth century, and its
export-based economy relied on its naval power to keep open trading
routes and protect Britain’s enormous colonial empire. Its security was
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based on the superiority of Britain’s navy, which was then the domi-
nant form of military technology.2 This superiority was due to Britain’s
early industrialisation and its lead in steel production. Britain’s naval
dominance was based on the strategy that the Royal Navy should
always be superior in power to the combined forces of the next two
largest fleets. In addition, Britain had an unrivalled network of naval
bases around the world, including Gibraltar, Malta, the Cape,
Alexandria, Bombay, Singapore, Sydney and Halifax, and by far the
largest merchant navy.3 Thus, British foreign and security policy 
was based on isolationism, in terms of its ability to depend upon its
own strength to repel any attack on it or its colonies through its naval
dominance.
However, the reality was that by the turn of the twentieth century
Britain was a declining superpower. Britain’s economic power was
already being challenged by its competitors, as it lost its economic lead
with the rapid industrialisation of other states.4 As the table below
demonstrates, the United States of America had overtaken Britain in
terms of its share of world manufacturing output, a key indicator of
economic strength. Whereas in 1860, at the height of its dominance,
the UK had almost three times the share of world manufacturing
output of its nearest rivals, by 1900 the USA had raced ahead with
23.6 per cent of world output compared with 18.5 per cent for the
UK. The British were ‘no longer absolute masters of the markets of the
world’.5 Britain’s relative share of steel production was declining, at a
time when steel production was the best single indicator of industrial
power and hence of military potential.6 The USA, Germany and France
were all expanding their naval capabilities. In addition, Britain had a
relatively small standing army, at a time when armies were gaining in
importance relative to naval power with the opportunities provided by
the opening up of vast tracks of land through the development of the
railway. For example, Russia expanded its standing army from 647,000
in 1890, to 1,119,000 in 1900, whereas the whole of the British
empire expanded its standing army from 355,000 troops in 1890 to
513,000 in 1900.7
Thus, at the turn of the century, ‘both the Pax Britannica and the
concomitant foreign policy of “splendid isolation” were brought to an
end with incredible swiftness.’8 The growth in economic and military
power of the United States, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and Japan,
and the increased interest in overseas markets and international power-
politics of Germany and the US in particular, posed threats to Britain’s
position as global hegemon and posed risks to Britain’s ability to stand
THE EMERGENCE OF THE BRITISH LABOUR PARTY 17
Vic01  10/15/03  2:09 PM  Page 17
alone. The growth of the German navy in the early 1900s was seen as
a particular threat to Britain’s global position, leading to a naval arms
race and a spiralling military and naval budget at a time when Britain
was losing its economic advantages. 
These factors led to a debate at the turn of the century about the
relative merits of ‘isolation or alliance’.9 The Conservative government
reluctantly agreed to form alliances with Britain’s European neigh-
bours, and to pursue a foreign policy based on a balance of power in
Europe. Britain only joined this system of alliances out of necessity: ‘it
was the problems caused by her imperial commitments which brought
England, gradually and unintentionally, into the European alliance
system.’10 Britain entered into a limited treaty with Japan in January
1902, and less formal ententes with France in April 1904 and Russia in
August 1907.11 The concern was that France was vulnerable to
German expansionism, and that if France could not rely upon substan-
tial British support, then it might in desperation become a political
satellite of Germany.12 As Foreign Office official Eyre Crowe explained:
‘The general character of England’s foreign policy is determined by 
the immutable conditions of her geographical situation on the ocean
flank of Europe as an island State with vast overseas colonies and
dependencies, whose existence and survival as an independent commu-
nity are inseparably bound up with the possession of preponderant sea
power.’ However, there was always the danger of ‘the momentary
predominance of a neighbouring State at once militarily powerful,
economically efficient, and ambitious to extend its frontiers or spread
its influence.’ Germany, for example, might indeed be ‘aiming at a
political hegemony with the object of promoting purely German
schemes of expansion, and establishing a German primacy in the world
of international politics’. Historically, ‘The only check on the abuse of
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Table 1.1—Relative shares of total world manufacturing output (%)
1860 1880 1900 1913
United Kingdom 19.9 22.9 18.5 13.6
United States 7.2 14.7 23.6 32.0
Germany 4.9 8.5 13.2 14.8
France 7.9 7.8 6.8 6.1
Russia 7.0 7.6 8.8 8.2
Source: Adapted from Paul Bairoch, ‘International industrialization levels from 1750 to
1980’, Journal of European Economic History, 11:2 (1982), table 10, 296.
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political predominance has always consisted in the opposition of an
equally formidable rival, or of a combination of several countries
forming leagues of defence. The equilibrium established by such
grouping of forces is technically known as the balance of power’.13
This context of Britain’s role in the world as a superpower, in
gradual but not yet conspicuous decline, affected the way that the
emerging Labour Party thought about itself and its foreign policy. The
Labour Party was the representative of the workers of the world’s
leading power, of the first state to industrialise and of a state with a
massive empire. It was internationalist in that it saw Britain as part of
an interconnected world and had a socialist belief in the need for inter-
national working-class solidarity, but it also saw Britain and itself as
world leaders. While the empire was viewed by many as a morally
unjustified form of oppression, and imperialism in general was seen as
a cause of war, Britain’s export-based economy meant that many
workers had an interest in the maintenance of the empire and access 
to overseas markets. Many also saw Britain as having a civilising 
mission in the world and, as the world’s greatest democracy, as having
a manifest destiny to act as a world leader. The empire was seen as a
demonstration of, as well as a means of continuing, British influence in
the world. Britain was not just another country, but the leading nation
with a great empire.
These issues will be dealt with more fully in the next chapter,
which outlines and assesses the main influences on the development of
the Labour Party’s attitudes towards international affairs, and focuses
in particular on the Boer War and views on imperialism. First, however,
it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the emergence of the
Labour Party, before commenting on how the structure of the party
has affected the way that policy has developed.14
The emergence of the Labour Party
The massive growth of British industry had meant that throughout the
nineteenth century the size of the working class had grown dramati-
cally. In the latter half of the century its political strength had also
increased, with the expansion of primary education, a greater focus on
social questions, increasing labour organisation and unionisation and
the extension of the franchise, particularly by the Third Reform Act of
1884.15 This increased the electorate from 2.62 million to 4.38 million
men.16 However, while the force of the working class in Britain was
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growing, it largely expressed its political viewpoint through support of
the Liberals, and it only formed a party specifically to represent itself in
1900. This was later than its European counterparts; the German
Socialist Party was formed at the Gotha Congress in 1875, and in the
elections of 1890 gained about a fifth of all votes cast and returned
thirty-five Socialist members to the German Parliament.17 The Belgian
Labour Party was formed in 1885; the Swedish Social Democratic
Party in 1887; even in the USA a Socialist Labor Party had been estab-
lished in 1877.18 In France, the development of trade unions occurred
relatively late, while socialist parties proliferated through a series of
splits and schisms in the late nineteenth century. The party that was to
emerge in Britain was also more eclectic in its intellectual and ideolog-
ical positions than some of its socialist counterparts overseas, having
been more influenced by the British liberal tradition than by any
British socialist or Marxist tradition.
The political organisations that came together to form the Labour
Party consisted of the Social Democratic Federation (SDF), formed by
H. M. Hyndman, William Morris and Tom Mann, the main Marxist
grouping in Britain at that time;19 the Fabian Society, a liberal-
influenced, predominantly middle-class debating society; and the
ethical socialists, whose main organisation was the ILP and who
worked closely with the trade union movement.20 However, these
‘socialist’ societies were very small, and the main force behind the
establishment of a party to represent the British workers was the British
trade union movement. This was stronger and more influential than its
overseas counterparts as a result of British early industrialisation. In
1868 the TUC had been established as a federation of all British
unions, and while membership fluctuated widely, in 1874 just under a
million trade unionists were affiliated to it through their union
membership. By the end of the century, there was an increase in indus-
trial conflict and the development of ‘New Unionism’ amongst the 
un-skilled and semi-skilled. In 1900, trade union membership stood at
just over 2 million.21 Following the Third Reform Act of 1884, the
trade unions had been able to sponsor a growing number of working-
men MPs. These ‘Lib-Lab’ trade-union-sponsored MPs co-operated
with the radicals on the left of the Liberal Party to press for further
measures of reform of particular relevance to organised labour, but did
not form their own party grouping.22 The influence of British radical
liberalism was strong, as was the religious Nonconformist tradition,
and ‘the British trade unions were far from being Socialist. Indeed,
most of their leaders saw in Socialism merely a utopia and in the theory
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of the class struggle a dangerously destructive doctrine.’23 Out of these
four sets of organisations, it was the ILP and the SDF that were the
most enthusiastic about founding a new political party, whereas the
Fabians and the more established trade unions had been largely
content to work with the Liberal Party.24
At the meeting of the 1899 TUC, a resolution from the
Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants proposed holding a special
congress of trade unions, co-operative societies and socialist bodies, to
‘devise ways and means for securing the return of an increased number
of labour members to the next Parliament.’ The discussion was a little
more controversial than the proposal, for it became clear the support-
ers of the motion, such as Ben Tillet of the Dock, Wharf, Riverside and
General Labourers Union, wanted to form a labour representative
body in Parliament, which would be independent from the existing
political parties. The motion was hotly debated, for some of the more
established trade unions wanted to maintain their sponsorship of
Liberal MPs, and miners’ representatives argued that the British
worker had little interest in direct Parliamentary representation and
that the suggestion was impractical as trade unionists had different
political opinions. Despite this, the motion was passed with 546,000
votes for the proposal and 434,000 votes against.25 This conference
was held in London on 27–28 February 1900. While some of the 
delegates were still reluctant to see a new grouping develop in
Parliament, it was decided to establish a committee to promote and co-
ordinate plans for labour representation, which was to be known as the
Labour Representation Committee (LRC).26 This occasion is seen as
the birth of what was subsequently renamed the Labour Party in 1906,
but very little was actually decided at this conference. There was no
clear political programme or declaration of principles upon which the
LRC was to be based, and it was not quite clear from the resolutions
that were passed at this conference as to whether the LRC was to act
independently as a party, or to work as a grouping within Parliament
in collaboration with one of the existing political parties.27 However,
an Executive Committee was set up, which initially consisted of seven
trade unionists, two ILP delegates and one Fabian Society delegate.
Two SDF delegates were nominated shortly after the conference.28
The membership of the Executive Committee did not reflect the
membership or resources of the respective organisations, for at the
conference there were delegates from sixty-five trade unions, repre-
senting half a million members, while the socialist societies had only a
few thousand members each.29 The ILP actually had a great influence
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on the development of the LRC in its early years, as member Ramsay
MacDonald was nominated as its secretary – the only full-time, though
unpaid, office holder – and it was the ILP that supplied the LRC with
a network of local branches across the country.
At its first election in the autumn of 1900, the LRC sponsored
fifteen candidates, but won only two seats, Richard Bell at Derby and
Keir Hardie at Merthyr, with 1.8 per cent of the vote. As more trade
unions affiliated to the LRC, it gradually grew in strength and
resources. The Taff Vale judgement of 1901, when the House of Lords
ruled that a trade union could be sued for damages resulting from
industrial action, jeopardised the rights that the trade unions had won
and exercised over the previous thirty years. Trade union membership
of the LRC doubled in 1902 following a dip in 1901, as: ‘The imper-
ative need to secure a reversal by legislation of the effects of the Taff
Vale Judgement and of other recent court decisions brought the Trade
Unions into politics much more rapidly than any amount of persuasion
by the Socialists could have done.’30 At the 1903 annual conference 
the LRC increased its subscription rate and introduced a compulsory
parliamentary fund for the payment of MPs. At the January 1906 
election it put forward fifty-one candidates, winning thirty seats, 
and gaining 5.9 per cent of the vote.31 When the 1906 Parliament
assembled, the LRC renamed itself the Labour Party. However, it was
still a very weak organisation, without a clear programme, and owing
its electoral success partly to a secret agreement made in 1903 between
Ramsay MacDonald and Herbert Gladstone, the Liberal Party Chief
Whip, that the Liberals would not put up a Liberal candidate in the
seats where Labour was standing.32
The context of the emergence of the Labour Party is important: it
emerged out of the strength of the trade union movement rather than
the strength of socialist societies, and it was greatly influenced by the
British liberalism. It emerged at a time when the labour movement in
Britain was expanding, but the British economy was already experienc-
ing relative decline as it was being taken over by rapidly industrialising
competitors, and Britain was finding it increasingly difficult to secure
its empire in isolation from political alliances. The next chapter will
deal with the main political influences on the development of the
Labour Party’s attitudes towards international affairs and British
foreign policy. However, first it is necessary to highlight some of the
aspects of the party’s structure that affected the making of policy. The
structure of the party meant that party activists had a voice at confer-
ence, which, while not necessarily deciding policy, certainly acted as a
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constraint on policy. It is worth considering this in a little depth, as the
structure and ethos of the Labour Party has had an impact on its
policy-making process and the way that the party’s foreign policy has
developed.
The Labour Party’s structure and the impact on policy
The Labour Party developed as a party that was external to the exist-
ing parliamentary elite, designed to represent the interests of the
British working class. As such, inherent within its organisational struc-
ture, its traditions and its ethos was an element of democracy and
participation. In particular, this was manifested through the power of
the annual conference to make policy, and one enduring area of
controversy has been over the issue of conference sovereignty.33 This
has varied somewhat over time, with the annual conference assuming
greater sovereignty and power when Labour has been in opposition,
but the power of the annual conference has been, for much of Labour’s
history, a matter of interpretation and practice. 
The issue of conference sovereignty was first raised when the 1906
party conference had asserted its right to ‘instruct’ Labour MPs.
However, the following year the annual conference approved an exec-
utive proposal put forward by Keir Hardie which has remained the
definitive statement on the relationship between the Parliamentary
Labour Party (PLP) and the party as a whole. This was that
‘Resolutions instructing the Parliamentary Party as to their action in
the House of Commons be taken as the opinions of the conference, on
the understanding that the time and method of giving effect to these
instructions be left to the party in the House, in conjunction with the
National Executive.’34 This position became known as ‘the 1907
formula’, namely that party conferences could not bind the party in
Parliament. This gave the Parliamentary Labour Party considerable
leeway in its policy positions. The relationship between the Executive
Committee (later known as the National Executive Committee, or
NEC), which was established at the LRC’s inaugural conference in
1900, and the annual conference, was left ambiguous. This relation-
ship was laid out in more detail in the party’s constitution of 1918,
drawn up as part of the reorganisation of the party’s structure to take
account of the Representation of the People Bill. This Bill widened the
franchise, and the purpose of the reorganisation was to widen access 
to the Labour Party and bring into its ranks the large sections of the
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electorate who were not members of a trade union, or members of the
socialist parties affiliated to the Labour Party.35 The new constitution
stated that one of the objectives of the party was ‘To give effect as far
as may be practicable to the principles from time to time approved by
the Party Conference.’36 In terms of the party programme and election
manifestos, it was the duty of the conference to decide what policy
proposals the party would promote, but ‘no such proposal shall be
made definitely part of the General Programme of the Party unless it
has been adopted by the Conference by a majority of not less than two-
thirds of the votes recorded on a card vote’. It was the duty of the
NEC and the PLP, prior to every general election, ‘to define the prin-
cipal issues for that Election which in their judgement should be made
the Special Party Programme’.37 However, no guidance was given as to
what should happen if there were conflicts between the programme of
Conference and the programme of the NEC. Further control was also
exercised over the PLP and NEC, as each had to submit a report to the
annual conference, which was then voted on.
Related to conference sovereignty was the issue of the control of
the agenda at the annual conference. Trade unions, trades councils,
constituency parties and other affiliated parties, and the NEC could all
submit policy resolutions to the conference, some of which were then
placed onto the conference agenda. As Lewis Minkin explains, on the
right wing of the party there has always been ‘considerable trepidation
about the organisational energy and dexterity’ of the left and a
tendency to see the preliminary agenda as the product of left-wing
planning. The left on the other hand has been ‘inclined to see the
whole process of agenda preparation as the product of a conspiracy of
the Conference officials, the leadership of the Parliamentary Labour
Party, the NEC and the Party bureaucracy.’38 This is because non-
decision-making can be an exercise of power and influence just as
much as decision-making.39 Whichever groups dominated the agenda-
setting process, the annual conference provided an opportunity for
activists to take centre stage, and since activists tended to be more
ideologically driven than party leaders, this had an impact on the
nature of Labour’s foreign policy, the type of issues that were raised at
conference and the subsequent policy proposals put forward. This was
in sharp contrast to the Conservative Party, where foreign policy was
pretty much left in the hands of the party leadership. In addition to
this, activists in the Labour Party, in particular if also trade unionists,
were sometimes given the chance to travel as part of visiting delega-
tions, fact-finding missions overseas and membership of international
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organisations, and so built up a knowledge and experience of interna-
tional relations at a personal level. Back-bench MPs also had a greater
influence on policy than their Conservative counterparts through their
involvement in the network of Labour Party policy committees and
potential membership of the NEC. 
In addition to the structural constraints arising from the role of the
party conference, Labour had to deal with the issue of minority groups
within the party and their impact on policy-making. This was particu-
larly significant over the areas of foreign and defence policy. The
Labour Party, unlike the Conservative Party, had to fight against
parties within the party and factions within the party, as its more demo-
cratic organisational structures provided factions with more opportu-
nities to exert their influence. One obvious occasion was the fight with
Militant in the 1980s, but another was the tension that arose over the
affiliation of the ILP during the First World War, when the Labour
Party largely supported the war, and the ILP opposed it. These
tensions extended into the 1920s and became particularly apparent
during the 1929–31 minority Labour government, which culminated
in the break with the ILP. However, perhaps the most significant
arguments within the party over the threat of a ‘party within the party’,
have arisen over the role of the Communist Party of Great Britain
(CPGB). Marxist groups had been affiliated in the Labour Party’s early
years. For example, the SDF was involved in the establishment of the
LRC in 1900, disaffiliated in 1901, and then split during the First
World War with one section, the British Socialist Party, affiliating to the
Labour Party again in 1916. However, later attempts by the CPGB to
affiliate to the Labour Party in the 1930s were viewed with great alarm
by the Labour Party’s leaders, as was their application in 1946. Herbert
Morrison spoke on behalf of the Labour Party’s NEC against the
motion. The arguments he used included that the CPGB was not
democratic but a ‘dictatorship’, not a political party but a ‘conspiracy’,
that the CPGB would be an ‘embarrassment to the Government’, and
that ‘they do only what Moscow wants them to do.’ Not unsurpris-
ingly, the motion on their affiliation was rejected by 2,678,000 votes
to 468,000.40 In addition, on Denis Healey’s suggestion, Herbert
Morrison successfully moved an amendment to the party constitution
to prevent the situation arising again.41 This stipulated that,
Political Organisations not affiliated to or associated … with the Party on
January 1, 1946, having their own Programme, Principles and Policy for
distinctive and separate propaganda, or possessing Branches in the
Constituencies, or engaged in the promotion of Parliamentary or Local
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Government Candidatures, or owing allegiance to any political organisa-
tion situation abroad, shall be ineligible for affiliation to the Party. 
The aim was ‘to end the possibility of communist affiliation once and
for all’.43 Since ‘individual membership of the Party is not possible for
anyone belonging to an organisation which is deemed ineligible for
Party affiliation’, this constitutional change ‘provided the Party leader-
ship with the means to control the extent of organised factionalism
within the Party.’44 However, while the problem of affiliation was dealt
with, individual communists, who tended to be highly motivated,
could still cause problems with policy development and policy imple-
mentation. Denis Healey, the Labour Party’s International Secretary,
noted later that ‘communist influence in the Labour Party and unions
remained a major obstacle in my task of winning support for the
[Attlee] Government’s foreign policy.’45
Indeed, concern over the ability of the communist minority to
influence the development or success of Labour’s foreign policy during
the 1945 Attlee government led the party to instigate a concerted anti-
communist campaign within the labour movement in Britain. Of
course, one of the strengths of the CPGB was its affiliation to the
Cominform, in that they received support and funding from the Soviet
Union, though this was also their major weakness, for they could be
accused of attempting to further the Soviet Union’s interests rather
than Britain’s in their foreign policy positions. However, the wartime
alliance with the Soviet Union meant that the Soviet Union in partic-
ular, and communism in general, had gained a legitimacy that it had
not previously enjoyed in the eyes of the British public. Left-wing
unionists and Labour Party members, non-communists as well as
communists, were calling for a ‘socialist’ foreign policy, which they
interpreted as being based on co-operation with the USSR, and the
idea that ‘Left understands Left’.46
However, mitigating against the power of minority groups and of
the annual conference to control the development of Labour’s policies
were the conventions of the British parliamentary system. These
‘require that Members of Parliament, and therefore parliamentary
parties also, must hold themselves responsible solely to the electorate
and not to the mass organization of their supporters outside
Parliament.’47 This provided legitimacy to the arguments of the lead-
ership of the Labour Party that it was the duty of the party to develop
policies that are acceptable to the electorate, and not merely to the
party. As McKenzie noted in his comparison of the Labour and
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Conservative Parties, despite the Labour Party’s origins as a gathering
of trade union, co-operative and socialist societies, the PLP increas-
ingly resembled its opponents, and ‘By the time the Parliamentary
Labour Party had taken office in 1924 its transformation was almost
complete. By accepting all the conventions with respect to the office of
Prime Minister and of Cabinet government, it ensured that the Labour
Party outside Parliament would be relegated to a status not unlike that
of the [Conservative Party’s] National Union.’48 In addition, the
annual conference was not the only avenue through which policy
proposals were made. The Labour Party established a network of advi-
sory committees to the NEC following its reorganisation in 1918,
which prepared policy and position papers, and advised MPs on party
policy and its development. These committees had a tendency to
proliferate, with the establishment of advisory committees and working
groups on specific foreign policy and security issues. While the
committee structure diffused some power from the NEC to the
committee members, the deliberations of the committees were private,
and could be used to control the development of policy in certain
directions. In addition, particular to the Labour Party was its member-
ship of the Socialist Internationals. The party was affected by decisions
made by the Internationals, and it tended to be party leaders who
made up the delegations to meetings of the Internationals. This too
tended to concentrate power over policy-making while giving the
impression of diffusing it.
Another factor that influenced the way that Labour’s foreign
policy developed was that the Labour Party was created out of the
trade union movement to represent interests external to those of the
parliamentary elite, and hence was an externally created, oppositional
party.50 This oppositional nature of the Labour Party meant that the
party’s foreign policy, unlike that of the Conservative Party, had for
extensive periods in the twentieth century developed more as a
response to the internal dynamics of the party, rather than as a response
to actualities of the international situation. The advantage of being in
opposition was that the party had more time for reflection and policy
development, and was able to pursue more long-term perspectives than
the party in office. However, ‘this is strongly counterbalanced by its
lack of responsibility for action and implementation, which breeds a
certain air of unreality and makes it receptive to the extremist pressures
within the party.’50 This has been the case with foreign policy, which
has tended to be more left-wing during long periods in opposition. An
additional factor that has contributed to this tendency is that, as John
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Young has pointed out, Labour leaders have usually appointed ‘reli-
able’ individuals to the positions of Foreign Secretary and Defence
Secretary, who have often been from the centre and the right of the
Labour Party, such as Ernest Bevin, Denis Healey, and David Owen.51
More left-wing appointments, such as Aneurin Bevan as foreign policy
spokesman in the late 1950s, were less radical on foreign affairs than
they were on domestic issues. This resulted in a certain pragmatism in
foreign policy, and a tendency for the party leadership to preach bi-
partisanship in an effort to disarm its critics and reassure Britain’s allies.
In brief, there are three main factors that affected the way that the
emerging Labour Party thought about foreign policy. First, it was
marked by the British position in the world, and of the British way of
doing things as a world leader. However, this was during the period of
the end of Britain’s world-wide predominance and the age of ‘Pax
Britannica’. This affected Labour’s view of Britain’s role in the world.
Second, the Labour Party emerged relatively late compared with some
of its European counterparts, and it was made up of an amalgam of
different groupings (within which the trade unions were dominant in
terms of numbers of members, finances and political impact, but were
under-represented on the core executive) and was without a clear polit-
ical ideology. It developed as an oppositional party, and the party had
to gain power within a historically constituted situation. Third has
been the impact of the party’s ethos and structure. There has been a
tendency, throughout the twentieth century, for the Labour Party’s
rhetoric on foreign policy in opposition to be significantly to the left of
actions taken once in power. This is because when in opposition the
party’s leadership was circumscribed by the party members, and when
in power by the realities of Britain’s role in the world. Labour’s foreign
policy has been more affected by this than that of the Conservatives,
because the organisation of the Labour Party has provided for more of
a role for the party members and activists, and given them more oppor-
tunities to state their opinions. The second and third of these factors
meant that there were diverse influences on the development of the
Labour Party’s world-view and competing perspectives on foreign
policy, which will be outlined in the next chapter.
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Chapter 2
The main political influences 
on the development of the 
Labour Party’s attitudes towards
international affairs
The Labour Party was born out of domestic political discontent, and
its policies – to a greater extent forged in opposition up until the 1940s
– tended to reflect this. Because of these two factors, Labour’s foreign
policy reflected the party itself, the beliefs and standpoints of the
various groups that came together to create it, and the dynamics
between them, rather than necessarily the external world and experi-
ence and appraisal of international affairs. This issue will form a recur-
ring theme throughout the next two chapters, which chart the early the
years of Labour foreign policy, showing how Labour’s foreign policy.
It is worth briefly considering the main influences on, and groupings
within, the Labour Party. This will, by necessity, be something of a
cursory sketch, and it is worth remembering that conflicts over ideol-
ogy and policy occurred within the different groupings almost as much
as between them. Jupp points out that until 1918 the Labour Party was
more of a movement than a party, ‘in the sense of having little central
discipline and being bound together by an agreement to accept all
ideological positions critical of existing society and postulated on social
change through political action. It had not orthodoxy, unlike the
European social-democratic parties.’1
The main groupings within the Labour Party and their
influence on Labour’s world-view
As noted in the last chapter, when the LRC was set up in 1900 there
were four main progenitors, each bringing their own influences on
domestic and foreign policy: in no particular order of importance, the
trade union movement, the ILP, the Fabian Society, and the SDF and
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various Marxist groups. In addition to these, a fifth grouping had a
remarkable degree of influence over Labour’s developing foreign
policy, and this was composed of radical Liberals, epitomised by the
members of the UDC. Each of these groups had its own particular
influence over the way that foreign policy and international affairs were
thought about. Each had their own particular analytical framework for
understanding relations between states, and each their own way of
responding to concrete situations. These different influences provided
a rich source for ideas on international politics, but also produced
impulses towards Labour’s appropriate response to particular foreign
policy issues that were sometimes antithetical to each other. This has
added to the problems of developing a typology of the British Labour
Party’s foreign policy, while also explaining in part the depth of the
some of the intra-party conflict on international affairs.
The first main group and influence within the Labour Party, the
trade unionists, tended to have a more materialistic viewpoint than
some of their political colleagues in that they were at times more aware
of the tensions between aims, such as international working-class soli-
darity, and the desire to protect British jobs; between anti-militarism
and concern to protect the substantial British arms trade. The trade
unions had a massive influence on the Labour Party’s foreign policy in
the first half of the century. This was because they had an international
department that was sometimes more extensive than that of the
Labour Party, because they were better financed than the Labour Party
and because they had more international experience than the Labour
Party. In particular, the British trade union movement already had a
history of involvement in labour affairs overseas, and in the interna-
tional trade union movement.2 This was partly due to Britain having
been the first highly industrialised nation, and partly due to Britain’s
position in the world with its extensive empire. 
Historically, there had been two forms of international trade union
organisation, both of which emerged around the turn of the twentieth
century. First, there were the International Trade Secretariats (ITSs).
These were transnational associations of unions in a given industry,
which tended to focus their activities in areas directly related to their
industrial sector. The second type of international trade union organi-
sation consisted of federations of the national trade union centres of
various countries such as the TUC in the UK and the American
Federation of Labor (AFL) in the US.3 While the ITSs tended to focus
their activities on industry-specific questions, the federations had a
more active political role. This was largely because the federations of
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national congresses tended to parallel the division of the labour move-
ment into communist and non-communist camps. Before the Second
World War, the two main federations were the International Federation
of Trade Unions (IFTU), a non-communist federation consisting of
some European centres and the AFL, and the communist Profintern,
also known as the Red International of Labour Unions (RILU), which
had been set up in the early 1920s. This organisation was in direct
competition with the IFTU, and as the RILU affiliates were charged
with the task of infiltrating and taking over their national trade union
centres, great hostility existed between the two. At the end of the
Second World War there was a doomed attempt to establish one inter-
national, the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), but this split
due to the developing hostilities of the Cold War and the enduring
suspicion and inability to agree between the communist and non-
communist unions. 
Because of the important role of British trade union leaders in the
international trade union movement, in the early years it was often
they, rather than Labour Party politicians, who were the most experi-
enced on the international stage. The union leaders tended to be crit-
ical of the intellectual wing of the party, and felt that they lacked real
experience of dealing with matters at the international level. The man
who represented the apogee of this viewpoint was Ernest Bevin. While
it might have seemed remarkable that a trade union leader became the
first Labour foreign secretary to operate within a majority Labour
government, Bevin was highly experienced in the international arena.
As with many of the union leaders in the first half of the century, Bevin
was to the right of opinion within the Labour movement, and was
instrumental in shifting the Labour Party from a position of pacifism
to one of rearmament in the 1930s. The relationship of the trade union
leadership being to the right of the party leadership on foreign and
defence policy continued until the 1970s, when it was reversed.
The second of the main influences, the ILP, was founded at a
conference in Bradford in 1893, where delegates included Ben Tillet,
George Bernard Shaw, and Keir Hardie, and at which Eduard
Bernstein of the German Social Democratic Party made an address.
Ramsay MacDonald, in a short history of the ILP, described it as a
product of the failure of liberalism to meet the new phase of conflict
between capital and labour – where the struggle was no longer for
political liberty but for economic enfranchisement – which challenged
capitalism as a system.4 Indeed: ‘The socialism of the ILP was based
partly on egalitarian and pacifist beliefs of Nonconformist religious
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origins.’5 It believed strongly in international and working-class 
solidarity, and saw the British empire as exploitative. For the ILP,
domestic and foreign policy were parts of a whole, with social reform
at home requiring the projection of democratic ideals abroad. It was
largely pacifist, believed in international co-operation, was against
overt militarism and war, and believed that an end to secret diplomacy
could mean an end to international conflict.6 Both Kenneth O.
Morgan and A. J. P. Taylor note that its leader, Keir Hardie, took an
independent line on social questions from the moment he entered
parliament in 1892, ‘But he kept quiet about foreign affairs until
driven to explosion by the Boer war’. This was ‘lest he compromise his
essential commitment to the cause of labour at home’.7 Despite this,
the ILP was influential over issues of foreign policy in the early years
through the role played by its leaders Keir Hardie and Ramsey
MacDonald. MacDonald visited South Africa in 1902 shortly after the
end of the Boer War, writing of the devastation that he saw in a series
of articles for the Echo and the Leicester Pioneer. Following his tour of
Canada, Australia and New Zealand in 1906 he wrote a short book on
Labour and the Empire.8 Hardie visited India as part of his world tour
of 1907, publishing his impressions of British rule in the ILP’s journal,
the Labour Leader, and then in collected form in 1909 as India:
Impressions and Suggestions. His criticisms were widely read and raised
awareness of the less positive aspects of British rule in India. Lenin
wrote that ‘the whole of the English bourgeois press raised a howl
against the “rebel”’.9 Ramsay MacDonald visited India in 1909, and
published his findings as The Awakening of India, the following year.
Morgan notes that these publications ‘began the process of giving
Labour a viable imperial and colonial policy, one which bore fruit in
1947.’10 In 1912, MacDonald was part of a royal commission sent to
investigate the Indian public services. Its findings were published in
1917, and he published his own book on The Government of India in
1919. These experiences led to the Labour Party giving an explicit
commitment to freedom for India in its 1918 general election mani-
festo, which also said that Labour would ‘extend to all subject peoples
the right of self-determination within the British Commonwealth of
Free Nations.’11
Ramsay MacDonald had a unique impact on the developing
foreign policy of the Labour Party, as he was not only a leading
member of the ILP, but was also a member of the SDF for a short
period, was on the executive of the Fabian Society (he attended inter-
national conferences in that capacity) and was secretary of the Labour
MAIN POLITICAL INFLUENCES 35
Vic02  10/15/03  2:10 PM  Page 35
Party from 1900 to 1911, and as such in charge of its organisational
development. In 1906 he succeeded Philip Snowden as chairman of
the ILP. He of course also became Labour’s first Prime Minister and
Foreign Secretary, and ‘one of the central themes of MacDonald’s
career as prime minister and as leader of the Opposition is to be found
in his concern for, and knowledge of, foreign policy.’12 Both he and
Hardie travelled widely and were closely acquainted with the socialist
leaders on the continent.
The ILP was keenly involved in the Second International, and
both Keir Hardie and Ramsay MacDonald attended its congresses,
Hardie as an ILP delegate, MacDonald as delegate for the Fabian
Society and then for the LRC/Labour Party.13 Here they joined in
with their French and German comrades in attacking Tsarist Russia,
one issue which united the European socialists. MacDonald was
bitterly opposed to the British government’s friendship with Russia,
and protested against the King’s visit to Reval in June 1908.14 Hardie
also vociferously condemned it, arguing that ‘For the King of Great
Britain to pay an official visit to the Czar of Russia was to condone the
atrocities for which the Czar’s Government, and the Czar personally,
must be held responsible.’15 He also declared at the 1912 Labour Party
Conference that ‘if he was called upon to choose between the autoc-
racy of Russia and the present German Government he would most
unhesitatingly cast his lot on the side of Germany as against Russia.’16
The Second International provided MacDonald and Hardie with an
opportunity to make more strenuous denouncements of foreign policy
than they tended to do at home, agreeing with the continental
Marxists that capitalism was the cause of war, and international social-
ism the only alternative. However, the Second International rejected
revolutionary means, and had a rule that only socialist parties and trade
unions favouring parliamentary action should be admitted to its
ranks.17 The Second International also provided ILP delegates with the
opportunity to interact with their continental counterparts, and both
men struck up friendships with many leading socialists, such as Jaurès
in France and Eduard Bernstein and August Bebel of the German
Social Democrats. In particular at this time, Hardie attempted to work
against the rising tide of militarism and anti-German sentiment in the
UK by strengthening links between the British Labour Party and the
German Social Democrats through the Second International.
MacDonald believed that the key to peace was through joining forces
with the German Social Democrats, who were opposed to the growing
German militarism, and argued that one of the primary aims of British
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foreign policy should be to ‘cultivate their friendship, and to help them
in their struggle to democratize Germany.’18 Both men differentiated
between the German government and the German public. A recurring
theme for Ramsay MacDonald was the need to educate the public
about foreign policy in order to curb government’s tendency towards
secret diplomacy and militarism.
The third influence on the fledgling Labour Party was its intellec-
tual wing, epitomised by the Fabian Society, which had been founded
in January 1884.19 Its most prominent members in its early years
included George Bernard Shaw, Annie Besant, and Sidney Webb, who
had joined in 1885 while working as a clerk in the Colonial Office. The
Fabians initially contained both an anarchist wing and a wing that
supported reform through constitutional means. In 1886 they voted to
follow the parliamentary route, rejecting anarchism and revolution,
and thus embraced a form of socialism that had much in common with
French ‘Possibilism’, a type of Marxism which believed in gradual
parliamentary reform.20
Margaret Cole described Fabian thinking as being characterised by
eclecticism, taking ideas from many thinkers including Marx, John
Stuart Mill, and De Tocqueville; by a belief in democracy and parlia-
mentary reform as the political agent of socialism, rather than revolu-
tion and class war; and gradualism.21 Sidney Webb wrote in the first
collection of Fabian essays that,
All students of society who are abreast of their time, Socialists as well as
Individualists, realize that important organic changes can only be (1)
democratic, and thus acceptable to a majority of the people, and prepared
for in the minds of all; (2) gradual, and thus causing no dislocation,
however rapid may be the rate of progress; (3) not regarded as immoral
by the mass of the people, and thus not subjectively demoralizing to them;
and (4) in this country at any rate, constitutional and peaceful.22
The Fabians did not have strong links with the trade unions, and 
were predominantly middle-class, London-based, and somewhat
exclusive, if not elitist. For them, the main role for the working class
was in terms of electing representatives who could then act as a check
on the running of the state by expert administrators from the civil
service. Thus, ‘Fascinated by the prevailing doctrines of Positivism,
with its belief in a gradual evolution of a harmonious and well-ordered
society guided by an educated elite, Webb’s Civil Service background
reinforced his collectivist belief that individuals must subordinate
themselves to the common good.’23 The Fabians, while having links
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with the ILP, were initially committed to working through the
reformist wing of the Liberal Party, rather than calling for the estab-
lishment of a new party. Indeed, Beatrice Webb, who in partnership
with her husband Sidney came to have considerable influence within
the Fabians, not least through their role in establishing the London
School of Economics in 1895, proposed a policy of ‘permeation.’ This
involved converting to Fabian socialism, or at least to parts of the
immediate Fabian programme, people in positions of influence,
whether as politicians or as advisors.24 Such people could remain
members of whatever party they wished, as long as they were
convinced of the superiority of the Fabians’ proposals – a sort of very
English Trotskyite entryism in reverse.
Of all the groups on the left in Britain at this time, the Fabian
Society were the least interested in foreign policy and international
affairs. Issues of war and peace were not of immediate concern to
them, and they had few links with overseas socialist organisations, apart
from sending delegates to the Second International. The one issue that
did impinge on their consciousness was British imperialism, and this
was only because it became impossible not to discuss it once the Boer
War had broken out. As will be demonstrated below, the Fabians were
divided over the Boer War, to the extent that they declined to even
make a public statement on it. Instead, in October 1900 they
published a manifesto intended to clarify their views on imperialism,
called Fabianism and the Empire, but this document was rather
ambivalent. They accepted as ‘a matter of fact’ that the world was
being divided up amongst the Great Powers, and took ‘the problem
before us’ as being how this could be ‘ordered’. They implied that they
supported imperialism, as long as it was carried out by civilised coun-
tries, such as Switzerland, rather than uncivilised countries, such as
Russia. Free trade was seen as a civilising influence across the globe,
and states had a right to trade, which involved ‘a right to insist upon a
settled government which can keep the peace and enforce agreements.’
Where a ‘native government’ could not be relied upon to do this, as in
China, then ‘the foreign trading power must set one up’. They were,
however, against ‘pure piratical conquests of weaker states.’25 Thus,
they ‘not only recognized that the world was being divided up
amongst the Imperialist powers, but in a general way they approved
and justified the tendency. They seem to have been of the opinion that
the states of Western Europe could and would benefit “less developed”
communities by taking over or ruling them, at least for a while.’26
Foote notes that ‘The elitism which came so naturally to the Fabian
38 THE LABOUR PARTY AND THE WORLD
Vic02  10/15/03  2:10 PM  Page 38
leaders went hand-in-hand with a commitment to a socialist Empire.’27
It was proclaimed that, ‘In the Socialist view, the guardianship of the
non-Adult races of the world must be undertaken as a corporate duty
by the Eight Great Powers, either jointly or separately.’28
Following their first foray into imperialism, the Fabians wrote
more widely about the British empire, and the need for successful and
productive management by Britain. They provided a Fabian gradualist
ideology of reform, and the Fabian Colonial Research Bureau had a
particular impact on the party’s plans for imperial reform post-1945.29
Much more cautious in their assessment of the chances of international
working-class solidarity than some of the other component parts of
British socialism, they tended not to be concerned about any possible
conflict between class interest and national interest. The one issue
where they did overcome their particular British perspective on world
politics was in their opinion of the Soviet Union. Many of the high-
profile Fabians supported strong relations with the Soviet Union,
discovering much in their fact-finding missions to recommend about
Soviet planning. 
The fourth main influence on, and grouping within, the Labour
Party were the Marxists. Many of the people who joined the party had
a basic Marxist belief in terms of capitalism being an exploitative class
mode of production, but did not necessarily see Marxism as a political
ideology that should determine policy. The main Marxist grouping at
the time in Britain, the SDF, was involved in the establishment of the
LRC in 1900, and key future Labour Party leaders such Ramsay
MacDonald, George Lansbury and Herbert Morrison were influenced
by their time spent as SDF members.30 Under the autocratic leadership
of Henry Mayers Hyndman, the SDF had a ‘penchant to split on
doctrinal grounds’,31 and many prominent figures on the British left
tended to have only a short stay in the organisation. The SDF disaffil-
iated from the LRC in August 1901 because it would not accept the
SDF doctrine of class war.32 The SDF had moved from a position of
supporting parliamentary reform at its establishment in 1884, to a
semi-revolutionary attitude by 1888, back again to reform by 1890,
and then to supporting a form of revolution rather than peaceful
change by 1900. The SDF argued that war and conflict was brought
about by the capitalist system, and that this was to be resisted through
the means of a general strike, or even revolution. Hyndman had been
greatly influenced by Marx’s Capital, to the extent that Marx felt that
Hyndman had plagiarised him in his work, The Text-book of Democracy:
England for All.33 However, Hyndman was also a very British Marxist,
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being seen by many on his contemporaries as ‘jingoistic’, and tending
to support an independent nationalism rather than any creed of inter-
national working-class solidarity. He strongly supported the British
empire while at the same time advocating Indian self-government, and
published many articles, books and pamphlets criticising British rule
there.34 Hyndman also supported the campaigned for Irish Home
Rule. He was unusual on the left in Britain in that he had started off
as a Conservative radical and was strongly anti-Liberal. The SDF
renamed itself the Social Democratic Party in October 1907, and then
formed the largest section of a newly created British Socialist Party in
1911, which included some rebels from the ILP and representatives of
other socialist societies.35 The British Socialist Party split during the
First World War, when the more nationalistic faction led by Hyndman
broke away to form the National Socialist Party. The internationalist
section of the British Socialist Party opposed the war and, in 1920,
became one of the elements in the British Communist Party.36 While
the SDF and then the British Socialist Party remained relatively small
organisations, Marxism and Marxists to the left of the main political
Labour Party grouping continued to have a massive impact on it. This
was not only through their involvement in the trade unions and party
as, alienated by Hyndman and the SDF they sought to build the
Labour Party into a Marxist party with its basis in the mass labour
movement, but also because of their impact on the left as it sought to
delineate itself as distinct from the far or hard left inhabited by the
Trotskyite and communist groupings.
The fifth grouping, not involved in the actual creation of the
Labour Party as such, but relevant for its influence upon Labour
foreign policy, is the Liberals.37 While the Labour Party led to the
demise of the Liberals, the Liberals in turn had a much greater impact
on the party than tended to be appreciated at the time. There was a
strong radical tradition within the Liberals, particularly on the issue of
foreign policy and international peace, which is wonderfully outlined
in A. J. P. Taylor’s book The Trouble Makers. The radical Liberals,
working within the Parliamentary system at the end of the nineteenth
century, argued against secret diplomacy with its disregard for any
form of popular control of foreign policy, proposing instead that
treaties should be subjected to Parliamentary ratification before being
signed. They tended to see foreign policy as ‘a conspiracy run by the
old order’ that ‘would disappear with the triumph of Radicalism’.
However, when in power the Liberals tended to vote to increase 
the defence estimates and to intervene overseas, and so ‘Imperialism
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was a product of Radical enthusiasm’, as well as being bitterly critiqued
by it.38
In August 1914, following the outbreak of the First World War,
Ramsey MacDonald joined with radical Liberals E. D. Morel, Norman
Angell, Charles Trevelyan and Arthur Ponsonby, to establish the
UDC.39 The UDC was particularly important during the First World
War and the inter-war period for its role in shaping Labour’s foreign
policy. Morel, for example, was editor of the influential journal Foreign
Affairs. His pamphlet, Morocco in Diplomacy, contained the secret
clauses of the Anglo-French entente, documents that revealed the
secret diplomacy at the heart of foreign policy. A. J. P. Taylor points
out that this pamphlet ‘had an influence without parallel.’40 Ramsay
MacDonald said of it: ‘From that time I suspected our diplomacy, and
ceased to believe the assurances given by Ministers in parliament or out
of it.’41
The UDC joined the Labour Party, but members such as E. D.
Morel and Arthur Ponsonby had entered the party ‘mainly because it
gave a hearing to their ideas on foreign policy. Their private attitude
toward the party appeared frequently to be conditioned by a convic-
tion of their own superiority to rank and file and leaders alike.’42 For
instance, Morel, while trying to explain the nature of the British
Labour Party to Count Max Montgelas, wrote that the British Labour
Party ‘has never contained among its leaders intellectuals of even
second-rate or third-rate type … The British Labour Party has never
thought internationally; has never been developed intellectually.’
Though he claimed that ‘In the last six years we have acquired a prodi-
gious moral influence upon this vast mass [of ignorance].’43 These
radical Liberals believed in the extension of national law to the inter-
national arena and the operation of international organisations, with
many of them calling for a League of Nations. Foreign policy should
not be pursued by individual states, aiming at creating alliances for the
purpose of maintaining a balance of power, but through a suprana-
tional body with the capability of securing international agreements. It
was argued in the House of Commons by Lees-Smith during a discus-
sion on German peace proposals that ‘I believe security can only be
obtained by a scheme by which the nations of Europe and outside
agree together that all will guarantee each and each will guarantee all
… we shall achieve the purposes of this War not according to whether
or not we obtain a military decision, but according to whether or not
there is created out of it a league of nations’ with ‘an absolute and 
decisive veto upon any mere aggression’. This was not Utopian, for
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‘We are standing upon the threshold of a new order of the world … If
Christian Europe does not now make up its mind to make an end of
war, I do not see how civilisation as we have known it can go on.’44
This was to be realised more fully by the United Nations (UN), rather
than the settlements following the First World War. Members of the
UDC, such as Hobson, Brailsford and Woolf, published detailed
schemes for a League of Nations. However, not all the UDC agreed
on the need for such a League: ‘Morel ignored the agitation for a
League. Ramsay MacDonald did more: he dissented from it. The
League, in his own favourite word, was “quackery”.’45 For them,
disarmament, open diplomacy and the democratisation of foreign
policy were more important.
The UDC also had a great impact in terms of expressing and
generalising pacifism, though their belief in pacifism was more complex
than often presented. Norman Angell, for instance, railed against his
critics who accused him of arguing in The Great Illusion that war was
impossible; rather, he had argued that a modern nation cannot profit
by conquest, ‘the argument is not that war is impossible, but that it is
futile.’46 These issues are explored in more depth below. Many in the
UDC supported Britain’s role in the First World War, while denounc-
ing the war itself.
Each of these five main influences had their own particular impact
on the development of Labour’s foreign policy. The radical Liberals
obviously contributed greatly to Labour’s liberal internationalism,
while the Marxists, the trade unions and the ILP each contributed to
Labour’s socialist internationalism. The Fabians provided in part the
rationalist underpinning of Labour’s views on international relations,
while the ILP provided the impulse towards common fellowship with
other states. The ILP and the radical Liberals reinforced each other in
their beliefs that militarism and secret diplomacy leads to war. Some of
the radical Liberals influenced the Marxist perspective on the economic
basis of inter-capitalist rivalry. These different contributing streams to
Labour’s foreign policy also often pulled in opposing directions.
Nothing revealed this more than the split over attitudes towards paci-
fism and war, brought to a head with the outbreak of the First World
War in 1914, but it also evident in the other major debates of the time,
in particular over the Boer War and imperialism. What was agreed,
however, by all the contributing groups, was that foreign policy could
not be viewed in isolation, as domestic and international policies were
inter-related and also because foreign policy was affected by economic
relations as well as political ones.
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The Boer War
The Boer War is significant because it raised the profile of foreign
policy within the Labour Party from the very start of its organisational
life. At the first annual conference of the LRC on Friday 1 February
1901, a resolution on the Boer War forwarded by the ILP was unani-
mously agreed to. ‘This Congress, believing the harrowing war in
South Africa to be mainly due to the corrupt agitation of the Transvaal
mineowners, having for its object the acquisition of monopolies and a
cheap supply of coloured and European labour’, urges the government
to seek the termination of hostilities and arbitration in South Africa.47
Keir Hardie argued that ‘The [Boer] war is a capitalist war. The British
merchant hopes to secure markets for his goods, the investor an outlet
for his capital, the speculator more fools out of whom to make money,
and the mining companies cheaper labour and increased dividends.’48
Hardie ‘became passionately absorbed by the Boer War’, denouncing
the war in the Labour Leader between 1899 and 1902.49 He drew on
both Marxist explanations of the Boer War as the result of the
inevitable decay of monopoly capitalism, and radical explanations of
the war as the result of a small band of gold speculators. He became a
member of the Stop-the-War committee, along with Liberals such as
Lloyd George. However, some of the Fabians endorsed the British
position on the war. ‘They supported war with the Boer republics as a
means of achieving “national efficiency” at home and a secure imperial
relationship overseas.’50 When it was suggested that they make a state-
ment condemning the war, the leadership of the society was divided.
Ramsay MacDonald and sixteen other members of the Fabian Society
resigned in protest when the Fabians voted by 259 votes to 217 against
supporting the issuing of a such a statement.51 This was the most
serious division to occur in the Society, and had an impact on the LRC,
where, overall, the Boer war roused much passion:
The socialists were divided; the Fabians were inclined to support it, but
the ILP and the SDF came out on the side of the ‘pro-Boers’ and incurred
great unpopularity. MacDonald and Hardie, in deploring the attack of a
large nation on a small, were hardly to be distinguished from the Liberal
Radicals. With the latter they accepted the Marxist analysis of the SDF –
the war had been brought about by the machinations of international
armament rings sponsored by international financiers.
Indeed, ‘In general the episode revealed many naiveties in the Labour
Party’s approach to foreign affairs.’52
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The Boer War also raised the profile of foreign policy and war
more generally within the fledgling Labour Party. It highlighted all
that was wrong with British imperialism, and became an argument
against it, as the war appeared to be ‘contrary to all our ideals of
national political justice’.53 While during its first year ‘critics of the war
were a distinct minority and ready targets for abuse and persecution’,
as information about Kitchener’s concentration camps filtered
through, the ‘anti-war critics gained a new respectability’.54 Before the
Boer War the imperialists had appeared to win the moral argument
over British imperialism, claiming that they brought about the aboli-
tion of slavery and the creation of schools, railways and health services
to the colonies. The Boer War turned the tables of morality against the
imperialists, as their claim to be fighting for the sake of the native
peoples in South Africa ‘was no good’.55 Campbell-Bannerman’s attack
on the ‘methods of barbarism’ in fact ‘switched the argument from the
causes of the war to the way in which it was being conducted.’ The
‘muddles and disappointments’ of the war ‘discredited not only the
competence, but also the principles, of those who had run it.’56
Furthermore, the Boer War raised questions that would later cause
so many divisions at the outbreak of the First World War, such as the
legitimate role of a political party at odds with government policy
during times of conflict. A. J. P. Taylor argued that these issues receded
following the end of the Boer War, and the overall domestic focus of
the fledgling party is evident in their annual congress reports and elec-
tion manifestos in terms of how little is said on foreign affairs.
However, the early manifestos were themselves remarkably short, so
the small amount of attention given in them to foreign policy does not
necessarily indicate a lack of interest.57 The annual conference reports
do contain a significant number of resolutions on international affairs,
suggesting that the issues of war, militarism and imperialism had not
receded. For example, the party held a special party conference on
disarmament at Leicester in 1911, and attended annual congresses of
the Peace Association.58 At the 1911 annual conference a proposal to
inquire into ‘the utility of the strike’ was defeated, but was passed 
the following year when Bruce Glasier of the ILP moved a resolution
that stated that Conference ‘expresses its approval of the proposal to
investigate and report on whether and how far a stoppage or work,
either partial or general, in countries about to engage in war would 
be effective in preventing an outbreak of hostilities’.59 The issue of a
general strike in response to the outbreak of war was remitted to 
the International Socialist Bureau, with Keir Hardie and Arthur
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Henderson writing to ask each affiliated organisation their views on the
issue, in particular whether they were ‘in favour of the organised
Working Class Movements of all countries being asked to come to a
mutual agreement whereby in the event of war being threatened
between any two or more countries, the workers of those countries
would hold themselves prepared to try to prevent it by a mutual and
simultaneous stoppage of work in the countries affected’.60 While little
came of the inquiry, with the outbreak of the First World War inter-
rupting the International’s efforts to garner support for a general
strike, in Britain the issue was returned to at Labour’s annual confer-
ences in the 1920s.
The Labour Party and the trade unions became increasingly
involved in international affairs in the years leading up to 1914, as
evinced by the conferences and meetings they attended and the
increasing volume of resolutions and writings on international affairs.
Militarism and rearmament involved trade unionists in particular on
two levels. On the one hand, militarism and a concomitant focus on
military strength was something to be deplored as a signal of an
increase in hostilities between countries. On the other hand, rearma-
ment and an arms race provided jobs and a steady wage. Hence, ‘there
was pressure from the dockyard towns, and to a less extent from the
ports, against any opposition which might reduce the number of
jobs.’61 This tension has existed throughout the twentieth century.
However, it has been argued by some that it was not until the outbreak
of the First World War that the Labour Party really took seriously ques-
tions of foreign policy. Attlee noted that ‘The Party … had no real
constructive foreign policy, but shared the views which were traditional
in radical circles.’62 The lack of a ‘constructive foreign policy’ reflected
the problems of pulling together the diverse influences on Labour’s
foreign policy rather than a lack of interest in it. Many in the party did
pay attention to foreign affairs, particularly those from the ILP. At the
1912 annual conference, Keir Hardie moved a resolution on foreign
policy, stating ‘That this Congress, believing the anti-German policy
pursued in the name of the British Government by Sir Edward Grey to
be a cause of increasing armaments, international ill-will, and the
betrayal of oppressed nationalities, protests in the strongest terms
against it.’ This diplomacy had led the government ‘to risk war with
Germany in the interests of French financiers over Morocco, to
condone the Italian outrage in Tripoli, the Russian theft in Mongolia,
and, above all, to join hands with Russia in making an assault on the
national independence and freedom of Persia.’ This resolution was
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passed unanimously. The next resolution was forwarded by J. Bruce
Glasier of the ILP: 
That this Conference, realising the menace to social progress and
working-class welfare involved in War, and the terrible suffering, sacrifice
of life, and waste of material resources which it involves, hereby, as in
previous years, expresses itself against the growing burden of armaments
and protests against Militarism and Compulsory Military Service in all 
its forms; and declares that national disputes should be settled by arbitra-
tion …63
This resolution caused concern to those in the armament industry,
who were concerned about the 130,000 workers directly employed in
armaments, but was unanimously carried.64 These statements, forming
Labour Party policy, were unequivocal on their stance on foreign
policy, and were strongly supported by the party despite its still
disparate strands. 
Imperialism
One of the major issues discussed by those on the left at the beginning
of the twentieth century was that of imperialism. Ramsay MacDonald
and Keir Hardie had long spoken against imperialism, and MacDonald
had argued that ‘Further extensions of the Empire are only the grab-
bings [sic] of millionaires on the hunt.’65 At the first annual conference
in 1901, a resolution was forwarded by the Independent Labour Party
That, inasmuch as modern Imperialism with its attendant militarism is a
reversion to one of the worst phases of barbarism, is inimical to social
reform and disastrous to trade and commerce, a fruitful cause of war,
destructive of freedom, fraught with menace to representative institutions
at home and abroad, and must end in the destruction of democracy, this
Congress desires most earnestly to impress upon the working class the
urgent need there is for combating this dangerous and barbaric develop-
ment in all its manifestations.66
Thus, imperialism was seen as a danger to democracy within Britain as
well as leading to war between states.
Influenced by the experience of the Boer War, J. A. Hobson, a
radical Liberal economist who later joined the Labour Party, wrote
what was to become a major text, Imperialism: A Study, which
appeared in 1902. He argued that imperialism was not caused by
selfish individuals, or by capitalists seeking raw materials or markets,
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but that it was economically determined by under-consumption.
Hobson’s theory of under-consumption argued that capitalists had to
invest profits abroad, to export capital, and that this caused imperial-
ism. ‘The economic root of Imperialism is the desire of strong organ-
ized industrial and financial interests to secure and develop at the
public expense and by the public force private markets for their surplus
goods and their surplus capital. War, militarism, and a “spirited foreign
policy” are the necessary means to this end.’67 Furthermore,
‘Imperialism makes for war and for militarism, and has brought a great
and limitless increase of expenditure of national resources upon 
armaments. It has impaired the independence of every nation which
has yielded to its false glamour.’68 Indeed, according to Hobson,
‘Imperialism is a depraved choice of national life, imposed by self-
seeking interests which appeal to the lusts of quantitative acquisitive-
ness and of forceful domination surviving in a nation from early
centuries of animal struggle for existence.’69 Not only did he provide
an economic explanation for foreign policy, but he also provided an
explanation for the relationship between the working class and imperi-
alism. Imperialism not only benefited financial and industrial interests,
but also appealed to those classes of workers in trades particularly
dependent on government employment or contracts, such as ship-
building, car and aeroplane manufacturing, and the arms trade.70
However, in terms of Hobson’s methodology, Taylor notes that
‘Hobson put the growth of external investments in one column of the
figures, the increase of colonial territories in another; and, since they
were both going up, argued that the caused the other. The conclusion
may have been faulty. Nevertheless its political influence was enor-
mous.’ It provided an explanation for international relations and the
causes of war for both Labour and the radical Liberals, lending them
‘a common ideology and rhetoric’,71 as well as impacting on the
Marxist understanding of international conflict through the subse-
quent study by Lenin.
Lenin used Hobson’s work as the basis for his study of imperial-
ism, first published in 1917, which became the starting point for any
Marxists’ understanding of international relations. Lenin noted that in
Britain, the ‘tendency of imperialism to divide the workers, to encour-
age opportunism among them and to cause temporary decay in the
working class movement’, had revealed itself in the middle of the nine-
teenth century, earlier than in other countries, because of its vast colo-
nial possessions and its monopolist position in the world market.72 For
Lenin, imperialism was the monopoly stage of capitalism, where the
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export of finance capital (the combination of bank and industrial
capital) led to the formation of international capitalist monopolies
which had divided the world among themselves.73 The territorial divi-
sion of the whole world among the greatest capitalist power was now
completed, and this lead to tension and conflict between them. This
viewpoint strongly reflected the Marxist reaction to the First World
War, which had been seen as a conflict between competing imperialist
powers. The more underlying influence of this economic perspective of
imperialism, international relations and conflict, however, was the
perspective that politics and economics were intimately linked and that
it was not possible to separate out the two. This tied in with Norman
Angell’s work, The Great Illusion, though this claimed to destroy the
economic argument for war. He explained that the motivation for the
international rivalry in armaments was due to the view that military
and political power gave a nation commercial advantage, and that it
was to a state’s economic advantage to subjugate a weaker state. This,
Angell argued, was an optical illusion, for it is an impossibility for one
nation to enrich itself by subjugating another.74 While war was entered
into for economic reasons, the victor was left the poorer, and so war
was economically futile.75 Modernisation was leading to the disappear-
ance of state rivalry, but ‘so long as nations believe that in some way
the military and political subjugation of others will bring with it a
tangible material advantage to the conqueror, we all do, in fact, stand
in danger from such aggression.’ The real guarantee of the good
behaviour of one state to another ‘is the elaborate interdependence
which, not only in the economic sense, but in every sense, makes an
unwarrantable aggression of one State upon another react upon the
interests of the aggressor.’76
H. N. Brailsford’s The War of Steel and Gold applied Hobson’s
1902 theory of imperialism, that is, the search for profitable invest-
ment overseas, to the European powers. He critiqued the current faith
in a balance of power, for ‘The balance is a metaphor of venerable
hypocrisy which serves only to disguise the perennial struggle for
power and predominance. When a statesman talks of a balance, he
means a balance favourable to himself.’ He argued that the leaders of
finance capitalism controlled the policy of their respective states, and
that ‘It is an economic motive which underlies the struggle for a
balance of power.’77 The doctrine of continuity in foreign policy in
Britain meant that there was little chance of change, and ‘whichever
party is in power, the Foreign Secretary will always be an Imperialist.’
However, he thought that war between the European powers was
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unlikely, as ‘In Europe, the epoch of conquest is over, and … the fron-
tiers of our modern national states are finally drawn.’78 This book was
published in May 1914, and so he was proved wrong on this point, but
it was sufficiently popular that a second edition was printed in
December 1914 and a third in June 1915, in which he argued that the
Great War demonstrated that the system of alliances had to be replaced
with an international organisation, and laid out a ‘rough tentative
sketch’ of the constitution of a League of Peace, ‘which might direct
its united forces against any Power which breaks the harmony of
Europe.’79
This chapter has demonstrated the impact that the different influ-
ences on the Labour Party had on its developing foreign policy. The
ILP, the trade union movement, the SDF and various Marxist groups,
the Fabian Society and the radical Liberals, each had their own partic-
ular influence over the way that foreign policy and international affairs
was thought about. Each had their own particular analytical framework
for understanding relations between states, and each their own way of
responding to concrete situations. These different influences provided
a rich source for ideas on international politics, but also produced
impulses towards Labour’s appropriate response to particular foreign
policy issues that were sometimes antithetical to each other. This
demonstrates the problems of attempting to generalise about the
nature of Labour’s foreign policy from its very beginnings in 1900,
while also explaining in part the depth of some of the intra-party
conflict on international affairs. These conflicts are examined in more
depth in the following chapters, starting with an assessment of
Labour’s response to the First World War.
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Chapter 3
Labour and the First World War
The Labour Party grew only moderately in parliamentary strength
following its 1906 election success of thirty seats, gaining forty seats in
the election of January 1910, and forty-two seats in the election the
following December.1 However, the labour movement in general was
growing significantly in terms of its economic, social and political
impact, with trade union membership increasing from just under two
million in 1900 to over four million in 1914, at a time of rising union
militancy. Major strike waves broke out in 1908 and from 1910
through to 1914, when the number of working days lost rose from an
average of two-to-three thousand days a year to ten thousand days a
year, and hit a peak of nearly forty-one thousand days a year in 1913.2
Domestic discontent over trade union rights, social conditions,
women’s suffrage and Home Rule for Ireland coincided with rising
international tension.3 The European states became increasingly
competitive over access to markets, with Germany and Italy in partic-
ular seeking to build up their own empires. Alliance diplomacy became
increasingly volatile, and crises broke out in the Balkans in 1908–9
when Austria-Hungary annexed the provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina;
and between French and German interests in Morocco in 1906 and
1911. The arms race between Britain and Germany escalated, as
Germany appeared to be directly preparing to challenge Britain’s naval
supremacy.4 However, despite these tensions, the outbreak of war in
Europe came as a great shock to most of Britain.5 In the spring of 1914
the Cabinet had been focusing its attention on the issue of Home Rule
for Ireland, to the extent that a permanent under-secretary at the
Foreign Office noted in May that ‘I have not seen such calm waters’ in
foreign affairs.6
The crisis that led to the outbreak of war in 1914 occurred when
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Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary,
was assassinated by a group of Serb and Croat nationalists during a visit
to Sarajevo on 28 June 1914. To summarise events very briefly, on 23
July Austria-Hungary presented Serbia with an ultimatum to be met
within forty-eight hours. This included the suppression of any anti-
Austrian propaganda in Serbia, and Austrian participation in the
Serbian investigation into the assassination. Serbia, which was suffering
from domestic political problems at the time, raised objections to this
last demand. Germany pressured Austria-Hungary into declaring war
on Serbia on 28 July, with both thinking that if they were united,
Russia, the Serbs’ ally, would not get involved. Austria-Hungary subse-
quently began mobilising its armed forces. However, Russia supported
Serbia and felt that if it got its ally, France, to stand firm, Germany and
Austria-Hungary would back off. Unfortunately, nobody backed off,
and all the states involved began mobilising their troops. Britain, which
had signed alliances with France and Russia, was under increasing pres-
sure to announce its support for them, but, with divisions in the
Cabinet over what course of action to take, the government was trying
to avoid any public commitment to intervene. This situation changed
somewhat when Germany demanded the right to move its troops
through Belgium in order to launch a pre-emptive strike on France.
Belgium had been guaranteed neutrality through an 1839 treaty by the
main European powers, and Britain was one of the guarantors. The
violation of Belgium’s neutrality, along with Britain’s treaty with
France, the fear that the European balance of power would be under-
mined in Germany’s favour and a wider concern that if Britain
remained aloof from a European-wide conflict its independence and its
powerful role in the world would be undermined, led the British
Cabinet members to reluctantly agree on 2 August 1914 that if
Germany violated France, it would intervene. Germany declared war
against Russia on 1 August and against France on 3 August. Britain
declared war against Germany on 4 August. Germany started moving
its troops through Belgium, and on 6 August the British government
decided to send an expeditionary force to France. On 12 August
Britain declared war against Austria-Hungary.7 The First World War, or
‘Great War’ as it was known at the time, had begun, which was to have
far-reaching impact on British politics in numerous ways. It led to the
introduction of conscription for the first time in 1916, due to the need
to expand Britain’s relatively small land army; the introduction of
government control over parts of the economy vital to the war effort,
including mining, which involved far greater consultation with trade
LABOUR AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR 55
Vic03  10/15/03  2:10 PM  Page 55
union representatives than before; government control of the railways
and shipping; government intervention in the supply and pricing of
food; and the diversion of production to armaments. British defence
expenditure rose from £91 million in 1913 to £1,956 million in 1918,
by which time it accounted for 80 per cent of total government expen-
diture.8 Under Lloyd George’s Ministry of Munitions, production of
guns, for example, rose from 91 thousand in 1914 to over 8 million in
1918, and production of machine guns rose from just 300 in 1914 to
120,900 in 1918.9
In addition to the First World War and its aftermath, this time
period was extremely influential in the development of the Labour
Party’s foreign policy because of events in Russia. The revolution in
Russia in 1917 was to have a resounding impact on Labour, in terms
of temporarily raising hopes for a future based on international social-
ist solidarity, while quickly undermining this through the provision of
a competing socialist world-view, foreign policy and international
movement to that provided by the Labour Party.
Labour and the war
The outbreak of the First World War tested the Labour Party’s atti-
tudes to foreign policy and defence as no previous event had. In
particular, it revealed the problems of forming a party out of an alliance
of left-wing groups. Until 1914, the Labour Party had proclaimed
itself as largely anti-war, and some of it leading members from the ILP
held pacifist views. The annual conference had regularly passed resolu-
tions condemning militarism and war, and in 1912 had passed a reso-
lution calling for an investigation into the extent to which a general
strike in countries about to engage in war would be effective in
preventing the outbreak of hostilities.10 The 1913 conference passed a
resolution that called upon the wives and mothers of the working class
to assist in defeating militarism and war ‘by teaching their children the
meaning of the international solidarity of the workers’.11 At the follow-
ing year’s conference another successful resolution called upon the
conference to resist conscription, increased expenditure on armaments,
and for the TUC ‘to consider joint action of the workers against war
in this and other countries; and further urges the people to use their
political power to democratise foreign policy and to replace our present
system of armed peace by an alliance between all the workers of the
world’.12 Tom Fox, the conference chairman said that ‘The Labour
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Party is here to denounce war and war-mongering in any disguise, to
warn and to arm our fellow workers of all nations against the common
foe.’13
In the run-up to the declaration of war, the Labour Party contin-
ued to pass resolutions denouncing war and urging arbitration. On 2
August, Keir Hardie and Arthur Henderson took part in a mass anti-
war demonstration in Trafalgar Square. On 3 August, Foreign
Secretary Sir Edward Grey announced to the House of Commons that
Britain was committed to supporting the French, and that ‘it is clear
that peace of Europe cannot be preserved.’ Ramsay MacDonald, leader
of the PLP, responded by stating the somewhat ambivalent view that
the Labour Party was against war, but if it were announced, would not
take action against it. ‘We will offer him ourselves if the country is in
danger. But he has not persuaded me it is.’ Indeed, MacDonald argued
that the British ought to have remained neutral.14 The following day
the Liberal government announced that Britain was at war with
Germany. In response, on 5 August the Labour Party’s NEC passed a
resolution by eight votes to four that the war was the result of ‘Foreign
Ministers pursuing diplomatic polices for the purposes of maintaining
a balance of power’, condemned Sir Edward Grey for committing
‘without the knowledge of our people the honour of the country to
supporting France in the event of any war’, and declared ‘That the
Labour Movement reiterates the fact that it has opposed the policy
which has produced the war, and that its duty is now to secure peace
at the earliest possible moment’.15 However, that same day the PLP
decided to support the government’s request for war credits of one
hundred million pounds, which was, in effect, a reversal of the party’s
existing policy. Ramsay MacDonald resigned as leader of the Labour
Party in protest at this particular decision, but more generally over the
PLP’s view that it should support the war, and Arthur Henderson
replaced him.
Once war broke out, it was supported by large sections of the
working class, and trade unions agreed to suspend protective practices
in order to increase war production, with areas such as mining and the
railways coming under semi-government control for the duration. The
Labour Party produced a manifesto in October 1914, The British
Labour Party and the War. This stated that while the party had always
stood for peace, the German military-caste were ‘determined on war if
the rest of Europe could not be cowed into submission.’ It explained
that the party had agreed to support the government’s recruitment
campaign due to a ‘fervent desire to save Great Britain and Europe
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from the evils that would follow the triumph of military despotism’.16
While before the outbreak of war the party had vehemently denounced
militarism and continued to vote against increased military expendi-
ture, once Britain had declared war, the party did not publicly speak
against the war as such, or threaten the war effort in any way. It said
that following the declaration of war, ‘the opinion of the majority of
the Party, after several meetings to consider the situation, crystallised
into a conviction that under the circumstances it was impossible for
this country to have remained neutral.’17 In May 1915, Asquith
decided that the war could not be prosecuted successfully without
bringing other parties into the government. Asquith lacked popularity
within his own party, with many Liberals having been bitterly opposed
to Britain entering into war, and had been criticised more generally
over his prosecution of the war, in particular over the shortage of
munitions. He subsequently invited the Conservatives and the Labour
Party to join him in a coalition government. This ‘caused much search-
ing of hearts’, but the party decided to accept the invitation, and
Arthur Henderson, now also a prominent member of the Fabian
Society, was made president of the Board of Education and a member
of the Cabinet. Henderson became the only Labour Cabinet minister
in this coalition government, while the Conservatives were given nine
ministerial posts, and the Liberals retained thirteen. Henderson himself
was concerned about his position, seeing his post at the Board of
Education as an office ‘for which he did not feel fit’. He also feared
that the government would use him to put across to the Labour Party
and trade unions ‘measures which were certain to arouse resentment,
and that the effect might be to antagonise Labour from the war effort
instead of strengthening its participation.’18 This duly occurred when
Asquith formally proposed in December 1915 a Military Service Bill to
introduce conscription. Conscription was highly controversial within
the Liberal Party as well as Labour, and Sir John Simon, the Liberal
Home Secretary, resigned in protest. Henderson also offered his 
resignation from the Cabinet, but Asquith persuaded the PLP that he
should remain in the government.19 At the January 1916 annual
conference the party voted by 1,796,000 to 219,000 votes against
conscription ‘in any form, as it is against the spirit of British democ-
racy’, and furthermore supported a resolution declaring the confer-
ence’s opposition to the government’s Military Service Bill by
1,716,000 votes to 360,000.20 The TUC had passed resolutions
against conscription in 1913 and 1915.21 However, Labour’s opposi-
tion to conscription then crumbled, and it voted to support temporary
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compulsory military service in April 1916.22 Not only this, but the PLP
and the NEC also agreed that the Labour Party organisation would
join forces in a campaign to enlist military recruits, and that the party
Head Office would be placed at the disposal of the recruitment
campaign.23
The January 1916 Labour Party annual conference had actually
seen a turning point in the party’s position and reaction to the war. It
moved publicly from grudging to outspoken support for Britain’s posi-
tion during the debate on a resolution championing the government
and denouncing German militarism. The resolution stated that,
[Conference] considers the present action of Great Britain and its
Government fully justified in the present war, expresses its horror at the
atrocities committed by Germany and her ally by the callous and brutal
murder of non-combatants, including women and children, and hereby
pledges the Conference to assist the Government as far as possible in the
successful prosecution of the War.24
The mover, James Sexton of the Dock Labourers, noted that this reso-
lution ‘was practically word for word in substance and in fact’ the same
as the one passed by the TUC in September 1915, and declared that
‘He was for this War and for all the risks associated with it, for the alter-
native was worse than any risk … If Germany won, nothing else in
God’s world would matter!’ Another trade unionist posed the question
of when there were trade union members fighting in the services, how
could any trade unionists tell his members that he had voted against
the war? The resolution was controversial, and Ramsay MacDonald
spoke against it. He also called for toleration, with a plea not to let
differences of opinion over the war become ‘reasons for permanent
dispute in their midst’, but with little real effect. He was opposed by
the speaker for the NEC, who asked the conference, ‘Who has the
right to speak on behalf of the Labour Movement? Was it the small
coterie of the Independent Labour Party or the great Trade Unions of
the country who … carried the same resolution with but two or three
dissentients [sic] in that very city four months ago?’ After an extensive
and emotional debate, the resolution was passed by 1,502,000 votes to
602,000.25
Thus, the First World War led to a widening gulf within the
Labour Party between two competing perspectives. The majority
supported the war once it was underway, and also supported the coali-
tion government. Some of the working class actually prospered under
the war due to the boom created by weapons production, ensuring
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employment and good wages. The minority still supported the pre-war
policy of international solidarity, and put this before what they saw as
national self-interest. G. D. H. Cole noted that in Britain, as in other
countries, 
[T]here were really two anti-war oppositions, the one, headed interna-
tionally by Lenin, revolutionary and entirely unconcerned with the merits
of the case advanced by any capitalist government, and the other either
out-and-out pacifist or working for peace by negotiation, but opposed to
any attempt to invoke revolutionary violence as a means of ending the war
by international working-class revolution.26
The ILP, led by Ramsay MacDonald, formed the centre of the
opposition to British foreign policy and the war, and was criticised by
the Labour Party and the TUC for doing so.27 It was argued that, had
events been left to the ILP, ‘the Germans would be here now.’28 While
there was no great public schism between the two parties, the ILP lost
much of its influence within the Labour Party during the war. When
Keir Hardie died in 1915, at the resulting by-election in Merthyr the
ILP candidate was defeated by the trade union candidate standing for
the Labour Party who stood on a platform of support for the war. At
the 1916 Labour Party annual conference, a resolution proposed by
the ILP criticising British foreign policy, which before the war would
have been uncontroversial, was defeated.29
The Fabians were more divided over the stance to take in response
to the war. Following their brief interest in foreign affairs caused by the
Boer War, they had returned to their domestic focus, and had said little
on international relations. Upon the outbreak of the First World War,
they held a discussion on the attitude to take to the war, which demon-
strated divisions between the ‘old guard’ Fabians such as the Webbs
who, like the Labour Party, supported the war, and the newer genera-
tion of Fabians who supported the ILP’s opposition to the war.30
However, in the end, Edward Pease, Secretary of the Fabian Society,
noted that ‘In accordance with the rule which forbids it to speak,
unless it has something of value to say, the Society has made no
pronouncement and adopted no policy’ on the First World War.31 This
was in much the same way as it had made no pronouncement and
adopted no policy on the Boer War. The main Marxist organisation,
the British Socialist Party was split over the issue of the First World
War. In 1916 Hyndman’s more nationalistic faction withdrew from the
British Socialist Party to form the National Socialist Party, where
Hyndman campaigned for a more vigorous prosecution of the war
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abroad, while at the same time arguing for better conditions for the
working class at home, and working on plans for the nationalisation of
the railways and greater government control of industry.32 The remain-
der of the British Socialist Party opposed the war, with some of its
members being imprisoned for their political activities and for object-
ing to military service. In its Huddersfield branch alone, at one point
twenty-five members were imprisoned.33
While the importance of the ILP and the other opponents of the
war declined at this time, paradoxically the UDC gradually increased in
importance. Morel, the Honorary Secretary and Treasurer of the
UDC, proclaimed that the organisation ‘has one supreme end and
aim’. This ‘is to create a public opinion in Great Britain, and eventu-
ally throughout the world, which will compel the so-called civilised and
the so-called Christian Governments of Europe to settle their differ-
ences in future by some other means than the massacre and mutilation
of multitudes of human beings.’34 In its first pamphlet, The Morrow of
War, the UDC said that it was set up to secure a new course of policy
that would prevent the peril of war befalling the British empire again.
It believed that ‘First, it is imperative that the war, once begun, should
be prosecuted to a victory for our country. Secondly, it is equally
imperative, while we carry on the war, to prepare for peace.’35 The
UDC was formally constituted at an inaugural meeting on 17
November 1914. At this meeting four ‘cardinal points’ were adopted.
These were, first, that no province was to be transferred from one
country to another without the consent of the population. Second, no
treaty or agreement was to be entered into by the government without
the consent of Parliament. ‘Adequate machinery for ensuring demo-
cratic control of foreign policy shall be created.’ Third, British foreign
policy was to aim not at maintaining a balance of power but at
concerted action between the powers to set up an international council
with machinery for securing an abiding peace. Fourth, Britain should
propose, as part of any peace settlement, a drastic disarmament agree-
ment between the powers, the general nationalisation of armaments
industries, and controls over the export of armaments between states.36
The UDC and the ILP co-operated in their anti-war activities, and
in this way the ILP in general, and Ramsay MacDonald in particular as
a leading member of both groups, were to have an indirect impact on
Labour’s thinking about war and peace. While there was sometimes
friction between the two groups, both came under virulent, and occa-
sionally violent, criticism for their stance on the First World War.37
Marquand notes that ‘the very fact that both groups were swimming
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against one of the strongest and fiercest tides of opinion in recent
British history created in both an exalted, almost religious, atmosphere
of dedication and solidarity – the solidarity of persecution.’38
The UDC blamed the outbreak of the Great War on balance-of-
power politics, secret diplomacy, the arms race between states, and the
arms trade.39 They were not pacifists as such, though they abhorred
war. While condemning war in general, and blaming the First World
War on all the participants rather than seeing it as a simple fight
between good and evil, the UDC believed that Britain must win the
war.40 They were critical of the Foreign Office, believing that it had
become ‘avowedly and frankly autocratic.’41 They saw the war as the
failure of diplomacy, and ‘Instead of taking advantage of the marked
growth in the pacific inclinations of the peoples of the world’, states-
men ‘have insisted on encouraging between the Governments of
Europe the most deadly and determined competition in preparation
for war that the world has ever known.’42 Thus, in the future, foreign
policy should not be left in the hands of the professional diplomats and
statesmen. Rather, there should be some form of popular control over
foreign policy. As it was not in the interests of the public to go to war,
they would resist aggression. Public opinion, if allowed to play a role
in international affairs, would act to prevent war. The UDC believed in
a rational, evolutionary view of the world, that modern, civilised,
educated people, if only made aware of the facts, would choose peace
not war, and so it was possible to get rid of war by willing it so and
simply creating the necessary international machinery for conciliation
and peace. 
The machinery for peace was to be through a League of Nations.
The suspicion and fear caused by exclusive alliances could be done
away with by extending national law to the international arena and
creating a League of Peace, ‘which should undertake, in the event of a
dispute, to offer mediation’. If one or both sides then resisted media-
tion, the League would throw its weight against the greatest aggressor
though a system of collective security. ‘If a sufficient number of nations
entered into such a League, they could make aggressive war obviously
doomed to failure, and could thereby secure the cessation of war.’43
Richard Crossman described the League as an attempt ‘to apply the
principles of Lockeian liberalism to the building of a machinery of
international order’.44
With hindsight it is possible to criticise the UDC for being unduly
optimistic about the potential nature of international relations and the
role that public opinion could play, as E. H. Carr scathingly did in
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1939 when he compared the ‘utopian’ view of international politics as
propounded by groups such as the UDC with what he described as the
‘realist’ perspective, which emphasised the over-riding importance of
power in international politics and the competitive nature of relations
between states in their pursuit of national power.45 However, at the
time, the views of the UDC anticipated and helped shape the general
consensus about the ability of the League of Nations and open
covenants to prevent war in the 1920s and 1930s. Indeed, the UDC
developed ideas about foreign policy which have remained with the
Labour Party, such as the need for the control of the arms industry,
and the importance of the role of public opinion, particularly in
preventing aggression between states.
One consequence of the First World War was that it recast divi-
sions within the various groupings of the Labour Party, with the ILP
declining in importance in particular. Another was that it led to Labour
MPs, most notably Arthur Henderson, entering government for the
first time. The coalition government that Asquith had formed in May
1915 was faltering, and on 5 December 1916 he resigned rather than
accept demands from his ministerial colleagues that he establish a war
committee led by Lloyd George to co-ordinate Britain’s war effort.46
Lloyd George replaced him as Prime Minister on 6 December, forming
a new coalition government. Lloyd George held a meeting with
members of the Labour Party the following day at which he offered
places in a coalition government. Beatrice Webb noted in her diary that
‘The pro-war Labour members drank in his sweet words; the pacifists
maintained a stony silence whilst Sidney [Webb] and one or two of the
waverers asked questions to which Lloyd George gave non-committal
answers.’ However, she did feel that this signified defeat for the paci-
fist wing of the party, as ‘From the narrow standpoint of the pacifist
movement, as a sect, the inclusion of pro-war Labour members in the
Lloyd George Government may be a fortunate circumstance – a
discredit to their warlike opinions.’47 Conference had in fact voted
overwhelmingly, by 1,674,000 votes to 269,000, to support entry into
the Cabinet in 1916, and supported it retrospectively in 1917.48
Henderson duly became a member of the inner War Cabinet, John
Hodge became the newly created Minister of Labour, with four others
in more minor posts.49 However, during 1917 the atmosphere
changed, as the United States joined the Allies, and Russia defected
after the October Revolution.50 Tensions quickly developed within the
Labour Party over whether to stay in the war government or not, espe-
cially over the issue of British relations with Russia.
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The 1917 Russian Revolution
Events in Russia caused another rethink in foreign policy, and a volte-
face back to the anti-war and internationalist sentiments of the pre-war
years. For example, in January 1917, the Labour Party had rejected an
invitation to attend an international socialist conference in Stockholm
on war aims and peace plans, but accepted it, after much prevarication,
once Russia had indicated its willingness to take part following the
revolution of February 1917.51 ‘Joy – an admixture of relief and pleas-
ure – was the characteristic British reaction’ to this revolution in
Russia, and this was not confined to the Labour Party.52 In the House
of Commons, Chancellor of the Exchequer Bonar Law moved the
government’s statement of congratulation, saying that, ‘This House
sends to the Duma its fraternal greetings and tenders to the Russian
people its heartiest congratulations upon the establishment among
them of free institutions’, though he could not resist tendering his
compassion for the deposed Tsar.53 Nye Bevan later described the
emotional and psychological impact of the revolution thus:
I remember so well what happened when the Russian revolution
occurred. I remember the miners, when they heard that the Czarist
tyranny had been overthrown, rushing to meet each other in the streets
with tears streaming down their cheeks, shaking hands and saying: ‘At last
it has happened.’ Let us remember in 1951 that the revolution of 1917
came to the working class of Great Britain, not as social disaster, but as
one of the most emancipating events in the history of mankind. Let us
also remember that the Soviet revolution would not have been so
distorted, would not have ended in a tyranny, would not have resulted in
a dictatorship, would not now be threatening the peace of mankind, had
it not been for the behaviour of Churchill, and the Tories at that time.54
In response to the Russian Revolution of February 1917, the
United Socialist Council, made up of the various British socialist
organisations that had temporarily joined forces in 1916, organised the
Leeds Convention of June 1917. This was described by Ralph
Miliband as ‘perhaps the most remarkable gathering of the period’, for
it brought together both the revolutionaries and constitutionalists on
the left.55 Graubard is less positive with his description that, ‘The Leeds
Convention stands out as one of the great anomalies in British Labour
experience’, for leaders such as Ramsay MacDonald and Philip
Snowden, who had always argued that it was necessary to work inside
the parliamentary system, agreed to a resolution creating extra-
parliamentary workers’ councils. ‘The most generous interpretation
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would be that they were themselves swept along by the emotion of the
mass. The least generous would be that they knew that nothing would
come of the whole effort and simply enjoyed the platform provided
them.’56
There were 1,150 delegates present at the Leeds Convention,
including Ernest Bevin, Ramsay MacDonald, Philip Snowden, Tom
Mann, Ben Tillet, Bertrand Russell and Sylvia Pankhurst. Four resolu-
tions were passed by the convention. First, one proposed by Ramsay
MacDonald was simply that the convention ‘hails the Russian
Revolution. With gratitude and admiration it congratulates the Russian
people upon a Revolution which has overthrown a tyranny.’ The
second resolution supported the declaration on foreign policy and war
aims of the Russian Provisional Government, and the third called for a
charter of civil liberties establishing complete political rights for all.
The fourth, and most controversial, called for the establishment of
workers’ and soldiers’ councils in Britain ‘for initiating and co-ordinat-
ing working class activity’, which some interpreted to mean extra-
constitutional and revolutionary activity. A message was also sent to the
Russian Workers’ Councils that the convention ‘has today endorsed
Russia’s declaration of foreign policy and war aims, and has pledged
itself to work through its newly constituted Workmen’s and Soldiers’
Council for an immediate democratic peace’.57 The conference is
significant for it united both constitutionalists and revolutionaries, and
‘Reacting to the mood of their audience, mild trade unionists talked
like Bolsheviks and for a few hours, within a crowded hall, a socialist
revolution in Britain seemed a viable proposition.’58 White, however,
has argued that the Leeds Convention ‘is better understood in a paci-
fist than in a revolutionary perspective’, and reflected an opposition to
the continuation of the First World War in the pursuit of total victory.59
The euphoria was short-lived. The Leeds conference was described
by the Labour Party as being ‘unrepresentative’, and it stated that any
members of the party present were there as individuals, and not as
representatives of the party.60 Not unsurprisingly, the appeal to estab-
lish British workers’ soviets was not carried through. However, the first
major problem that the Russian Revolution caused for the Labour
Party was created by Russia’s request for British involvement in a
meeting of the International Socialist Congress, made up of all
Socialist and Labour Parties, including Germany, to be held in
Stockholm to discuss war aims. This caused tensions within the move-
ment. The party’s NEC rejected an invitation in May 1917 to send a
delegation to the Stockholm conference,61 but then voted in favour of
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attendance at the special Labour Party conference of August 1917
following a plea from Arthur Henderson. Henderson had just returned
from an official visit to Russia, sent by an alarmed British government
as ‘its most conciliatory representative’ to St Petersburg to find out
‘what might be the result of the changes’.62 He told the Labour Party
conference that the Stockholm meeting would be held with or without
British involvement, and ‘it would be highly inadvisable and perhaps
dangerous for the Russian representatives to meet representatives from
enemy and neutral countries alone’. As long as Russia agreed that the
conference would be for consultative purposes rather than being oblig-
atory and binding, then the Labour Party should attend.63 However,
the British government had announced that it would refuse passports
to delegates, and debate still raged within the Labour movement on
whether minority groups, such as the ILP and the British Socialist
Party, should be represented at Stockholm. Another vote on whether
Britain should attend the Stockholm conference was held. This
resulted in a tiny majority of 1,234,000 to 1,231,000, but in the end
there was no British delegation.64 Henderson, who supported
Stockholm and all that it stood for in terms of securing international
socialist co-operation in pursuit of peace, resigned from the Cabinet on
11 August following the ‘doormat incident’, when Lloyd George kept
him waiting for an hour outside the doors of a Cabinet meeting while
his Cabinet colleagues discussed his recent activities in promoting the
Stockholm conference.65 This did not result in Labour itself with-
drawing from the coalition government, for Henderson was replaced
in the inner War Cabinet by G. N. Barnes. This incident demonstrated
the conflicting tensions within the party between socialist solidarity
and national concerns, with a tenacious feeling against any negotia-
tions with socialists from enemy countries, and was prescient of the
troubles to come over the establishment of a post-war Socialist
International. 
These events also had an enduring impact on the Labour Party in
that Henderson, slightly bruised from his experience of government,
then devoted himself to reorganising the Labour Party’s structure,
drawing up the new constitution that was approved in 1918.66 He 
was determined to change the party from a collection of affiliated
organisations on the left to an organised, national, centralised but
broad-based and moderate socialist party that was resistant to the
extra-parliamentary and revolutionary left, for his trip to Russia had
convinced him of the need to prevent extremists from taking control
of the party.67 He was also determined to create an organisation that
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would be able to exert more influence in parliamentary politics, follow-
ing what he perceived as the coalition government’s shoddy treatment
of the labour movement. Labour’s international committee, the
Advisory Committee on International Questions, was set up as part of
the major reorganisation of its machinery for the handling of foreign
policy. This body had responsibility for making recommendations to
the Executive and the Parliamentary Party on foreign policy. Allied
intervention in Russia was the first important issue that the committee
discussed. At its first meeting of 30 May 1918, Sidney Webb was
appointed chairmen, and Leonard Woolf secretary. Members included
H. N. Brailsford, G. D. H. Cole, Arnold Toynbee and, from July,
Ramsay MacDonald.68
If the Russian Revolution of February 1917 had created a complex
situation for the Labour Party to respond to, the October Revolution,
which saw the more militant Bolsheviks oust the Mensheviks,
compounded this. At this time there was no Communist Party in
Britain, only the British form of Marxism propounded by the British
Socialist Party and Hyndman’s newly formed National Socialist Party.
However, ‘Bolshevik Russia was already becoming a focus of loyalty for
the extreme left in all countries – and at the same time, or course, a
focus of opposition for the right, whose friends among the Russian
Socialists had been driven from power and in many cases were fleeing
into exile.’69 Many on the left were dismayed by the violence surround-
ing the second revolution, and ‘The direct and muscular Marxism of
the Bolsheviks was alien to the Fabian gradualists of the Labour Party
and the socialist pacifists who led the ILP.’70 Events in Russia radi-
calised the Labour Party, in that it provided a socialist ‘utopia’ for
those on the far left to look to, work with and emulate, and, it is
argued, major revolutions ‘exert a demonstration effect’ to those in
other countries who also seek to overthrow the state.71 The establish-
ment of the Bolshevik regime also provided a communist foe for those
on the centre and centre-right of the labour movement to be fearful of,
thus deepening existing divisions between the revolutionary and the
parliamentary left. As Skocpol points out, revolutions ‘also affect those
in other countries who oppose revolutionary ideals but are compelled
to respond to the challenges or threats posed by the enhanced national
power that has been generated’ by a revolution.72
This tension was given an added dimension when the British
Socialist Party, along with some smaller parties, formed the
Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) on 1 August 1920. The
instructions from Moscow were for the CPGB to affiliate to the
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Labour Party and convert the bulk of the party to the communist
cause. The CPGB’s requests for affiliation were turned down in 1921
and 1922, and at the 1925 Labour Party annual conference a consti-
tutional resolution proscribing all dealings with the CPGB was
passed.73 In March 1919, the first meeting of the Third International
(also called the Comintern or Communist International), was held in
Moscow, which proclaimed the arrival of world revolution. Part of its
role was to bolster communist parties around the world, which were to
be loyal to Moscow, follow Comintern policy and submit to its author-
ity. However, while Moscow supported the fledgling CPGB, financially
and otherwise, it also undermined its legitimacy on the left through
the insistence that it be loyal to Moscow above all else. As Jupp notes,
the establishment of the Comintern gave the leaders of the Labour
Party the opportunity to exclude from its membership Marxists who
wished to join it. This in turn ‘hastened the process by which the
Labour Party developed into a unitary political party in alliance with
the trade unions and with a commitment to parliamentary socialism’.
Indeed, before the Bolshevik revolution, the issue of whether Marxists
belonged within the Labour Party, was a matter for individuals.74 After,
it became an issue of party unity and control.
Another attempt to affiliate to the Labour Party was made in
1935, as part of the campaign for a ‘United Front’ against fascism,
which led the party leadership to delineate the difference between it
and the Communists in its statement ‘British Labour and
Communism’. This stated that for nearly twenty years the Communist
Party had sought to subvert the British labour movement, and
‘Throughout the whole period the British Labour Movement has been
subjected to one long stream of invective and vilification by the
Communist Press subsidised by Russian money.’ The sympathetic
interest that British labour had shown in the Soviet Union ‘has been
qualified by growing resentment against Russian effort through the
Communist International to establish and finance revolutionary
Communist Parties in other countries with the object of destroying
existing democratic industrial and political Labour Movements, and of
bringing about the overthrow of the existing social system by
violence.’75
The second 1917 revolution also had a particular impact on
Labour’s thinking on foreign policy in that it provided a major issue 
of contention between Labour and its Liberal and Conservative 
opponents. British foreign policy towards Russia following the
October Revolution was based on non-recognition of the Soviet
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Union, and limited intervention. The Labour Party bitterly opposed
this, seeing it as the cause for bad relations between the Soviet Union
and Europe, for ‘By maintaining troops against Russia, the Allied
Governments violate in their most flagrant manner the right of the
Russian people to [govern] themselves … They are thereby multiply-
ing the reasons for civil war in Russia.’76 The Labour Party launched a
manifesto in January 1920 that called for the ‘Complete raising of the
Blockade and a complete peace with Russia.’ It also called for full
recognition of the Soviet government, while pointing out that ‘Such a
formal recognition of a Government would no more imply moral
approval of it than did our formal recognition of the Tsar’s
Government.’77 One of the main actions of the first Labour govern-
ment of 1924 was to recognise the Soviet Union. However, Labour
was never fully comfortable with the Soviet Union, and large sections
of the party quickly came to see it as a source of conflict in foreign
policy, as will be demonstrated in the following chapters.
The Internationals, the post-war settlement 
and establishment of the League of Nations
One major consequence of the outbreak of the First World War 
was that it demonstrated the problems of transcending national 
loyalties in order to reach the goal of international socialist solidarity,
and this was illustrated most clearly by the collapse of the Second
International, the main international socialist body at that time. The
Second International had had an impact on the development of
Labour’s foreign policy in its early years, providing a forum for 
British socialists to meet with their overseas counterparts, and an
opportunity to focus on international issues. The split between parlia-
mentary and revolutionary socialists within the Second International
had become institutionalised when it moved to exclude anarchists and
anti-parliamentarians from its meetings, but one remaining notable
division was over the issue of whether to hold a general strike in the
face of war. Within the British contingent, Keir Hardie and the ILP
tended to support a general strike, while most Fabian socialists and
some of the other members of the Labour Party did not. However,
Keir Hardie and Arthur Henderson had proposed a resolution
supporting the calling of a general strike to be used, if political action
had failed, to prevent the outbreak of war. All the members of the
Second International had been invited to comment on this resolution,
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and at an extraordinary Congress of the Second International held at
Basle in 1912 the resolution had been passed.78 This meant that at the
outbreak of the First World War, the policy of the Second International
was to call for a general strike in response to the threat of war.
However, while the Second International held a series of rallies across
Europe in the summer of 1914, with Hardie leading an anti-war
demonstration in London on 2 August, its plans for mass popular
resistance in the face of war came to little, and it disintegrated into
different camps.79
Despite the collapse of the Second International, the Labour Party
still kept in close contact with some of its European counterparts.
Issues that united the British and European socialist parties were a
belief that labour should have a role in the drawing up of the post-war
settlement; that there should be some form of international socialist
body to replace the Second International; and that socialist parties
should campaign for the establishment of an international body to
arbitrate between states and so prevent war. A conference was held by
the Socialist Parties of the Allied Nations in London in February 1915,
where it was agreed that,
On the conclusion of the war the working classes of all the industrial
countries must unite in the [Socialist] International in order to suppress
secret diplomacy, put an end to the interests of militarism and those of the
armament makers and establish some international authority to settle
points of difference among the nations by compulsory conciliation and
arbitration, and to compel all nations to maintain peace.80
The aim of internationalism and the commitment to an international
federation of nations was then formally incorporated into the Labour
Party’s constitution, which was adopted in February 1918. This
committed the party
To co-operate with the Labour and Socialist organisations in other coun-
tries and to assist in organising a Federation of Nations for the mainte-
nance of freedom and peace, for the establishment of suitable machinery
for the adjustment and settlement of international disputes by conciliation
or judicial arbitration and for such other international legislation as may
be practicable.81
The commitment to international socialist co-operation, to the estab-
lishment of an international body for the socialist parties and to the
establishment of an international body to act as a federation of nations,
was clear. At a joint TUC and Labour Party conference on post-war
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aims on 28 December 1917, a resolution calling for a League of
Nations was accepted.
The Labour Party took part in two Inter-Allied Conferences of
Labour and Socialist Parties, held in London in February and in
September 1918. The second of these passed resolutions strongly
supporting the establishment of a League of Nations and welcomed
the fourteen points laid down by President Wilson. Following a speech
by Kerensky, a moderate socialist who had been the Russian Prime
Minister from July 1917 until he was ousted by the October
Revolution, a resolution was passed that said that ‘the present effort of
the Allied Governments to assist the Russian people must be influ-
enced only by a genuine desire to preserve liberty and democracy in an
ordered and durable world peace in which the beneficent fruits of the
Revolution shall be permanently secure.’82 It denounced the Versailles
Treaty for its harsh treatment of Germany, in particular the ‘War Guilt’
clause.83 This stated that ‘Germany accepts the responsibility of
Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to the Allied
governments and their nationals imposed on them by the aggression of
Germany and her allies.’84 Following this, an international labour and
socialist conference was held in Berne in January 1919, at which steps
were taken to reconstitute the Second International, which also
became known as the Berne International. Resolutions were passed
that welcomed German involvement in the conference, and said that
this ‘has convinced the Conference that, from now onward, the united
working classes of the whole world will prove the most powerful guar-
antee for the suppression of all militarism and of every attempt to
destroy international democracy.’85 Despite the First World War
providing evidence to the contrary, the Labour Party still expressed the
belief that international socialist solidarity was possible.86
Another socialist international, the ‘Two-and-a-Half ’ Inter-
national, was established shortly afterwards, which aimed to unite the
new Second International with the recently established Third
(Communist) International. This body only existed for a short time,
merging with the Second International in May 1923 at a conference in
Hamburg to form the new Labour and Socialist International (LSI).
This conference declared the post-war situation to be an ‘imperialist
peace’. It argued that: ‘The imperialist war had for its objectives the
conquest of the world’s wealth and ended in the destruction of this
wealth.’ However, ‘The Peace Treaties violate all economic principles;
… They have brought to the defeated nations insecurity and the
menace of continuous violent oppression.’ Therefore ‘Labour opposes
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to the policy of imperialism its policy of peace’, and ‘One of the most
important tasks of the workers of all countries is to watch over the
foreign policy of their Governments.’87 The Labour and Socialist
International continued in existence up to the Second World War, with
its headquarters initially in London, and then in Zurich. Arthur
Henderson was its president until 1929. The LSI continued the work
of the Second International, focusing on the gradual improvement of
international relations and of working-class conditions by
Parliamentary and trade union efforts.88 However, the prospects for
international socialist co-operation deteriorated through the rivalry of
the LSI and the Third International, with the Third International
instructed to wage a war on centrists, revisionists and social democrats,
while the LSI sought to protect itself from dangerous revolutionaries.
The Labour Party’s international role expanded in the immediate
post-war years, with a greater influence within the Socialist Inter-
national than before, partly as a result of the decline in the role of the
German socialists within the International. The party also had a greater
confidence in its right to have a role at the international level. This was
largely evinced through its lobbying on the post-war international
settlement, and on its stringent critique of the Versailles Treaty. A. J. P.
Taylor has suggested that the Versailles settlement was condemned by
the party before it was even made.89 Winkler has argued that the 
immediate reaction to the peace settlement ‘was bitter, and it was
virtually unanimous’. Official party statements denounced the 
unilateral disarmament of Germany, and warned that the burden of
reparations might ruin Germany and therefore endanger the entire
European economy. They also made it clear that ‘the party considered
France – strong, armed, and in their view aggressive – a much greater
danger to European stability than was Germany.’90 Certainly
MacDonald argued that the Versailles Treaty would result in ‘unsettle-
ment and war’ and referred to the Paris peace negotiations as ‘a heart-
less farce sinking into a melancholy tragedy’.91 However, Labour’s
major contribution to the post-war settlement was over its drive to
create a League of Nations, which was founded at the Paris Peace
Conference on 24 April 1919. 
Winkler also highlights that the Labour Party criticised the League
of Nations once it was established. ‘As for the League of Nations,
Labor, whose agitation and enthusiasm had helped to make it possible,
was profoundly disappointed. It was disappointed with the league’s
membership, its structure, and its proposed functions.’92 This is too
strong an interpretation, for Labour’s attitude towards the League was
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more complex than this suggests. The party welcomed the League, and
argued that it was better fitted than its political opponents to make a
success of the League. The party felt a sense of pride in the lobbying
role it had played in the League’s creation. However, the party had
major reservations about it as it was constituted. It regretted that it was
a league of governments, and not an assembly of delegates chosen
from national parliaments, that is, elected representatives. Labour had
wanted a League that was ‘so strong in its representative character and
so dignified by its powers and respect that questions of national
defence sink into the background of solved problems’.93 In 1919 the
Labour Party and TUC held a special congress to discuss the Covenant
of the League of Nations. While it welcomed the League, the congress
drew up a list of twenty-two proposals for amendments to the
Covenant. These included the proposal that the League be under the
control of a body of elected delegates, and not the Executive Council;
that all countries, including Russia and Germany, be invited to join the
League, as long as they agree to abide by its rules and decisions; and
that the manufacture of armaments be under the direct control of the
League.94 The Labour Party was afraid that the League and the peace
settlement were designed to shore up balance-of-power politics. It was
argued that ‘Each successive Peace Treaty, and almost every decision of
the Supreme Council, has been conceived in a spirit of imperialism and
national aggrandisement utterly inconsistent with the professed aims
with which the country waged war’, whereas the League of Nations
had so far ‘been quietly strangled by the victorious Powers almost at
the moment of its birth’.95 By excluding certain countries, and failing
to address the issue of militarism and the causes of war, it was feared
that the League would be undermined in its ability to carry out its role.
Despite this, the League still provided the Labour Party with hope for
the future, and was seen as the mechanism through which international
disputes could be settled though conciliation and arbitration, and as
the key to maintaining international peace. 
As a consequence of the First World War and the resulting delib-
erations over the establishment of a League of Nations, some on the
left, and in particular the UDC, began to wonder whether nationalism,
rather than capitalism, was at the heart of militarism and war. The
doctrine ‘that peace could result only from national self-determination,
had left is followers in disarray. It had caused chaos at the Paris peace
conference, and it was increasingly clear that this mode of thought lent
itself far more readily to right-wing authoritarianism … than it did to
any form of parliamentary democracy.’96 Norman Angell pointed out
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that ‘Governments formed by Socialist, Labour or Pacifist parties
continue in some measure the policies of their bourgeois and
Imperialist predecessors.’ As he explained, the problem of the ‘disor-
derly’ state in the international system ‘is not created by Capitalism,
nor would it be solved by Socialism. It is the product not of Capitalism
but Nationalism. And Socialist States which were also Nationalist
would have even more cause for quarrel than States which permit indi-
viduals to form economic organizations which are often in fact inter-
national, which function in large degree irrespective of national
barriers.’97 The irony of the situation was that the ILP had declined in
its importance within the Labour Party due to its opposition to the
party’s position on the war, and had also declined in its international
role as the Labour Party increased in its. However, the UDC, which
had shared some of the ILP’s opposition to the war and included ILP
members, in particular Ramsay MacDonald, gradually built up influ-
ence on the left so that when the war was over they became a guiding
force for the Labour Party on foreign policy. Many of Labour’s ideas
on a League of Nations, on the importance of self-determination, on
the dangers of the Versailles Treaty, originally came from the UDC. ‘By
1918 UDC policy had virtually become Labour Party policy – the anti-
war ILP-ers had joined the UDC and the anti-war Liberals had joined
the Labour Party. Both groups together dominated the new Labour
Party Advisory Committee on International Questions.’98 This
Committee ‘was of the utmost importance’ during the 1920s.99
Despite the divisions and contentions caused by the First World War,
not only within the Labour Party but within international socialism as
a whole, by the early 1920s the internationalist, anti-war section of the
party held sway, with a resolution agreeing to ‘oppose any War …
whatever the ostensible object of the war’ being passed at the 1922
annual conference.100 Their views were to remain dominant until the
late 1930s.
In conclusion, the first major test of Labour’s developing world-
view was over the response to the outbreak of the First World War. 
This undermined certain meta-principles of Labour’s ideology, namely
an optimistic view of human nature, and a belief in progress and in
international socialist solidarity, while at the same time providing
evidence of the disastrous effects of militarism, secret diplomacy and
imperialism, which Labour had been agitating against. Internationally,
the First World War demonstrated that socialist parties had not yet
found a way to overcome their national loyalties, nor achieved interna-
tional socialist solidarity, with the collapse of the Second International
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following the outbreak of war in 1914. At home, the war led to bitter
divisions within the Labour Party over foreign and defence policy. The
majority of the party supported the war and the coalition government
and put national interest before class interest. The minority of the party
still supported the pre-war policy of international solidarity, and put
this before national self-interest. However, out of this conflict devel-
oped an increased desire for a new approach to world affairs, strongly
influenced by the work of the Union of Democratic Control, based on
a League of Nations which would settle international disputes through
conciliation and arbitration, and a renewed optimism in international-
ism. This was to be severely tested by Labour’s first experiences in
government, which are analysed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4
The Labour minority governments
The Labour Party saw an improvement in its electoral fortunes in the
immediate post-war period. At the 1918 election Labour gained 22 per
cent of the vote, a tremendous increase from 7 per cent at the last elec-
tion held in 1910.1 During the war both the trade union and the
Labour Party membership had doubled, and working-class militancy
had increased in the first few years of peace.2 With the concomitant
increase in class-consciousness, the working class now identified far
more strongly with the Labour Party than the Liberals and the Liberal
Party was split between the followers of Lloyd George and Asquith.
The Labour Party became the official opposition in 1922, out-strip-
ping the Liberals in the election of that year. They formed minority
governments in 1924 and 1929–31, but were unable to gain a major-
ity of seats. Rather surprisingly, it is in the area of foreign policy that
Labour is seen as having had the most success in these two early expe-
riences in government, even though foreign policy is subject to more
external restraints than other policy areas.3 The Labour Party and
minority Labour governments had considerable impact on Britain’s
stance on open diplomacy, internationalism, the arms trade, and the
League of Nations. From the early 1920s to the late 1930s, the inter-
nationalist, anti-war section of the party, strongly influenced by the
UDC, dominated Labour Party thinking on international affairs. While
this wing of the party had initially been highly critical of the League of
Nations, they came to see it as the avenue through which peace could
be maintained. 
Despite, or possibly because of, the trauma of the First World War,
the post-war years saw a period of remarkable optimism about the
ability to banish war and conflict through the rational application of
international law and the operation of the League of Nations. The
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ideas of the UDC, developed through their publications during the
war, coincided with liberal internationalist views propounded by
President Woodrow Wilson. In particular, they were similar to, and
preceded, the Fourteen Points of the peace programme Wilson
outlined in his address to Congress on 8 January 1918, and took with
him to the Versailles Conference in December. These included ‘Open
covenants of peace, openly arrived at’, with no secret agreements;
freedom of the seas; the removal of economic barriers to trade; the
reduction of national armaments to the lowest level consistent with
domestic safety; a free hearing of all colonial claims to self-determina-
tion; the restoration of occupied territories; and the formation of a
general association of nations ‘for the purpose of affording mutual
guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great
and small states alike.’4 In terms of national self-determination, the
Labour Party’s 1918 general election manifesto said that Labour
would ‘extend to all subject peoples the right of self-determination
within the British Commonwealth of Free Nations’ and called for
‘freedom’ for Ireland and India.5 This was repeated in its 1922 general
election manifesto, which also advocated support for the new consti-
tution of the Irish Free State.6 In terms of open covenants, the Labour
Party’s perspective was that public opinion would ensure that open
agreements conformed to the highest morality and public opinion
would prevent the outbreak of war, for a League of Nations could rely
on public opinion rather than the use of force or economic sanctions
to ensure compliance within itself. For those on the political left,
having found a way of resolving conflict between states, it was also
necessary to deal with the domestic causes of state aggression. Central
to this was dealing with and regulating the arms industry, with foreign
policy radicals believing that ‘if there were no armaments, there would
be no war’.7 The obvious conclusion was to cut down and abolish
armaments. At this time there seemed no reason not to, as there was
no obvious aggressor in the world. As Ben Pimlott explains: ‘The lack
of an identifiable foreign danger focussed attention on the danger
within: the threat presented by the capitalist system, by arms dealers
and manufacturers, by imperialist competition, above all by the inertia
or hypocrisy of governments in their relations with neighbours.’8 What
developed within the Labour Party was the closest they had had to date
to a comprehensive and widely accepted viewpoint on foreign policy.
Windrich has argued that Labour followed a ‘socialist’ foreign policy in
the post-war years;9 Winkler that the party developed a ‘League of
Nations’ policy.10 Certainly these years were marked by a fair degree of
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agreement within the different wings of the party on the basis of a
British foreign policy, despite the widespread and enduring differences
between the various groups and factions of the party and the mutual
suspicion between the trade unionists and the intellectuals. Both paci-
fists and non-pacifists could agree on the need to remove aggression
and conflict from the international system through the League of
Nations. While those who had fought most to get such a body as the
League established were the most critical of it once it was created,
there was a general belief in its ability to maintain peace. This agree-
ment continued until the mid-1930s, when the horrors of the Spanish
Civil War broke down the consensus on the ability to maintain peace
through non-intervention and the ability of the League of Nations
system to regulate and control conflict.
Labour in government, 1924
The election of November 1922 saw a marked improvement in the
standing of the Labour Party, with 142 MPs elected. The Liberals were
still divided, with the Independent Liberals gaining fifty-four seats and
the National Liberals sixty-two.11 This meant that for the first time
Labour was the second most powerful party in Britain and could sit on
the opposition front bench. Ramsay MacDonald, who had lost his seat
at the 1918 election as a result of his anti-war record, was returned to
Parliament, as were Philip Snowden and George Lansbury. E. D.
Morel of the UDC was elected to Parliament for the first time, as were
Sidney Webb, Clement Attlee, Herbert Morrison and Emanuel
Shinwell. A number of former Liberal MPs were returned as Labour
Party ones, including Arthur Ponsonby and Charles Trevelyan, found-
ing members of the UDC. Arthur Henderson, the most senior Labour
MP at the time, lost his seat. Ramsay MacDonald was elected chairman
of the PLP, making him leader of the party. This was somewhat
remarkable given his rift with the party over the First World War, and
while he had been busy in the international labour movement since the
end of the war, the loss of his parliamentary seat in 1918 had meant
that he had continued to have a low profile within the party during the
intervening years. Bonar Law led the Conservative government until
May 1923 when, due to his ill health, Stanley Baldwin replaced him as
Prime Minister. Foreign affairs took up much parliamentary time, with
the crisis over Germany’s reparation payments and France’s occupation
of the Ruhr. Marquand notes how ‘Foreign crises usually strengthen
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the Government of the day. This one brought greater benefits to the
Opposition. MacDonald knew more about foreign affairs than Bonar
Law or Baldwin, and spoke on them with greater authority.’12
MacDonald linked the economic conditions at home with the crisis
abroad, arguing that ‘the unemployment problem at home could not
be resolved until Europe had been pacified and the reparations issue
resolved.’13 The 1922 Labour Party manifesto had called for revisions
of the Peace Treaties, with German reparations being brought within
Germany’s capacity to pay, an all-inclusive League of Nations ‘with
power to deal with international disputes by methods of judicial arbi-
tration and conciliation’, and arms limitations. Labour’s 1923 mani-
festo expressed similar sentiments, calling for ‘a policy of International
Co-operation through a strengthened and enlarged League of Nations;
the settlement of disputes by conciliation and judicial arbitration’ and
the revision of the Versailles Treaty, especially regarding German repa-
rations.14 Sidney Webb argued in his speech to the 1923 annual confer-
ence that the peace treaties had failed because they ignored both
economics and morality, and called for a foreign policy based ‘not on
what we presume to think our rights, but on what we can discern to
be in the common interests of the world’ and on how ‘we can best
serve humanity as a whole’.15
The general election of 6 December 1923 resulted in the
Conservatives winning 258 seats, with Labour on 191 and the Liberals
159.16 The Conservatives under Baldwin tried to establish a govern-
ment, but the Liberals, united again under Asquith, made it clear that
they would support a minority Labour government rather than a
minority Conservative one. There was fevered speculation about which
party would form a government. Following the King’s Speech on 15
January laying out the Conservatives’ legislative programme, the
Liberals voted with the Labour amendment to it. This meant that the
Conservative government was beaten, and the King called upon
MacDonald to form a minority Labour government. On 22 January
1924 Ramsay MacDonald visited the King and became, with the
support of the Liberals, the head of the first-ever Labour govern-
ment.17 He not only became Prime Minister, but also appointed
himself as Foreign Secretary, arguing that the position needed a power-
ful figure. Arthur Ponsonby, who had earlier worked as a diplomat in
the Foreign Office, became MacDonald’s parliamentary secretary at
the Foreign Office. Attlee was made the Under-Secretary for War
under Stephen Walsh ‘who, though he had no experience of military
matters, was an excellent chief and very popular with the Army.’18
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MacDonald faced a number of problems in forming a government
as a result of Labour’s unexpected victory. First, the Labour Party was
used to making decisions through committees and conferences, and
this ‘was not easy to reconcile with the constitutional necessity of
entrusting power to one man – MacDonald himself – to form a
government’.19 This problem was overcome by Sidney Webb persuad-
ing the various committees of the labour movement that MacDonald
should have an entirely free hand in appointing his Cabinet.20 Second,
neither MacDonald nor his colleagues had any real experience of
government, with MacDonald never having held even the most junior
of ministerial posts. Arthur Henderson was the politician with the most
experience of government, having been in the War Cabinet, but he had
lost his seat and MacDonald did not choose to find a way of bringing
him into the government.21 This lack of experience certainly put the
Labour government at a disadvantage. MacDonald attempted to over-
come this problem by appointing some Cabinet members from outside
the Labour Party; most notably Lord Haldane, the former Liberal War
Minister, became Lord Chancellor, and Lord Chelmsford, a
Conservative peer, became First Lord of the Admiralty.22 Third, there
was also a lack of experience and of ministerial talent amongst the
Labour MPs in general. MacDonald wrote to Henderson that ‘we are
terribly short of men’ to put in the ministries, and ‘We shall have to put
into some of the offices men who are not only untried, but whose
capacity to face the permanent officials is very doubtful.’ However, he
felt it was important to have someone good working at Eccleston
Square, the Labour Party headquarters, for ‘I may be wrong, but, for
the life of me, I cannot see this Parliament lasting any time.’23 Fourth,
Labour did not have a clear policy programme to draw upon, as,
according to Attlee, ‘I do not think that MacDonald had envisaged
having to take office, and the Party programme, except on foreign
affairs, was very much a minority document. It gave no clear lead on
priorities.’ Furthermore, ‘The position of a minority Government is
always difficult. There were those in our ranks who thought that we
should have declined the responsibility.’24 While sections of the press
and the political elite were horrified at the prospect of a Labour
government, the Labour Party itself was amazed and somewhat over-
awed. Only a few years ago they had been a minor party, trailing far
behind the Liberals, with no expectation of assuming power. Sidney
Webb noted that ‘The sudden responsibility of so sudden and unex-
pected an assumption of office gave the Party a shock which sobered
even the wildest of shouters.’25
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In addition to all these problems, the ability of the Labour
government to affect change in either foreign or domestic policy was
minimal given that it relied on the Liberals for support in the House
of Commons to push its legislation through. Despite, or possibly
because of this, foreign affairs was seen as this historic government’s
major area of success during its brief period in office. Rather than
seeing a conflict between domestic and international priorities, to
MacDonald and the rest of the Cabinet ‘it seemed obvious that
Britain’s domestic problems were the product of a much larger inter-
national crisis, which could only be solved by international agree-
ment.’26 In electoral terms, success with foreign policy was important
for the Labour government, as it provided an opportunity for Labour
to demonstrate that it was capable of representing the nation, and not
just class interests.
The Labour government had four areas of foreign policy for which
it is remembered. First, its achievement in dealing with the main
problem at the heart of European security, namely Franco-German
relations. In opposition, Labour had been united in its condemnation
of the Versailles Treaty, and its election manifesto had called for its revi-
sion, particularly with regard to German reparations. The Labour Party
tended to see France, rather than Germany, as the expansionist power
de-stabilising Europe and many, including MacDonald, had been
opposed to reparations of any sort. However, on assuming office,
MacDonald went out of his way to court the French, breaking with
diplomatic tradition by writing personally to the French Prime
Minister, and supported the American plan drawn by the Dawes
Committee for improving the system of German reparations.27 During
July 1924 MacDonald chaired a conference in London consisting of
government delegations from France, Germany, the USA and Britain,
where his informal and friendly diplomatic approach were much
praised, and eased the way to reaching agreement on the Dawes Plan.28
Successful agreement was reached on the French evacuation of the
Ruhr, on the easing of the system of reparations, which had previously
been seen by many as intractable problems, and the conference saw the
Germans being dealt with as equals for the first time since the war.
Lyman calls this achievement ‘the high point of MacDonald’s career’.29
Pelling has argued that ‘It was no small success to have brought the
French and Germans back into almost friendly negotiation, and to
have found a temporary solution of the reparations question.’30 The
Labour Party was delighted that MacDonald ‘had exploded the myth
that foreign affairs were a secret science, the last mystery of state,
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which only members of the traditional ruling classes could master’.
However, many also saw the Dawes Plan as betrayal of their earlier
policy on reparations. Morel argued in the House of Commons that it
‘is not going to solve the problem of reparations’, that it would bring
about the ruination of German industry, that it was viewed with
‘profound apprehension’ by Labour back-benchers, and that,
[T]he only serious justification for accepting the Dawes Report would be
if that Report puts an end to the latent state of war which has existed in
Europe ever since Allied statesmanship admitted the principle … that it
was tolerable that there should be an invasion of German soil, an abroga-
tion of German civil law, and an elimination of German sovereignty, in
order to force payment of reparations.31
The TUC accepted the Dawes Plan but was critical of it, and during
the presidential address at the 1924 annual conference it was pointed
out that it was the German worker who would have to make sacrifices
as a result of the Dawes Plan.32 One of the complaints was that
MacDonald had changed Labour’s policy on reparations on his own,
without referring it back to the party, which was against the democratic
and consensual ethos of the party.
Second, the Labour government fulfilled its manifesto pledge to
end secret diplomatic agreements by announcing that it would inau-
gurate a new practice of laying all treaties with other nations on the
table of the House of Commons for a period of twenty-one days, after
which the treaty would be ratified. This, MacDonald argued, would
strengthen the control of Parliament over the conclusion of interna-
tional treaties and agreements, allow discussion of them, and ‘By this
means secret Treaties and secret clauses of Treaties will be rendered
impossible.’33 As far as the Labour Party was concerned, it was felt
‘With pride and appreciation that the nine months of the British
Labour Government was an expression of a new spirit in diplomacy
and the beginning of a policy for Great Britain of the promotion of
peace and reconciliation among the peoples.’34 The lack of parliamen-
tary control over foreign policy and diplomacy had been one of the
Labour Party’s main criticisms while it was in opposition. However,
MacDonald’s own approach was actually quite secretive: as both Prime
Minister and Foreign Secretary he had a very unusual amount of
control over the development of Labour’s foreign policy. He did not
refer many foreign policy questions to the Cabinet, nor discuss them
with his ministerial colleagues.35 ‘This tendency towards tight personal
control contrasts unfavourably with MacDonald’s own insistent
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demand in his opposition days for the “democratic control of foreign
policy”.’36 Indeed, the ‘relative freedom of action in foreign affairs
gave the Labour Government its greatest opportunity for accomplish-
ment’.37
One of MacDonald’s decisions that was very unpopular amongst
many sections of the Labour Party was his agreement to build five
replacement Navy cruisers, for which he was criticised in the House of
Commons for not adhering to the principles of disarmament to which
he had pledged the government. MacDonald argued that construction
would keep 4,750 dockyard workers from losing their jobs, an issue
that has always proved problematic vis-à-vis the arguments for disar-
mament, and that the decision was not against disarmament as such as
they were replacement ships, not new ones. He said that the way to
disarmament was not to allow the Navy ‘to disappear by wastage from
the bottom’, for ‘what a magnificent conception of pacifist principles
are held by hon. Members who think the best way to do that is to allow
your ships to fall to pieces!’38 MacDonald did, however, go against the
advice of the Admiralty and the Foreign Office by rejecting the
proposal to build a new naval base at Singapore, fearing that there
would be no hope of reaching an international agreement on disarma-
ment if Britain went ahead with this project.39
The third main foreign policy issue was Britain’s attitude towards
the League of Nations and the form that its collective security was to
take. The Labour government rejected the draft Treaty of Mutual
Assistance, which had been put forward at the fourth session of the
Assembly of the League of Nations in September 1923. This treaty was
based on a system of collective assistance, including military, of all of
the members of the League for any of their number who was the object
of a war of aggression, combined with a reduction in national arma-
ments commensurate with the security furnished by the Treaty of
Mutual Assistance. MacDonald argued that ‘the guarantee afforded by
the draft Treaty is so precarious that no responsible Government will
feel justified in consenting to any material reduction of its armaments
in return.’ This undermined the whole objective of the Treaty, which
furthermore would ‘involve an increase rather than a decrease in
British armaments’.40 Britain was only one of several countries that
rejected the draft Treaty, and in its place the Geneva Protocol for the
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes was drawn up. This placed
more emphasis on the settlement of international disputes by concilia-
tion and arbitration before they led to war. This was supported by both
the Labour government and the Labour Party.41 The Labour Party
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passed a resolution on 17 March 1925 that stated ‘That this Party
holds that this Country should do everything in its power to obtain the
acceptance of the principles of the Protocol and the holding of the
Disarmament Conference. It stands by the Protocol on the ground
that it furnishes the only practical plan at present for obtaining disar-
mament, and substituting arbitration for war as the method of settling
disputes.’42 The rhetoric of the Geneva Protocol was more in line with
both Labour Party and radical liberal thought on international affairs.
However, while the emphasis of the Treaty and the Protocol were
different, the Geneva Protocol depended ultimately on the sanction of
the use of force, and was therefore not so dissimilar to the Mutual
Security Pact, or even to the covenant of the League of Nations. Article
16 of the covenant stated that should any member of the League resort
to war, it shall be deemed to have committed an act of war against all
other Members of the League, and all financial, commercial and diplo-
matic relations will be broken off. ‘It shall be the duty of the Council
in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned
what effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League
shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the
convents of the League.’43
MacDonald played a leading role at the Assembly of the League of
Nations in September 1924 in getting the Geneva Protocol accepted
by the delegations to it, and in the League recommending that the
governments of the member states accept the Protocol.44 However,
MacDonald and the Cabinet then prevaricated over the Geneva
Protocol, arguing that they needed more time to discuss the implica-
tions of any of the Protocols drawn up at Geneva before the govern-
ment agreed to it.45 Before further negotiations could take place,
Labour was replaced by a Conservative government, which in turn
refused to sign the Protocol. MacDonald then railed against the
Conservative government for not signing the Geneva Protocol, for
‘The Protocol … brings into diplomacy a new moral obligation … it
supplants a system of force by one of justice’. The Protocol would
involve ‘powers of enforcement’, that is, sanctions, but these would
only need to be used once or twice before ‘it will become impossible
for a nation to defy it – impossible, not owing to the menace of force,
but to habit and other psychological and moral reasons. The nations
will simply accept it.’ ‘The new order of the Protocol will be its own
sanction,’ and ‘The era of peace will have come at last.’46 Overall,
MacDonald was fairly ambivalent towards the League of Nations; 
he was not convinced that collective security would work, preferring
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disarmament instead, but argued that the League needed to be
strengthened and made more representative by admitting Germany
and the Soviet Union to its ranks, and convincing the USA to join
without having ‘to go cap in hand to America to beg her to come in’.47
The fourth area of foreign policy for which the Labour govern-
ment is remembered was its action in granting de jure recognition to
the Soviet Union. It did this on 1 February 1924, just over a week after
gaining office. ‘In recognizing the Soviets the Government had laid its
hands on the most explosive issue in British politics … For many
Labourites, friendship with Russia was the one foreign policy issue that
really mattered; for many of their opponents, to make overtures to 
the Soviets was to embrace Evil itself.’48 However, while the Labour
government was keen to establish diplomatic and economic ties 
with the Soviet Union, the Labour movement continued to fight
communism and communists within their own ranks and within the
international labour movement, seeing a re-invigorated Labour and
Socialist International as a bulwark against an expansionist Third
International.
As part of the recognition process, MacDonald invited the Soviets
to London to a conference to discuss the proposed recognition treaty,
which included negotiation for a loan to Russia, compensation for
British creditors who had suffered losses during and since the Russian
Revolution, and the basis for Anglo-Russian trade. These negotiations
opened on 14 April, and dragged on for four months with little
progress, but with much criticism and tension. Two treaties were even-
tually signed, the Commercial Treaty, which laid out conditions for
trade, and the General Treaty, which pronounced that there would be
a later treaty to outline the settlement of all claims for compensation,
and which made a British loan to the Soviet Union conditional upon
this settlement.49 Attlee notes that ‘The Labour Government made
earnest attempt to arrive at an agreement with the U.S.S.R., Ponsonby,
the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, showing great
patience. The position was not made more easy by the activities of the
British Communist Party.’50 While recognition was in keeping with its
policy of international solidarity and was seen by many on the left as a
policy success, it led to domestic political problems, feeding the accu-
sations of being ‘soft’ on communism that arose out of the Zinoviev
letter and the Campbell case and which contributed to the general
election defeat in October.51 J. R. Campbell, the acting editor of a
Communist paper, Workers Weekly, and a leading member of the British
Communist Party, was arrested under the Incitement to Mutiny Act on
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a charge of attempting to ‘seduce’ members of the armed forces from
their loyalty to the King, following the publication of an article calling
on the armed forces not merely to refuse to go war, but to join forces
with the workers to smash capitalism. The prosecution was dropped by
the Labour government, but it was ‘alleged that the prosecution was
stopped for political reasons’, and Asquith, the Liberal leader,
proposed a Motion that an inquiry into the government’s role be
held.52 This Motion was passed, producing a difficult position for the
government, and MacDonald decided to dissolve the Labour govern-
ment. During the election campaign, the Daily Mail produced a copy
of a letter that the Foreign Office had obtained, which had allegedly
been written by Zinoviev, the Secretary of the Third International, to
the British Communist Party. This urged them to do everything possi-
ble to assist the ratification of the two Russian Treaties.53 The
Conservative opposition and most of the press presented this as
evidence that the Labour Party was much the same as the Communist
Party, even through the letter was thought to have been a forgery. The
government was unsure of how to deal with the situation, and it has
been argued that both the Zinoviev letter and the Campbell case were
mishandled by MacDonald, ‘who might have made them both recoil
effectively upon the Conservatives’.54 The result was that although the
Labour Party increased its vote by over a million at the election of 29
October 1924, they lost forty seats. The Liberals also fared badly, with
only forty MPs being returned. On 4 November the Conservatives
formed a government with Stanley Baldwin as Prime Minister. Labour
had been in power for only nine months.
Following its loss of power, the Labour Party’s foreign policy was
based on a return to its pre-government position of support for disar-
mament. Labour back-benchers in particular, and the wider Labour
movement in general, took the opportunity to exert their influence
over policy after having had to restrict their comments during Labour’s
period in office. MacDonald also seemed keen to assert his disarma-
ment credentials more forcefully. The party attended the League of
Nations conference on the regulation of the international traffic in
arms and ammunition in May 1925, and generally showed a more
positive stance towards the League than previously. Despite Labour’s
efforts to pressurise the British government into supporting the Arms
Traffic Convention proposed by the conference, it only did so after
gaining an amendment which excluded from the agreement ‘ships of
all kinds’ and their armaments, including ships, aeroplanes and
submarines.55 This of course benefited the British arms industry. The
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party flirted with the idea of supporting moves to outlaw war, and
discussed with seriousness the proposal being put forward in the USA
by Senators Borah and Capper outlawing war. There were conflicting
views on whether the ‘outlawry of war’ coincided or conflicted with
Labour Party policy. The Party supported the idea in the abstract, but
not the US Senators’ proposal as it included scrapping the League of
Nations and instead relying on alliances between individual states.
Leonard Woolf, for example, was very critical of the Senators’ propos-
als.56 The Labour Party International Department Advisory
Committee produced a number of memos outlining its position. The
Locarno Pact was criticised, and Norman Angell raged against the
Conservative government’s failure to sign an arbitration treaty.57 The
Labour Party repeatedly voted against the government’s defence 
estimates, its position being that the party ‘whether in power or in
opposition, supports some expenditure on Armaments’, but that the
party ‘believes that the present expenditure could be drastically
reduced’. The party line was that,
Support of some expenditure on armaments is based on the assumption
that the Covenant of the League [of Nations] is taken seriously. The plea
that our forces are used only to maintain peace, if not hypocritical, means
that we repudiate the use of force to press purely British claims … Our
policy is the maintenance of peace: the pre-war policy was the pursuit of
national advantage.58
The party’s attitude towards the nature of the armed forces was that a
national military capability was only acceptable to the extent that it
formed part of an international military force that could be for inter-
national intervention, under the control of the League of Nations, in
the last resort.
Labour Party rhetoric also took a more Marxist turn, and at the
1926 Labour Party Conference a resolution was passed supporting the
concept of a general strike against war.59 This came only five months
after the British general strike had collapsed, partly, it was argued,
through lack of support from the TUC and Labour Party leadership,
causing massive disappointment and acrimony on the political left.
Anti-war statements were supported in the international labour and
socialist arena, and by the Parliamentary Labour Party in the House 
of Commons. Hugh Dalton, for instance, made many speeches in
favour of disarmament in the-mid 1920s.60 However, following a trip
to Poland in 1926, where Dalton became aware of Polish fears of
Germany, he became ‘determined’ to ‘rewrite the Foreign Policy of the
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Labour Party’, and to shift it away from the current anti-French, pro-
German stance.61 Dalton published his views in Towards the Peace of
Nations in 1928, in which he called for a strong League of Nations to
police the world.62 Dalton actually defended the Versailles settlement,
and argued against frontier changes. He also argued in favour of an
international air force under the control of the Council of the League
of Nations, to replace national air forces.63 Dalton was not in the
majority, and for much of the 1930s the official Labour Party foreign
policy was to oppose rearmament and to believe in the ability of the
League of Nations to deter aggression. 
The 1929–31 government 
The next general election was held in on 30 May 1929, when the
Conservatives fared badly, dropping from 419 seats to 260. Labour
won the election with 288 seats, which was nearly double their
achievement at the last election, but the result did not give them an
overall majority.64 With the support of the Liberal Party, they formed a
minority government with Ramsay MacDonald as Prime Minister. This
time the formation of MacDonald’s Cabinet was acrimonious. He
reluctantly appointed Arthur Henderson as Foreign Secretary upon
Henderson’s insistence that he would not accept the more junior post
originally offered to him, which served to exacerbate existing tensions
between the two men.65 Philip Snowden became Chancellor of the
Exchequer, ‘one of the few Cabinet ministers to be given office
without dissent’.66 This was a key post, for the government was soon
faced with a mounting economic crisis. 
The Wall Street crash of October and November 1929 had a
dramatic effect on the British economy, as it was caught in what
MacDonald described as the ‘economic blizzard’ from America. There
was a sharp decline in world trade and a collapse in world commodity
prices, which greatly affected Britain’s exports at a time when the
government had been pinning its hopes on a trade revival to deal 
with existing economic problems. Britain’s balance of payments wors-
ened, and there was declining confidence in sterling. Unemployment
rose rapidly from 1.164 million in June 1929 to 2.5 million in
December 1930.67 The rate of unemployment rose from 9.9 per 
cent in September 1929 to 22.4 per cent in September 1931.68 The
‘Great Depression’, as it subsequently became known, was ‘the most
important event of the inter-war years. It killed the bright hopes of the
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nineteen-twenties. It brought ruin and poverty to millions and
wreaked havoc with their political faiths.’69
The government was faced with a limited range of options: to
come off the Gold Standard and devalue the pound in order to
increase British exports, while adopting protectionist policies to
decrease imports; or to cut government expenditure while raising taxa-
tion; or to try to reverse the recession by expanding the economy
through public works and increasing the purchasing power of the
workers. Snowden was firmly committed to the idea of free trade, and
would not countenance the introduction of tariffs in imports or the
rejection of the gold standard. Indeed, Attlee’s view was that Snowden
‘clung obstinately to the Gold Standard, while he had a fanatical devo-
tion to Free Trade’.70 Snowden’s perspective did reflect the economic
orthodoxy of the day, namely that devaluation would lead to financial
disaster and to retaliatory measures by other countries, but, ‘Lacking
vision, Snowden had no alternative strategy to offer.’71 Therefore, his
response to the economic crisis and mounting unemployment was to
increase taxation and reduce expenditure. Particularly controversial
was his plan to cut unemployment pay. This was against Labour’s
previous commitment to treat the unemployed humanely and its 1929
election manifesto pledge to provide more generous maintenance for
the unemployed, and was met with fierce resistance by his Cabinet
colleagues. Sir Oswald Mosley, who held the ministerial post of the
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster with special responsibility for
unemployment, proposed a very different policy to deal with both the
general economic crisis and the high levels of unemployment, in what
was called the ‘Mosley Memorandum’. He advocated import controls
combined with the expansion of public works, along with a complete
overhaul of the way that unemployment was dealt with within the
government administration. His proposals gained some support inside
and outside of the government, but were rejected by the Cabinet, and
he resigned from the government in May 1930.72 At the 1930 Labour
Party annual conference there was a resolution calling for an NEC
report on Mosley’s Memorandum, which was only very narrowly
defeated. However, his popularity within the party had increased
greatly, and he received a huge ovation from the floor for his speech,
and was elected to the NEC for the third time.73
In terms of foreign policy, Labour’s election manifesto had
proclaimed that ‘Peace is one of the greatest issues of the Election.’ It
stated that the Labour Party ‘stands for arbitration and disarmament’,
and that it would press ‘for the speedy completion of the Disarmament
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Treaty and the convocation of a General Disarmament Conference’. It
said that Labour would re-establish diplomatic and commercial rela-
tions with Russia, which had been terminated by the Conservative
government, and would ‘give the fullest and most cordial support’ to
the League of Nations and the International Labour Office.74 This it
did, and the 1929–31 Labour government pursued what Henry
Winkler has called a ‘League of Nations’ policy.75 This was based on
‘the limitation of national armaments, the eradication of outstanding
grievances, particularly in Europe, the arbitration or other pacific
settlement of international disputes, and the provision of pooled secu-
rity against aggression.’76 This was to be done through a strengthening
of the League, and a small reduction in national defence expenditure.
Whereas the 1924 government had agreed to military sanctions to
maintain security, the 1929 government relied on the sanction of the
law and disarmament. Both governments tended to see the British
empire as a single unit when it came to foreign and security policy, and
the colonies and the self-governing Dominions were expected to
support unreservedly British initiatives at the League of Nations for
disarmament and peace as part of imperial diplomatic unity.77 The
1929 Labour government signed the Optional Cause of the Statute of
the Permanent Court of International Justice. This provided for the
settlement, through the Court, of disputes between nations, which had
been argued for back at the 1926 Labour Party annual conference.78
Other government actions included evacuating British troops from the
Rhineland; re-establishing diplomatic and economic relations with
Russia, which had been terminated by the Conservatives; and signing
up to a revised version of the Young Plan, which reduced German
reparations by 20 per cent, at the Hague Conference of August 1929.
MacDonald visited the USA in October 1929, which was the first time
that a British prime minister had done so. Following a ticker-tape
parade in New York, he met with President Herbert Hoover in
Washington D.C., and was then taken to the President’s holiday retreat
at Rapidan in the Blue Ridge Mountains. From there MacDonald went
on to meet with Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King in Ottawa.
According to Hugh Dalton, the Under-secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, this trip to the USA ‘removed many misunderstandings’.79 The
trip was heralded as a success both in the media and by the leaders of
all the British political parties.80
Labour’s 1929 general election manifesto had made no mention
of the British empire but MacDonald did take a keen personal interest
in the development of self-government in India. He supported a policy
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of giving India Dominion status, which had been announced by the
viceroy, Lord Irwin, in October 1929, and called a round-table confer-
ence to discuss India’s future in 1930. This was at a time of mounting
tension in India. At the end of 1929 the Indian National Congress
called for complete independence from Britain, and in March 1930
Gandhi started his campaign of civil disobedience with his 200-mile
march to the sea to collect salt in symbolic defiance of the British salt
law, for which he was arrested. MacDonald hoped to diffuse the situa-
tion by offering concessions to the nationalist movement. However, at
the same time, the findings of the Simon Commission, appointed by
the Conservatives in 1927, were presented, which did not even
mention the option of giving India Dominion status and self-govern-
ment. The first round-table conference, convened in November 1930,
was fractious, being marked by communal differences and mutual
suspicion. However, it was agreed, subject to certain reservations, that
India would become a self-governing federation.81 When he presented
the results of the conference to the House of Commons, MacDonald
said that the purpose of the conference had been to demonstrate that
Britain was ‘honestly endeavouring to meet the legitimate expectations
of India’, for the only alternative to concessions to self-government
was ‘Repression and nothing but repression … a kind of repression
from which we shall get neither credit nor success. It is the repression
of the masses of the people’ and ‘it will develop into the repression of
the whole of the population’. He declared that ‘If you are prepared to
subdue by force not only the people but the spirit of the time – then
refuse to allow us to proceed.’82 It was the first occasion at which the
British government had discussed constitutional reform with represen-
tatives of the colony concerned. Despite the problems and lack of real
consensus, this first round-table conference did go some way to help
prepare the ground for the 1935 Government of India Act, which gave
the federal assemblies full responsibility for government, and for the
independence of India in 1947.
In the Middle East, MacDonald continued existing policy during
the second Labour minority government in much the same way as he
had during the first, that is, to support what were seen as Britain’s
strategic defence interests. Iraq had become a British Mandate 
under the auspices of the League of Nations in 1920. The Labour
government renegotiated the 1927 Treaty with Iraq, which had been
unpopular in Iraq, but extended the lease of the British air force base
at Basrah for twenty-five years as part of a limited military alliance.83
Sidney Webb, Secretary of State for the Colonies and for the
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Dominions, argued that a military alliance with Iraq was ‘vitally neces-
sary in order to secure Imperial interests … there is no other means of
securing that unfettered use in all circumstances of our strategy air
route, of adequately safeguarding our position at the head of the
Persian Gulf’.84 Security and defence interests were prioritised over any
Labour Party aspiration to reform Britain’s imperial role. Henderson
sought, against the wishes of MacDonald, to improve Britain’s rela-
tionship with Egypt in terms of making some marginal concessions
over the withdrawal of British troops from Cairo and Alexandria, 
while continuing the policy of retaining British troops and bases in the
Suez Canal zone and refusing to accede to Egyptian claims on the Suez
Canal itself.85
MacDonald’s personal interest and involvement in foreign affairs
meant that tension between MacDonald and Henderson remained
high. Henderson’s standing internationally grew during his period in
office. He campaigned for the League of Nations to call a World
Disarmament Conference, which had been part of the Labour Party’s
1929 manifesto. The League agreed to this, and invited Henderson to
be its president, but the conference was not convened until 2 February
1932, by which time the Labour government had been replaced by the
National government. However, in recognition of his role, in 1934
Arthur Henderson became the second Englishman ever to receive the
Nobel Peace Prize for his work on disarmament.
The 1929–31 government has been criticised for not achieving a
great deal in terms of foreign policy, and for being overly optimistic
about basing its policy on arbitration, international co-operation and
disarmament.86 However, it was widely believed at the time that it was
possible to eliminate conflict through disarmament and through inter-
national legislation. These views were not confined to the left, but
were reflected in the proposed policies of all the parties. What is signif-
icant here is that the Labour Party had, by this time, accepted that it
had to work through the League of Nations, rather than railing against
it as it had after the First World War. Holding office in 1924 had
provided a change in expectations, resulting in an increased sense of
responsibility within the party, and a more realistic assessment of what
was achievable by the PLP. The party seems to have been unusually
pleased with the government’s handling of foreign affairs, with little 
in the way of criticism from the back-benchers or from the annual
conference. While the foreign policy achievements of the 1929–31
government were limited, this has to be seen within the context of the
mounting financial crisis in Europe. Germany was unable to pay its
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reparations, and was facing financial collapse. MacDonald tried desper-
ately in the summer of 1931 to secure a final settlement of the repara-
tions problem, but France would not agree to a moratorium or a
reduction of German reparations.87
Germany’s plight impacted on Britain, there was a run on sterling,
and in July 1931 Britain lost a quarter of its reserves. As the economic
crisis worsened during 1931, Snowden continued to oppose the intro-
duction of tariffs or devaluation, and supported cutting expenditure,
including unemployment payments. This was against the advice of
numerous committees and commissions, and against the wishes of the
majority of his Cabinet colleagues. In August 1931 the crisis peaked,
and Snowden proposed cutting some public sector pay, and cutting
unemployment benefit by 10 per cent, along with an increase in taxa-
tion in order to have ‘equality of sacrifice’. The Cabinet was asked to
vote on 23 August for a 10 per cent cut in unemployment benefit,
without having been informed by Snowden that the Treasury had
decided that the taxation increases were impracticable and would have
to be reduced. The TUC and parts of the Labour Party vehemently
opposed the cuts, and the Cabinet was divided. As it was likely that
ministers such as Arthur Henderson would resign if the proposals were
forced through, the Cabinet agreed that it was impossible to continue.
There had been some discussions within the Cabinet about the
proposal for some kind of national government to deal with the
economic crisis, and it was agreed that MacDonald should offer his
government’s resignation to the King, and recommend to him that he
should meet the three party leaders. The King accepted the resignation
of the Labour ministers, but not that of MacDonald, inviting him
instead to form a temporary national government with Stanley Baldwin
and Sir Herbert Samuel, made up of individuals rather than represent-
ing one party, to deal with the immediate economic situation.88 On 21
September Britain was forced off the gold standard, and although this
did not bring about the disasters that had been predicted earlier, the
economic crisis continued. Against all previous announcements, the
National government then determined that it should continue in
power, and called a general election for 31 October 1931 in order to
extend its mandate beyond dealing with the immediate economic
crisis. Labour opposed the National government, and moved to the
opposition benches.89 On 1 October the Labour Party announced that
supporters of the National government would immediately cease to
belong to the party. This effectively expelled MacDonald from the
Labour Party, and made formal the growing rift between him and 
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the labour movement, for up until this point it seems that MacDonald
had hoped to maintain the co-operation of the party and possibly bring
in Labour politicians such as Henderson to any future government. 
The 1931 defeat
Despite initial statements to the contrary, at the October 1931 general
election Ramsay MacDonald, along with Philip Snowden, J. H.
Thomas and Lord Sankey, ran as part of the National government
coalition. This was elected with a massive landslide, gaining a total of
554 seats, 473 of which were Conservative, thirteen were National
Labour, thirty-five National Liberal, and thirty-three Liberal. While
the Conservatives won the bulk of the seats, Ramsay MacDonald
remained Prime Minister until the following election of 1935, which
was also won decisively by the National government. The Labour Party
was dramatically defeated in 1931, and Labour dropped from having
288 MPs to only 52, with the Independent Liberals led by Lloyd
George gaining four seats.90 Apart from George Lansbury, all the ex-
Cabinet ministers lost their seats, including Arthur Henderson who
had taken over as party leader. Many of the younger generation of
MPs, who later went on to take up the top posts in the Attlee govern-
ment, including Hugh Dalton, Herbert Morrison, Emanuel Shinwell,
and Philip Noel-Baker, also lost their seats. MacDonald’s defection to
the National government was blamed by the Labour Party for their
defeat, and he and Snowden were picked out as being personally
responsible for the inability of the Labour government to deal with the
economic crisis. ‘The shock [of the defection] to the Party was very
great, especially to the loyal workers of the rank-and-file who had made
great sacrifices for these men.’91
Subsequent to his defection to the National government,
MacDonald was seen as a traitor to his class and to his party, who, it
was argued, had either engineered the events of the previous few
months so as to stay in power, or had been seduced by his high friends
from the opposition. Marquand describes how,
Old enemies rushed forward to testify to his defects; old supporters kept
silent, or joined in the chorus of denunciation … Little by little, the
MacDonald of flesh and blood faded from the party’s collective memory.
In his place appeared a two-dimensional monster of vanity, snobbery and
social cowardice, whose systematic flattery by the upper class adequately
explained his own behaviour and his party’s downfall.92
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Even Philip Snowden, who had also defected to the National govern-
ment, accused MacDonald of deliberately planning the establishment
of a National government in order to be able to remain in power with
his Liberal colleagues, while attributing his own actions to a sense of
duty, which were only undertaken with deep regret at being separated
from his Labour colleagues.93 Nevertheless, Snowden managed to
overcome any remaining loyalty he might have felt towards his Labour
colleagues by describing the Labour Party’s 1931 manifesto as ‘the
most fantastic and impracticable document ever put before the elec-
tors’. Its economic policy was ‘Bolshevism run mad’.94
The party itself moved to the left, and George Lansbury became
leader of the PLP, with Clement Attlee as his deputy. Apart from these
two, the only other Labour MP left of any repute was Stafford Cripps,
of whom Dalton said the disaster of the 1931 election produced ‘an
adolescent Marxist miasma’.95 The crisis of 1931 polarised the medley
of political standpoints within the labour movement. The collapse of
the party in Parliament produced a division between the few remain-
ing MPs and the Labour Party officials and trade unionists at Transport
House, who viewed the MPs as left-wing, in particular on foreign
affairs and defence. It also reduced the influence of the PLP vis-à-vis
Transport House and the annual conference at a time when the trade
unions were taking an increased interest in the direction of the Labour
Party. The trade unions became increasingly outspoken, as their lead-
ership developed new policies for the party, which then became part of
the Labour Party creed. Bevin and Citrine of the TUC were instru-
mental in getting the party to accept a Keynesian approach to the
country’s economic problems, based on devaluation and maintaining
expenditure rather than the deflationary policies the party had previ-
ously backed. Both the PLP and the unions had moved to the left on
foreign policy, adopting a more pacifist stance than previously, but it
was largely the TUC who then shifted Labour Party policy away from
the pacifism that they had embraced to a policy based on rearmament
in the late 1930s.
The general atmosphere of betrayal, confusion, and loss of faith in
the leadership of the Labour Party was added to by breakaway
groups.96 Oswald Mosley, who had not only been a minister in the
previous Labour government, but had also apparently been considered
for the post of Foreign Secretary,97 established the British Union of
Fascists in 1932.98 Attlee later said that ‘This was at first not much
more than a “ginger” group which attracted such young men as
Aneurin Bevan, John Strachey and John Beckett’, and that after a while
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‘Genuine socialists’ left Mosley, while he and the residue became the
British Union of Fascists.99 However, this was an embarrassment to the
Labour Party, and made Labour supporters uncomfortably aware of
the dangers of fascism at home as well as abroad. Those on the far left
tended to argue that Mosley’s followers were the ‘storm troops’ of the
National government.100 Meanwhile, the Independent Labour Party
disaffiliated in July 1932. Relations between the ILP and the Labour
Party had seriously deteriorated during the 1929–31 government, and
the ILP had been particularly critical over Labour’s handling of the
economic crisis. Attlee, who left the ILP just before this point, felt that
‘a great loss to the Labour Movement’ when the ILP broke away, but
that ‘The I.L.P. became more and more a narrow sect rather than a
broadly based political party, and its influence steadily declined.’101 The
ILP then campaigned on a more militant and left-wing programme,
but it lost many members following its purge of reformist branches and
became increasingly isolated from the organised working class.102 In
turn, a group broke away from the ILP to form the Socialist League,
with Sir Stafford Cripps as its leading figure. They, nominally, worked
within the Labour Party. 
This is the context within which the Labour Party’s foreign policy
was revised. The party had little input into international affairs, apart
from Arthur Henderson acting as President and Chair of the World
Disarmament Conference in Geneva in 1932. The 1931 Labour mani-
festo had proclaimed that on international affairs ‘The Labour Party
has always been in the van of the Movement for International Peace;
and it is universally recognised that its record, as a Government, above
all in solving disarmament by Arbitration, gave to Great Britain the
moral leadership of the world.’ It would put forward proposals for
drastic cuts in armed forces and the expenditure on them at the forth-
coming Disarmament Conference.103 At the time of the invitation to
chair the conference, Henderson had been Foreign Secretary. Now he
had lost his seat and was not even an MP, he was being undermined by
criticism from the British press and from abroad and was suffering
from ill-health throughout the conference.104 His authority at the
conference ‘became little more than nominal’, and the much-hoped-
for conference achieved very little. ‘Thus by July 1932, after five
months of laborious haggling, all that had been accomplished was a
general resolution affirming a commitment to substantial reductions in
weapons without stipulating precise limits. Even those delegates who
accepted the resolution as a basis for future negotiation viewed it was
an admission of failure.’105 There had been no concrete commitment
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to disarm, merely for future discussions, which then dragged on unsuc-
cessfully until 1935. The Labour Party blamed the National govern-
ment for the failure of the Conference, and accused it of sabotaging
disarmament.106 Many in the Labour Party still believed in disarma-
ment and pacifism, and in the leadership role that Britain could play.
They also believed in working through the League of Nations.
However, these views had shifted from the consensus of the 1920s,
and, with its defeat and MacDonald’s policy of gradualism and respon-
sibility discredited, Labour moved into a period of greater radicalism in
its views. Labour was highly critical of the existing system of interna-
tional relations and the government’s foreign policy, and increasingly
embraced pacifism. These views were not tested by external events, but
were shaped and honed by internal problems and attitudes. Partly they
were a response to the ambiguities of policy left from the 1920s, which
resurfaced following the doubts produced by Labour’s 1931 defeat.
In conclusion, the inter-war period was significant for the Labour
Party’s foreign policy. The two minority governments of 1924 and
1929–31 were not seen as particularly successful in terms of domestic
policy, but were seen to have had some success in international affairs.
This demonstrated that Labour could be trusted to represent the
nation and not just class interests, which was reassuring to the elec-
torate. The activities of the minority Labour governments, and of the
Labour Party when in opposition, had some considerable impact on
British views of internationalism, collective security and the League of
Nations. From the early 1920s to the late 1930s, the internationalist,
anti-war section of the party, strongly influenced by the Union of
Democratic Control, dominated Labour Party thinking on interna-
tional affairs. While this wing of the party had initially been highly 
critical of the League of Nations, they came to see it as the institution
through which peace could be maintained. Despite, or possibly
because of, the trauma of the First World War, the post-war years saw
a period of remarkable optimism about the ability to banish war and
conflict through the rational application of international law and the
operation of the League of Nations. 
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Chapter 5
The Labour Party, pacifism 
and the Spanish Civil War
On 18 September 1931 Japan invaded China on the pretext that a
Japanese railway in Manchuria had suffered from Chinese sabotage.
Japanese troops over-ran Manchuria and set up a puppet state. China
appealed to the League of Nations for assistance under Article 11 of
the Covenant, and the League responded by asking Japan to evacuate
the territory it had occupied. Japan, which had signed up to the
Covenant of the League of Nations and the Briand-Kellogg Pact
(thereby agreeing to respect the territorial integrity of other member
states and never to use war as an instrument of policy), then used
Shanghai as a base for further incursions into China.1 Condemnation
of Japan by the League was muted, as both public opinion and the
Western governments tended to think that China was exaggerating the
threat from Japan. There was little sympathy for China, which, it was
felt, was unable to govern and bring order to Manchuria. It was also
argued by many that intervention by the League would do more harm
than good.2 The Labour Party and the TUC issued a declaration on
‘The Far Eastern Situation’ on 23 February 1932, saying that it was
clear that Japan was ‘responsible for this state of war’. They recom-
mended that the member states of the League of Nations consider
recalling their ambassadors from Japan, but hoped that this would not
be necessary, and ‘hope and believe that a manifestation of world
opinion that the war must cease will not go unheeded in Japan’. If,
however, Japan continued in its course then it may be necessary for the
British government to propose that the League consider financial and
economic measures.2 George Lansbury, who had become leader of the
Labour Party following the 1931 election, felt that ‘There need not be
war. The European powers, with the USA, have only got to make it
plain that they will boycott Japan unless it acts reasonably and Japan
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will give way.’4 Stanley Baldwin, leader of the Conservative Party and
a Cabinet minister in the National government, argued that military
action was too dangerous to consider as there was no defence against
air attack, and ‘the bomber will always get through’.5 Indeed, by this
point, concern about the ability of air power to render nations vulner-
able to attack increased the belief that war was to be avoided at all
costs. Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald, after some prevarication,
rejected America’s proposal that the two countries should make a joint
protest against Japan’s actions. ‘The Admiralty had made it clear that
Britain was in no condition to go to war with Japan’, and that Britain’s
armed forces were not strong enough to be able to back up any threat
with the use of force.6 The outcome of the Manchurian crisis was that
Japan ignored the statements by the League of Nations. This discred-
ited the League somewhat, and started to undermine the belief in the
system of collective security that had been developed with Covenant of
the League of Nations and the Geneva Protocol, designed to prevent
the use of force and the outbreak of war between member states. This
was the context in which the Labour Party embraced the most pacifist
stance of its history, just as the optimism of the 1920s was being
replaced by the growing fear of fascism in the early 1930s.
Labour and pacifism
The Labour Party’s official foreign policy after the defeat of 1931 was
based on collective security through the League of Nations, with
support for the Geneva Protocol and the ultimate use of sanctions, and
this was the policy supported by the bulk of the labour movement. In
addition to this, the party was committed to supporting any multilat-
eral agreements that arose from the World Disarmament Conference,
held in Geneva in February 1932. However, the Labour Party came
very close to briefly embracing pacifism instead of collective security as
its remaining leaders, Lansbury, Attlee, and Cripps, all rejected the
existing system of international relations and advocated their own
visions of Labour’s foreign policy. Lansbury, who had very strong
Christian as well as socialist and pacifist views, espoused a form of
absolute pacifism, opposing the use of force on humanitarian grounds
under any conditions. He advocated unilateral disarmament and the
dismantling of the British empire. He argued that ‘Our people 
must give up all right to hold any other country, must renounce all
imperialism and stand unarmed before the world.’ Britain ‘will then
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become the strongest nation in the world fully armed by justice and
love … Socialism, which is religion, is the one road which will lead to
salvation.’7 A strong believer in the power of public opinion, he told
Cripps that what they needed was a public campaign on peace and
disarmament, for ‘no nation can stand out against the public opinion
of the world’.8 Attlee espoused what could be described as national
pacifism, rejecting national defence in favour of an international mili-
tary or police force. He argued in the House of Commons that ‘There
is no effective defence against air attack’, and so in these circumstances
‘the pacifist is the realist’.9 Attlee went further when he stated that
Labour ‘did not believe in national armaments; we could only agree to
armaments if those armaments were part of a system of pooled security
to be used on behalf of the League for keeping the peace of the world.’
However, recent events had shown that today there was no system of
pooled security, and that the League had failed.10 His pessimistic view-
point lead him to conclude that the League of Nations needed to be
replaced by a new organisation, such as a world commonwealth, which
could provide collective security through an international military
force. Sir Stafford Cripps, who had moved sharply to the left following
the collapse of the 1931 government, espoused a form of class pacifism
– war was to be resisted on all counts, unless it was a class war, and he
argued against the working class joining the military forces, as the only
acceptable form of army was a ‘citizens’ army’. Cripps had ‘an incorri-
gible obtuseness to the effect of his utterances’,11 and Dalton, who had
a low opinion of Cripps generally, said that his ‘oratorical ineptitudes’
meant that ‘Tory H.Q. regard him as their greatest electoral asset.’12
For Cripps, war was the result of economic nationalism caused by
developed capitalism. This was a return to the left-wing view of impe-
rialism espoused before the outbreak of the First World War. He was
scathing about the League of Nations, arguing that it had become
‘nothing but the tool of the satiated imperialist powers’, and argued
against the use of sanctions by the League as a deterrent to aggression,
calling it an ‘International Burglars Union’.13
While support for the League of Nations and multilateral disarma-
ment through the work of the Disarmament Conference remained
official party policy, a pacifist position was strongly asserted at the 
1933 annual conference. One resolution was passed which called 
for the ‘total disarmament of all nations throughout the world and 
the creation of an International Police Force’.14 Another resolution 
was carried unanimously, which asked the party ‘To pledge itself to
take no part in war’, to consult with the trade union and co-operative
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movements with a view to deciding ‘what steps, including a general
strike, are to be taken to organise the opposition of the organised
working-class movement in the event of war or threat of war’, and for
the national joint bodies to endeavour to secure international action by
the workers on the same line.15 This effectively raised the issue of a
general strike in the event of war, a policy that had been previously
rejected. Arthur Henderson spoke in favour of the resolution, saying
‘It is a dedication, a solemn vow, pledging us to the works of Peace.’
He welcomed ‘this new spirit, this willingness to dare and to risk all
things in the cause of peace.’16 Hugh Dalton was uncomfortable with
the resolution, later noting that ‘The Conference was in no mood to
reject it or allow it to be withdrawn.’17 Thus, with ‘more expediency
than courage’,18 he accepted it on behalf of the NEC, saying, some-
what confusingly, ‘the resolution does not carry us perhaps quite far
enough’, in that it did not endorse economic and financial sanctions 
as well.19
Thus, the overall picture of Labour’s foreign policy at this point
was rather confused. Official policy remained in support of the League
of Nations and any agreements on national disarmament that came out
of the Disarmament Conference. However, some sections of the party
were committed to the policy of a general strike in the event of war;
some to complete national disarmament and the establishment of an
international military force; while Lansbury, the leader of the party,
was advocating national and international disarmament and pacifism. It
was in the sphere of foreign policy that the most serious differences
appeared between the PLP, which contained some of the most outspo-
ken advocates of pacifism, and the rest of the Labour movement. This
confusion was addressed by the National Council of Labour,
comprised of the PLP, the party’s NEC and the General Council of the
TUC, which produced a memorandum, ‘War and Peace’. This rejected
the use of a general strike, since ‘The lack of an independent trade
union movement in such countries as Germany, Italy, Austria, e.t.c.,
makes the calling of a general strike against their Governments an
impossibility.’ The document accepted ‘national pacifism’ (in terms of
meaning no war between nations), and maintained that ‘loyalty to the
world community on the issue of peace overrides any national duty and
notably our duty to the government in war. We are world citizens
because of our country’s membership of a world community.’ The
over-riding claims of world citizenship were arbitration, ‘the duty to
insist that our Government settle all its disputes by peaceful means and
eschew force’; the use of sanctions as collective action against a peace-
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breaker; and resistance to war.20 This document was approved by the
1934 annual conference by 1,519,000 votes to 673,000. 
The next major statement on foreign policy appeared in Labour’s
1935 general election manifesto. This reiterated that Labour sought
the ‘whole-hearted co-operative with the League of Nations’ and
‘stands firmly for the Collective Peace System’. It stated that Labour
would ‘maintain such defence forces as are necessary and consistent
with our membership of the League’, but it also appeased the pacifists
in the party by stating that, ‘Labour will propose to other nations the
complete abolition of all national air forces, the effective international
control of civil aviation and the creation of an international air police
force; large reductions by international agreement in naval and military
forces; and the abolition of the private manufacture of, and trade in,
arms.’21 These were precisely the policies that had been put forward at
the World Disarmament Conference, but which had not been passed.
By the time of the 1935 election, the conference had collapsed, with
no major agreements having been reached. Whereas the experience 
of holding office in 1924 had produced a more realistic assessment of
what could be achieved in the realm of foreign policy within the party,
by the mid-1930s this had been replaced by the assumption that a
future Labour government could automatically deliver on disarma-
ment and world peace, in spite of evidence to the contrary. Indeed, it
was felt that the second Labour minority government had given Britain
‘the moral leadership of the World’,22 and Labour just had to wait until
it was in power again in order to implement its disarmament policies.
Labour was not alone, however, in supporting policies of disarmament,
collective security through the League, and, it was hoped, world peace.
Pacifist sentiment was not confined to the left in Britain, and the
memory of the horror of the First World War was still potent enough
to convince many of the need to avoid war at all costs. The Peace
Society had gained greatly in popularity, and its meetings were well
attended. There was still a surprisingly strong faith in the League of
Nations amongst the general public, despite the failure of the League
to deal with Japan. A ‘Peace Ballot’, a sort of referendum on support
for the League of Nations, was organised in the summer of 1935 by
the members of the League of Nations Union, at which nearly
11,500,000 voted. The overwhelming majority supported a League of
Nations policy, based on disarmament by agreement among nations,
the abolition of air-warfare, the abolition of private arms manufactur-
ing and sales, and support for economic sanctions, and, in the last
resort, military measures by the League against an aggressor.23
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The collapse of the World Disarmament Conference and the
government’s gradual disclosure that Hitler, who had become
Chancellor in 1933, was rearming Germany, provided an alarming
background to the Labour Party’s flirtation with pacifism. The party
voted against the 1935 defence estimates, but in anticipation that
Baldwin would further propose the enlargement of the air force
because of the threat being posed by Hitler and German rearmament,
the PLP, the NEC and the TUC’s General Council decided to meet to
discuss the issue of British defence policy on 22 May 1935. The TUC
met prior to this meeting to determine their position. Its leader, Walter
Citrine, mapped out the pacifist positions being held by the Labour
Party. He was concerned that not only was there ‘mental confusion’
over the Labour Party’s foreign policy, but that sections of the labour
movement refused to accept it. He complained that ‘Lansbury is
absolutely pacifist – from purely Christian motives – and he thinks that
this country should be without defence of any kind… . but it certainly
isn’t our policy.’ He continued that there were others, such as
Henderson, who believed in the collective peace system, such as
placing forces at the disposal of the League of Nations, ‘but really they
are not living in worlds of reality at all. The collective peace system
should be operated, but did anyone think it would have to be operated
in the next few months?’ Citrine said that Hugh Dalton had told him
the day before that German aircraft could reach Prague in twelve
minutes, while German trade unionists had secretly sent him details of
the German air force, munitions factories and underground aero-
dromes. He further noted that ‘in every country with the exception of
France where there is a division of opinion, the Socialists have
supported their Governments in one way or another in increasing their
defence.’24 Ernest Bevin, the leader of the massive Transport and
General Workers’ Union, prevaricated, suggesting that the TUC
should speak to the Prime Minister since it had ‘a big part to play’ but
‘We don’t know what has been going on’. The meeting was recon-
vened the following day, with heightened tension, just hours before the
joint meeting was to be held, and just after Hitler’s speech to the
Reichstag in which he outlined Germany’s foreign policy. He had
stated that Germany would not return to the League of Nations unless
it was given equality of status with the other great powers, and that
while Germany would agree to non-aggression pacts and the limitation
of arms, it would only do so once it had gained parity with each of
these states and, until then, would continue in its expansion of its navy
and air force.  Ernest Bevin was more outspoken than the day before,
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saying that Germany would not listen to reasoned debate, and that
dealing with Hitler was like dealing with communists:
Have you ever tried to settle within your own Movement with any of your
people who follow the philosophy of Communism – whenever you get the
type of mind who follows the dictatorship, you can never get a compro-
mise or settlement or trust. And really there is no difference between the
Russians, Fascists or Communists.26
One delegate argued that they should listen to Hitler, but he was in the
minority. Others argued that ‘Hitler means war’, and that ‘Hitler is
merely playing for time … But the more weakness we show the more
danger of war.’ Another referred to the fate of their friends in the
German Social Democrats who had been imprisoned, tortured, and
sometimes killed: ‘Pacifism in the face of that is absolute cowardice.’
He also argued that Labour was partly to blame for the situation,
having been in government for two years only recently. However,
others felt that they were being tricked into voting for the defence esti-
mates, and that they should call a disarmament conference.27 
The meeting adjourned with no clear decision, but the deliberative
process that the TUC General Council went through tells us much
about how the trade union leadership was feeling, and how it came to
have such an impact on Labour’s position on rearmament. Bevin and
Citrine had been holding discussions with Hugh Dalton, and all three
agreed that Labour’s foreign policy, vacillating between various forms
of pacifism and support for the League of Nations, was not tenable in
the face of German rearmament and the threat posed by Hitler.
Together this unlikely combination – the rumbustious Bevin and
ascetic Citrine co-operated but disliked each other immensely, and
neither had much time for Labour Party intellectuals such as Dalton –
formed an alliance that managed dramatically to shift the Party’s 
position on defence.28 Together they urged the PLP to stop voting
against the estimates. Dalton accused Attlee of wanting ‘to sponge on
the Red Army’,29 while Attlee argued that there was no point trying to
match German rearmament, since ‘equality and parity, in the present
conditions of international anarchy, being but new names for the old
balance of power and the old armaments race’.30 In the end the PLP
decided to vote against the defence estimates and rearmament, with
the left-wing still reluctant to give arms to a government to which it
was opposed, but the ground had been prepared for a shift of policy
position, and for the undermining of Lansbury’s position as party
leader.
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The widely anticipated Italian invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) on
3 October 1935, and its forcible annexation of Abyssinia into its East
African empire in 1936, reinforced the tension between the conflicting
views on foreign policy. The Labour Party was now divided between
those who believed in strong support for the League of Nations and
the implementation of economic sanctions in response to the Italian
attack; the pacifists, led by George Lansbury, who opposed economic
sanctions in principle; and those further to the left, such as Cripps, who
viewed the League of Nations and its sanctions as a sham, run in the
interests of capitalism and imperialism. In the lead up to the 1935
annual conference, it became clear that Labour was facing a show-
down; this was not only on the future direction of the party’s foreign
and defence policy, but also on its leadership.
The 1935 conference, as Ben Pimlott puts it, ‘focussed on the
ritual martyrdom of George Lansbury’.31 At the centre of the conflict
was the resolution that the NEC had drafted for submission to the
conference to support sanctions by the League of Nations if, as it
looked increasingly likely, Italy was to invade Abyssinia. However, it
was more than just Lansbury the man who was being rejected, it was
his view of international socialism based on pacifism, and his position
on Britain’s foreign policy and role in the world. Even most of the
Labour-left had by this time come to the conclusion that the use of
force could not be ruled out against fascist aggressors, and that unilat-
eral disarmament would leave Britain exposed and vulnerable to attack.
However, there was deep mistrust of the National government and
concern that it might use rearmament for aggressive purposes.
According to G. D. H. Cole, ‘Most of the Left in the Labour move-
ment did not share Lansbury’s pacifist convictions. But they were
moved, as he was, by deep mistrust of the Government, and were
exceedingly reluctant to agree to a re-armament policy which they felt
sure would be used not to support the League but to do without it and
to betray it.’32 Tension was further heightened by Stafford Cripps
resigning from the NEC on the eve of the conference over his objec-
tions to the resolution. Moved by Hugh Dalton on 1 October, it called
for the League of Nations to ‘to use all the necessary measures
provided by the Covenant to prevent Italy’s unjust and rapacious
attack upon the territory of a fellow member of the League’. Cripps
opposed the resolution, and after a lengthy debate, Lansbury then laid
out his position on foreign policy and how it differed from Labour’s
official policy. He spoke against rearmament and the use of force even
by the League of Nations, for ‘I personally cannot see the difference
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between mass murder organised by the League of Nations, or mass
murder organised between individual states.’ While ‘it is difficult for
me to stand here today and publicly repudiate a big fundamental piece
of policy,’ he said that ‘I believe that force never has and never will
bring permanent peace and permanent goodwill in the world.’ He
went on to proclaim that given the chance he would go to Geneva and
tell them that Britain was finished with imperialism and that ‘we would
be willing to become disarmed unilaterally’. He declared that ‘God
intended us to live peaceably and quietly with one another. If some
people do not allow us to do so, I am ready to stand as the early
Christians did, and say, “This is our faith, this is where we stand, and,
if necessary, this is where we will die”.’33 He was received sympatheti-
cally by many, with applause at the beginning of his speech, and was
supported by some; it was even recommended that Abyssinians offer
hospitality to the invaders and ‘trust to the moral judgement and moral
pressure of the whole world’. However, Lansbury was strongly
opposed by the majority of the leading figures in the Labour move-
ment, with Attlee defending the use of sanctions ‘for insuring the rule
of law’, and Bevin deconstructing Lansbury’s moral scruples. He
stated: ‘It is placing the Executive and the Movement in an absolutely
wrong position to be taking your conscience round from body to body
asking to be told what you ought to do with it.’34 Bevin pointed out
that the Labour Party and the TUC had already endorsed the princi-
ple of sanctions in the document For Socialism and Peace, which had
been supported at the 1934 annual conference. Neither Lansbury nor
anybody else had suggested putting unilateral disarmament into the
policy document, and for Lansbury now to speak against that policy
was a betrayal. The trade unions had been let down by certain
members of the Labour Party, and he reminded conference that ‘our
predecessors formed this Party. It was not Keir Hardie who formed it,
it grew out of the bowels of the Trades Union Congress.’ Bevin went
on that while trade unionists were loyal, party members such as
Stafford Cripps and Lansbury stabbed the Labour movement in the
back by complaining to the press and resigning over policies which
they had been involved in developing. He finished by saying that those
who could not endorse the party’s support for the League of Nations
should ‘take their own course’.35 This made Lansbury’s position
untenable, and he resigned from the leadership of the party. Attlee later
said that ‘This was a grief to all of us, for we had a great admiration
and affection for him, but he was right in thinking that his position had
become impossible.’36
PACIFISM AND THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 115
Vic05  10/15/03  2:11 PM  Page 115
The differences between viewpoints had led to the resignation of
the Labour Party’s leader. This was the second time that a leader had
left over a policy difference with the party, Ramsay MacDonald’s resig-
nation in 1914 over the PLP’s support for the war being the first. That
both leaders resigned over foreign and security policy was remarkable.
Lansbury’s departure occurred only a month before a general election,
held on 14 November 1935. Deputy leader Clement Attlee became
temporary acting party leader during the election, which saw 154
Labour MPs elected. This was a very good result compared with the
scant fifty-two seats won in 1931, but Labour had expected to win
more.37 There followed a leadership election, between Attlee,
Morrison and Arthur Greenwood. At the first ballot, Attlee gained
fifty-eight votes, Morrison forty-four and Greenwood thirty-three. At
the second ballot, most of Greenwood’s supporters switched to Attlee,
who subsequently won. Attlee assured the PLP that he had been
elected to the leadership for one session only, and if they wanted him
to stand down after that he would. 
Attlee was an unlikely leader, ‘Quiet, unassuming and with the
appearance of a suburban bank manager’.38 One of his early decisions
was to form a Defence Committee to meet and discuss defence prob-
lems, and he spoke in favour of the creation of a Ministry of Defence,
for he was ‘determined to take steps to create a better knowledge of
defence problems in the Party’. Indeed, Attlee, when made Under-
secretary of State for War in the 1929–31 Labour government, had set
out to learn as much as he could about defence problems, ‘for I
realised that, whatever might be done in the field of disarmament,
there was bound to be the need for an army for policing the wide-
spread territories of the British Commonwealth and Empire’. Attlee
wrote that ‘It always appeared to me that some of my pacifist friends
in their insistence on the wickedness of warfare seemed to think that
an inefficient Army was less wicked than an efficient one, a point of
view to which I was unable to subscribe.’39 Attlee made Hugh Dalton
the opposition spokesman on foreign affairs, a position Dalton used
not only to criticise the government on its position of neutrality on
Abyssinia, and urge a tougher policy, but to get the Labour Party to
shift its policy away from pacifism. He was helped in this by trade
union leaders Bevin and Citrine.
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Troops in Rhineland and German rearmament
Early in 1936 another conflict arose with the entry of German troops
into the Rhineland, which had been demilitarised in the Treaty of
Versailles. This posed a problem for Labour in that while it condemned
Nazism, it had repeatedly blamed the Versailles Treaty for German
rearmament and militarism. The NEC had even said in its report for
1934–35 that with regard to ‘the Nazi regime’s open reversion to
power politics and international anarchy’ that ‘The verdict of history
will assign to the British “National” Government a not inconsiderable
share of responsibility for the present Nazi menace, in so far as it has
been created by external factors.’40 Even non-pacifists such as Dalton
supported the government’s policy of asking for a formal condemna-
tion by the League of Nations, rather than any other form of immedi-
ate action. It was felt that no physical resistance could be taken, for
‘public opinion in this country would not support, and certainly the
Labour Party would not support, the taking of military sanctions or
even economic sanctions against Germany at this time in order to put
German troops out of the German Rhineland.’41 Dalton later admitted
that he had been wrong on this, and that Hitler’s reoccupation of the
Rhineland, against the advice of even his own military advisors, had
been the ‘greatest bluff of his life.’ In his diary Dalton noted that
‘Hitler’s rearmament races on. Few people in the Labour Party seem
to know or care anything about it.’ He then attempted to get the 
PLP to abandon its yearly practice of opposing the defence estimates,
but it voted by 57 votes to 39 to continue its practice of voting 
against them.42
The National Council of Labour reacted more strongly to the
invasion of the Rhineland than the Labour Party’s NEC did alone. It
denounced it as a violation of the Locarno Treaty, which Germany had
signed, and as evidence of the ‘clear determination of Nazi Germany
to repudiate its obligations and take what it wants by force’.43
However, it also urged that ‘a sincere effort must be made to discover
a basis of negotiations with Hitler’.44 At the 1936 TUC conference,
Bevin said that it was time to re-examine the labour movement’s
commitment to a League of Nations system of collective security. He
argued that ‘The question of collective security it in danger of becom-
ing a shibboleth rather than a practical operative fact … We are not
going to meet the Fascist menace by mass resolution. We are not going
to meet it by pure pacifism.’ If this meant ‘uprooting some of our cher-
ished ideals and facing the issue fairly in the light of the development
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of Fascism, we must do it for the Movement and for the sake of poster-
ity’.45 Bullock notes that Bevin’s point ‘was accepted without challenge
with that practical common sense which distinguished the discussion of
foreign affairs in the TUC from the debates at Labour Party confer-
ences throughout the 1930s’.46 This is perhaps a little unfair, for of
course the trade unions and the TUC played a not-insignificant role in
the debates at the Labour Party conferences themselves.
The confusion within the Labour Party over foreign policy and
disarmament continued. On the eve of the Labour Party’s 1936 annual
conference, Stafford Cripps argued against those who recommended
conditional support for rearmament. In one of his more astounding
pronouncements in a speech in Leeds, he urged an end to recruitment
to the armed forces, saying that it would not necessarily matter if
Britain were conquered by Germany. ‘British Fascism would be less
brutal than German, but the world situation would be no better.’47 If
Britain were pushed into war, he hoped that the workers would revolt,
which would result in the fall of the capitalist government.48 At the
conference, the party’s NEC then forwarded a resolution which ran
counter to the stronger tone of the National Council, declaring that
‘The armed strength of the countries loyal to the League of Nations
must be conditioned by the armed strength of the potential aggres-
sors’, but concluding that ‘having regard to the deplorable record of
the Government, the Labour Party declines to accept responsibility for
a purely competitive policy.’49 Proposed reluctantly by Dalton, this
suggests that the trade union influence was taking the National
Council towards a more militarised stance than the NEC was prepared
for, though no one was actually clear whether the above resolution
implied that Labour would vote against the government’s defence esti-
mates or not. Bevin revealed his annoyance at the situation, referring
to a speech by Morrison in defence of the resolution as ‘one of the
worst pieces of tight-rope walking I had ever seen in this Conference’.
As for Cripps’ position, Bevin was scathing: ‘I say this to Sir Stafford
Cripps. If I am asked to face the question of arming this country, I am
prepared to face it … Which is the first institution that victorious
Fascism wipes out? It is the trade union movement.’ Bevin, unlike the
other speakers, was unequivocal in his support for rearmament, and
said it was time to ‘tell our own people the truth’ about the situation:
The International Movement are wondering what we are going to do 
in Britain. Czechoslovakia, one of the most glorious little democratic
countries, hedged in all round, is in danger of being sacrificed tomorrow.
They are our brothers … You cannot save Czechoslovakia with speeches.
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We are not in office but I want to drive this Government to defend
democracy against its will, if I can … I want to say to Mussolini and Hitler
… ‘If you are banking on being able to attack in the East or the West, and
you are going to treat the British Socialist Movement as being weak and
are going to rely on that at the critical moment, you are taking us too
cheaply.’50
This comment on Czechoslovakia was made two years before Munich,
and as Bullock notes, ‘Bevin, commonly regarded as an uneducated
man, never made the mistake of referring, as Chamberlain did in 1938,
to Czechoslovakia as “a far-away country” of whose people “we know
nothing”.’51 Bevin further argued that it had been the mentality of the
liberal pacifists that had led Britain into war in 1914, and that the
League of Nations could not be left to defend democracy because it
has been proved weak: ‘The League of Nations is the first puny attempt
at world organisation.’ Therefore he would vote for armaments to
defend democracy and our liberty, though we must ‘strive with all our
might … to build the great moral authority behind international law,
[so] that in the end law will triumph by consent instead of by force’.
For the time being, he was afraid that ‘we may have to go through
force to liberty’. He finished by calling for clarification on what the
resolution really meant in terms of supporting or not supporting rear-
mament.52 This was not provided, and despite Bevin’s comments the
resolution was passed. Adding to the confusion was the developing
crisis in Spain.
The Spanish Civil War
A republican, socialist, anti-clerical, Popular Front government had
been voted into power by a narrow margin in Spain in February 1936.
On 18 July the monarchist, nationalist, General Franco led an army
coup to topple it; the result was a bitter and all-out civil war, which
continued until the defeat of the Popular Front government in 1939.
The British government, along with the major European states and
America, signed a non-intervention agreement, which included an
arms embargo, for fear that the conflict might spread across Europe.
Despite the non-intervention pact, the right-wing nationalist rebels
received considerable support from the fascist regimes of Germany 
and Italy in the form of weapons and men. At least 40,000 Italian
troops and up to 15,000 Germany troops were sent to Spain.53 The
Soviet Union sent arms to the left-wing Republican government, and
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volunteers from across Europe – including Britain – arrived in Spain to
support the Republican cause. Numbers are difficult to estimate, but
perhaps up to 15,000 such volunteers formed what were called the
International Brigades.54
The dilemma that the Labour Party faced over the Spanish Civil
War reflected the wider debate on foreign and defence policy in the
1930s. The Labour Party was horrified by events in Spain, and now
found that relying on the League of Nations to defend democracy
against fascism did not produce the desired results. However, at this
time intervention was equated with precipitating war, not preventing
it, and the underlying fear was that intervention would be worse than
futile as it cause the conflict to spread across Europe.55 Thus, the
Spanish Civil War highlighted the confusion and divisions within the
labour movement on foreign policy. Labour’s immediate response to
the Spanish situation in July 1936 was to send a delegation to see
Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. A special
meeting of the PLP, the General Council of the TUC, and the NEC of
the Labour Party was then held on 28 August, at which a statement
was drawn up stating the party’s position on the situation, ready to be
presented at the annual conference. This in effect argued that non-
intervention was the preferable policy as it would reduce the danger of
a general war in Europe; but that it should only be supported so long
as it was being carried out by all sides and that there should be an
immediate inquiry into alleged breaches of the arms embargo. While
expressing ‘regret that it should have been thought expedient, on the
ground of the dangers of war inherent in this situation, to conclude
agreements among the European Powers laying an embargo upon the
supply of arms’, it said that ‘such agreements may, however, lessen
international tension’. The ‘utmost vigilance will be necessary to
prevent these agreements being utilised to injure the Spanish
Government’. The statement ended by calling for the labour move-
ment to support the International Solidarity Fund for Spain, which was
created to provide humanitarian assistance to the Spanish people.56
Not everybody in the Labour Party supported this policy.
Morrison was ‘strongly and unconditionally against non-interven-
tion’.57 Many regretted that the non-intervention pact had been
signed, but since the pact was originated by Léon Blum, the leader of
the French Socialist Party and Prime Minister at the head of the
Popular Front government, they felt that they had to support it. Attlee
noted in his memoirs that ‘The French attitude hampered us in bring-
ing pressure to bear on our own Government, while the efforts of the
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Communists to exploit Spanish resistance for their own ends did harm
to the cause of freedom.’ But ‘Enthusiasm for the Republic ran very
high in all Left Wing circles in Britain’.58 Hugh Dalton, George Hicks
and William Gillies, the Secretary of the Labour Party’s International
Department, had been to see Blum in September 1936, and according
to Dalton, Blum had ‘insisted that the policy of non-intervention in
Spain was his policy. It was he and not Eden, as some alleged, who had
first proposed it. He was sure that this policy, if it was fully observed
by all the European Governments, would help the Spanish
Government forces much more than the free supply of arms to both
sides.’ Dalton noted that Blum’s preference for a non-intervention
pact was due to concern that, having just disarmed the groups of right-
wing extremists in France who had opposed his Popular Front
government, any French intervention on a large scale would result in
rearming both left and right within France.59
At the 1936 TUC and Labour Party conferences, support for 
the non-intervention pact was presented as policy in the report 
of the National Council of Labour. This was accepted more readily at
the TUC conference than the Labour one,60 where Arthur
Greenwood, the Deputy Leader of the Party, was jeered when he
moved the resolution supporting the report.61 He did not help himself
by pointing out to the conference that ‘We know perfectly well that 
it was within the rights of any Government to provide all the necessary
military equipment for the assistance of a nation fighting an internal
rebellion. Unfortunately, that line was not taken’, and the non-
intervention pact was signed instead. This was ‘a very, very bad second
best’. The alternative now was to allow the situation in Spain ‘which
has almost broken the hearts of many of us’, to develop into a
European-wide struggle. Asking ‘Is this Conference prepared to 
have the battle between dictatorship and democracy fought over the
bleeding body of Spain?’62 Greenwood argued that the alternative to
non-intervention was free trade in arms, which would result in the
collapse of the Popular Front government in France, and a war involv-
ing all of Europe, which was not what the British public wanted.
The resolution was carried by 1,836,000 votes to 519,000, but
under pressure from the floor, it was announced that Attlee and
Greenwood would go that evening to London to discuss the situation
in Spain with Neville Chamberlain, who was acting Prime Minister
while Baldwin was away. Attlee returned and urged a speedy investiga-
tion into the alleged breaches of the non-intervention pact: Labour’s
position was that if it were found that countries had been flouting the
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agreement, then the British and French governments, who had initi-
ated it, should at once restore to the Spanish government the right to
buy arms.63
It quickly became apparent that the non-intervention agreement
was being breached. Spain complained of this to the League of
Nations, and lobbied the international labour movement to rethink
their policy of support, however reluctant, of non-intervention. At the
request of the Spanish trade union centre, a meeting of the Inter-
national Federation of Trade Unions, the Labour and Socialist
International and the International Trade Secretariat was held on 
28 September to discuss the situation in Spain. British representatives
argued against changing the existing line, that is, observation of the
non-agreement pact, but agreed that the accusations that Germany
and Italy were breaking the arms embargo be investigated.64 A month
later another meeting was held, and this time the representatives
agreed there was evidence that the agreement was being breached.
They agreed that,
In view of the fact that the Non-intervention Agreement has not
produced the results expected in the international sphere, because of the
determination of the Fascist Powers to assist the rebels and of the impos-
sibility of establishing really effective supervision, the two Internationals
declare that it is the common duty of the Working class of all countries,
organised politically and industrially, to secure by their influence upon
public opinion and upon their respective Governments the conclusion of
an international agreement – for which the French and British
Governments should take the initiative – restoring complete commercial
liberty to republican Spain.65
Members of the trade unions and socialist parties of the two interna-
tionals should also do all they could ‘to prevent the despatch of
supplies to the Spanish rebels’.66 The PLP and the Labour Party’s
NEC, along with the TUC’s General Council, subsequently unani-
mously adopted a declaration on Spain on 28 October 1936. This
stated ‘that the right of the constitutionally elected Government of
Spain to secure, in accordance with the practice of international law,
the means necessary to uphold its authority and to enforce law and
order in Spanish territory must be re-established’.67 After this the
Labour Party lobbied, without success, for the lifting of the non-inter-
vention pact and the recognition of the Spanish Republican govern-
ment’s right to buy arms from abroad, arguing that non-intervention
had been shown to be one-sided and a sham.68
The Labour leadership was sympathetic to the republican cause 
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in Spain, and had a hard time defending their initial support for 
non-intervention. However, it was felt by some that Spain was a
distraction from the real danger of German rearmament. Buchanan
argues that for the leadership of the labour movement, the Spanish
Civil War was ‘a faction fight in a backward and feudal society which
could have little relevance to Britain and which distracted attention
from the real threat of a resurgent Germany. Thus, the Civil War had
merely exposed Spain as an innately violent and undemocratic
society.’69 Certainly Hugh Dalton’s position was that ‘I valued France
above Spain, both as a civilised modern state, and as a friend and
pledged ally of Britain. I was not an admirer of the Spanish approxi-
mation to democracy.’ Labour ‘knew very little of the Spanish Left-
wing leaders … And there were other elements in the Spanish Left,
including Anarchists, who did not inspire much confidence.’
Furthermore, he did not support “Arms for Spain” if this meant that
Britain was to supply arms which otherwise could be used for rearma-
ment against the German threat. Dalton points out, however, that ‘My
own personal view of the Spanish Civil War … differed from that of
most of my colleagues.’70
Spain was ‘at once a test of conscience and a symbol of protest’
which stirred the emotions of the younger generation on the left ‘as no
other event in the pre-war decade’.71 However, it was difficult for pro-
interventionists to counter the Labour leadership’s arguments, given
that it was French socialist Prime Minister Léon Blum who had origi-
nally proposed and supported the non-intervention policy. Further-
more, the Soviet Union, officially at least, also supported it. Hardest of
all reasons to overcome, most of the Labour Party had spent the last
few years supporting pacifism, and the years since the First World War
fighting for disarmament, and so now had to undergo massive shifts
both intellectually and emotionally when confronted with the failure of
the non-intervention policy to alleviate the situation in Spain. A few on
the left resolved the situation for themselves by joining the
International Brigades and fighting for Spain, but, more generally,
discontent was strongly expressed by the rank-and-file on Spain. 
Numerous resolutions were sent in to the Labour Party and the
TUC urging action to support Spain. One asked the National Council
of Labour to organise meetings and demonstrations for Spain up and
down the country, and urged ‘the smashing of the non-intervention
pact’ and ‘full support for the Spanish government’ in its ‘heroic fight
against Fascism’.72 The reply from Labour headquarters was that while
the PLP had raised the issue of the government’s attitude to Spain, ‘It
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is quite clear, however, that there will be no withdrawal from the Non-
Intervention Pact either by the British Government or the French
Government. Nor is there the least possibility of Munitions being sent
to Spain from the Armaments Manufacturers in the country.’
Furthermore,
The Radical element of the Blum Government is as strongly opposed to
the supply of Munitions to the Spanish Government in accordance with
Treaty obligations as is the British Government, and any attempt to test
the issue in the French Chambre would bring down the Blum
Government with the possibility of a strong turn to the right rather than
the left.
The official response ended with ‘These are the facts of the situation
which the National Council of Labour has had to face from the very
beginning, and no Resolutions passed by enthusiastic Demonstrations
will alter them – tragic as the situation is.’73 Of course, we do not know
what would have happened in France, but with the only left-wing
European government lobbying for the Non-Intervention Pact to
continue, Labour was left with very little scope for action. Another
resolution, from the Birmingham Labour Party, expressed its ‘grave
concern’ at the government’s proposal ‘to prevent the enlistment of
British volunteers for the International Column to fight in the case of
international Democracy’. It also called for the Labour Party ‘to
demand the immediate withdrawal of the arms ban and expose the pro-
Fascist policy of non-intervention’.74 A resolution from the South
Wales Regional Council of Labour stated that ‘This Conference views
with dismay the tragic results arising from the farcical policy of non-
intervention in Spain … which deprives the Spanish people of the
means of defending their lives and liberties, while other members of
the so-called Non-Intervention Committee are openly and defiantly
supplying all the armaments they require to [the] rebels’. It was there-
fore the view of the Conference that ‘the present is the supreme
moment’ for the British labour movement ‘to take such action as will
force the British Government to remove the embargo on the supply of
arms to the Spanish Government’. The Conference declared that it was
ready ‘to take such action as may be necessary to prevent the supply of
materials of all kinds to the aggressive Fascist Powers, to force the
Government to reverse its pro-Fascist policy, and we ask the National
Council of Labour to call an immediate National Conference to decide
upon the necessary action to secure that result’. This resolution had
actually been ‘altered’ from its original format, which had specifically
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said that the labour movement was ready to take such action, both
‘industrially and politically’, to stop the ‘supply of materials to the
Fascist Powers’.75
Support groups for Spain also sprang up. The Labour Spain
Committee, which represented local and divisional labour parties but
did not represent the official line of the Labour Party leadership,
campaigned under the slogan ‘Arms for Spain’. It urged others to
‘demand that our Leaders shall at once prepare to use all the power of
the Trades Union and Labour Movement to end the farce of the Non-
Intervention Agreement, and to secure for the Spanish people their
right to purchase the arms of which they stand in such desperate
need’.76 The IFTU and the Labour and Socialist International
launched an ‘Aid for Spain’ campaign, which the Labour Party and
TUC vigorously supported. More specifically, the Basque Children’s
Committee was set up to provide support for displaced Basque chil-
dren. A camp for refugee children was set up in May 1937 at Eastleigh,
which held 4,000 refugee children prior to their dispersal to homes
around the country.77
The labour leadership did make some attempt to influence the
government. Citrine had written to the Prime Minister on 31 January
1937 to express his horror at the massacres in Spain during aerial
bombing campaigns. This action was approved by the National
Council of Labour, who determined that the government ‘be urged to
press forward with its proposals for securing a speedy agreement to put
an end to such bombing outrages’.78 A deputation from the General
Council of the TUC, headed by Ernest Bevin and Walter Citrine, went
to see the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, on 22 March 1937 to
inform him of the resolution passed at the recent international confer-
ence in London. They expressed the grave anxiety felt in the Labour
movement at the delay in the operation of effective control over the
non-intervention agreement, and the reports of the continued landing
of German troops in Spain. ‘The deputation urged that decisive steps
should be taken to establish an effective system of control and to
secure the early withdrawal of the foreign troops from Spain.’79
The Labour Party established a Spain Campaign Committee, with
William Gillies and Ellen Wilkinson as its secretaries. This organised
and advertised demonstrations around the county, held meetings and
allocated speakers from the Labour Party, and organised appeals for
money through a ‘Milk for Spain’ fund. It was not so different from
the unofficial campaign for Spain in its aims, informing party members
that, ‘We are not neutrals in this conflict’, and that ‘We shall demand
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Freedom, Food and Justice for Democratic Spain and the ending of
Fascist intervention.’ It pointed out that ‘Democratic Spain is not
merely confronted with enemies within’ for it was having to defend
itself against ‘the men and resources of Hitler and Mussolini. The war
in Spain is an international war.’ Hence, ‘We demand unconditional
freedom of commerce for the Spanish Government in the purchase or
arms.’ It also highlighted the plight of the refugees in Spain, with offi-
cial estimates that there were now 800,000 refugees in Catalonia alone.
There was a desperate need for food and supplies, but ‘the most urgent
necessity of the moment is for milk’ for the children. Labour Party
members were asked to distribute leaflets and posters and to help the
‘Milk for Spain’ fund by buying milk tokens from Co-operative Society
stores.80 The party also organised a ‘Christmas Gifts for Spain’
campaign which asked people to buy parcels of food, clothing and soap
to send to Spain, and collected money through the International
Solidarity Fund.81 Publicity leaflets were produced such as We Saw in
Spain, a collection of articles by Attlee, Ellen Wilkinson, Philip Noel-
Baker and John Dugdale on their trip to Spain,82 and What Spanish
Democracy is Fighting For, published on the second anniversary of the
start of the civil war.83 These highlighted the suffering of the Spanish
people, and graphically described the plight of the refugees. In this
way, the Spanish Civil War had a radicalising effect on many in the
Labour Party and the trade union movement, leading people to ques-
tion their previous conviction in the moral superiority of disarmament,
arbitration through the League of Nations, and non-intervention. 
The acceptance of British rearmament
One major effect of the Spanish Civil War was that it undermined the
popularity of pacifism on the left, destroying the Labour Party’s stance
on pacifism and non-intervention, and paving the way for its accept-
ance of rearmament and the use of force. In July 1937, after extensive
lobbying by Hugh Dalton, the PLP agreed by forty-five votes to
thirty-nine to refrain from its usual habit of voting against the army,
navy and air force estimates in the House of Commons. Instead, they
would abstain. This signalled an end to the party’s automatic stance
against rearmament. Dalton notes that whereas the previous year he
had been unsuccessful in attempting this, ‘In 1937, after twelve
months of Spain, the Party’s policy being “Arms for Spain”, it became
impossible, in the view of many of us, to justify a vote which, whatever
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pundits in Parliament procedure may pretend, means to the plain man
“No Arms for Britain”.’84 He asked his colleagues ‘what possible
answer had we got in the country to the accusations that we want Arms
for Spain, but no arms for our country?’ He argued that people were
‘bewildered’ by Labour’s attitude on foreign policy and defence.85 The
decision to abstain was greeted with approval by the conservative press.
According to the Daily Telegraph, ‘Labour’s decision … is the first
indication that the Socialists are realizing the nature of the world in
which they live.’86 The Times expressed the opinion that ‘Mr. Dalton’s
action is of special importance and there is no doubt that he consider-
ably enhanced his Parliamentary prestige by his victory yesterday.’87
The change of stance on the defence estimates also helped pave the
way for the adoption at conference of a new statement on
International Policy and Defence. This stated that ‘A Labour
Government will unhesitatingly maintain such armed forces as are
necessary to defend our country and to fulfil our obligations as a
member of the British Commonwealth and of the League of
Nations.’88 As Bullock notes, ‘the debates at the two autumn confer-
ences made clear what the resolution left unsaid, that acceptance of the
report meant the abandonment of opposition to rearmament.’89 At 
the 1937 TUC conference the report was adopted by a show of
hands.90 Bevin was chair at this conference, with Dalton present as
Chairman of the National Executive. At the Labour Party conference
the following month, Dalton was chair, and devoted much of his
speech to foreign affairs and defence. Lansbury spoke against the
statement on International Policy and Defence, proposing that it be
remitted back to the NEC rather than accepted as policy. Philip Noel-
Baker described the report as ‘bold, courageous and opportune’,
minimised the shift in policy, and said that ‘There is really only one
point of substance on which we differ from Mr Lansbury. It is on the
proper use of power.’
He wants a League of Nations that acts by conciliation, and conciliation
alone. He wants us unilaterally to disarm … For ten years we had in
Geneva a League of Nations whose members all believed that the new law
of the Covenant would be observed … [but since] 1931 … we have had
a League of Nations without sanctions, a League of Nations where, with
one feeble, transient exception, aggressors have had nothing to fear but
resolutions. What are the results? The long, cumulative martyrdom of
Manchuria, which still goes on; the squalid degradation of Mussolini’s
triumph over black men whom he burned and bombed … the fearful
holocausts in Spain; a major war in China … a Europe where two great
Powers bombed and burned Guernica systematically to the ground … an
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Assembly of the League of Nations so demoralised that last week it
refused to help the Chinese wounded in order not to irritate Japan …
That is the result of Mr. Lansbury’s policy. It is cause and effect. Italy
attacked disarmed Abyssinia and disarmed Spain, and Japan attacked
disarmed China, because there was no collective security to make them
safe.91
After a long and heated debate, the statement on International Policy
and Defence was adopted by a massive margin of nearly 2 million votes,
as Lansbury’s motion to reference it back was defeated by 2,169,000
to 262,000 votes.92 Bullock notes the role of the Spanish Civil War in
prompting this change, that ‘More than anything else it was the
Spanish Civil War which produced the swing in Labour opinion
between 1936 and 1937.’93 Buchanan, somewhat surprisingly,
disagrees, arguing that ‘the conversion to rearmament, while genuine,
was often incidental to labour’s response to the Civil War’.94 It seems
likely, however, that Spain did indeed provide the catalyst for the rejec-
tion of disarmament and non-intervention, but it did so within the
wider context of a build up of awareness that fascism and rearmament
in Europe were not being deterred by the League of Nations’ policies
of conciliation and arbitration.
The period after the Labour minority governments saw significant
transformations in Labour’s foreign policy, with the optimism of the
1920s being replaced by the growing pessimism and fear of fascism in
the 1930s. The initial reaction to the perceived failures of the League
of Nations over its inability to prevent the use of force by Japan in
1931 and then by Italy in 1935 was, paradoxically, to increase support
for the League in the short-term, for there appeared to be no alterna-
tive to this policy. This period saw Labour’s foreign policy shift from a
fairly anti-militaristic, and almost pacifist stance in 1933 to 1936, to
support for rearmament and a policy of strength in the face of the
threat posed by fascism. This was quite a remarkable shift in policy in
a short space of time, resulting in the resignation of George Lansbury
as party leader, and an increase in the influence of trades union move-
ment over foreign policy through the work of the TUC on the
National Council of Labour. In particular, the Spanish Civil War burst
the bubble of popularity of pacifism on the left, destroying the Labour
Party’s stance on pacifism and non-intervention, and paved the way for
its acceptance of intervention and the use of force and the role of
power in international affairs. It meant that when the Chamberlain
government was replaced in 1940, the Labour Party was ready to join
forces with Churchill in a coalition government to support Britain’s
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war effort. It also meant an end to the perception that the Labour
Party stood for non-intervention and was against the use of force as a
tool of foreign policy.
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Chapter 6
Hitler, Munich 
and the Second World War
By 1937 the Labour Party had accepted the need for rearmament 
in the face of the threat posed by Hitler and the growth of fascism in
Europe, whereas the National government combined a policy of 
rearmament along with conciliation towards Hitler. Hitler’s remilitari-
sation of the Rhineland in 1936, in defiance of the Treaty of Versailles,
and his failure to meet Germany’s reparations payments, had been met
with little resistance or even criticism by the British government. By
1937 all the European powers were rearming, with only the United
States holding back from the rapidly escalating arms race, as shown in
Table 6.1. In simple numerical terms, aircraft production had risen in
Germany from just 36 in 1932 to 5,606 in 1937, while in the UK it
had risen from 445 aircraft in 1932 to only 2,153 in 1937.1 Diplomacy
became increasingly tense, and the League of Nations increasingly
redundant.
The British government still went under the title of ‘national’, but
consisted mostly of Conservatives, with only a handful of Liberal and
National Labour ministers, notably Ramsay MacDonald until his
retirement in May 1937. MacDonald’s death in November of that year
was scarcely acknowledged by the Labour Party, which had entered a
period of relative unity in terms of its leadership and for whom the
crisis of 1931 was now in the past. Stanley Baldwin retired from his
post as Prime Minister in May 1937, and was replaced by the sixty-
eight-year-old Neville Chamberlain, also a Conservative. Chamberlain
was appalled at the prospect of war in Europe, and thought that the
best way to avoid war was through concessions to Hitler and
Mussolini. Overall, Chamberlain was ‘Suspicious of the Soviet Union,
disdainful of Roosevelt’s “verbiage”, impatient at what he felt France’s
confused diplomacy of intransigence and passivity, and regarding the
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League as totally ineffective, the prime minister embarked upon his
own strategy to secure lasting peace by appeasement.’2 Not all the
National government agreed with Chamberlain’s policy, and in
February 1938 Anthony Eden resigned as Foreign Secretary after
repeated disagreements with the Prime Minister over his conciliation
towards Germany. Winston Churchill led the parliamentary opposition
to appeasement outside of the government, and his visceral criticisms
of Britain’s failure to rearm quickly enough or to stand up to Hitler
sounded less erratic and more prescient as time went on. These criti-
cisms were echoed, though in slightly more muted tones, by the
Labour Party. Labour seemed relatively isolated at this time, making
little headway either in electoral or policy-making terms. However, the
irony is that despite its isolation from power, it was the Labour Party
that finally brought about the downfall of the Chamberlain govern-
ment in 1940, and it was Labour’s exclusion from government that
meant that it was the only party that was free from the taint of appease-
ment once war broke out.
The Munich crisis
On 12 March 1938 Hitler marched his troops into Austria, annexing
Austria to the German Reich, without arousing much protest from the
British National government. In August Hitler threatened to send
troops into Czechoslovakia to reclaim the German-speaking
Sudetenland, which had been transferred to the Czechs as part of the
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Table 6.1—Defence expenditure totals and as a percentage of national income,
1937
State % of national income Defence expenditure 
spent on defence $000,000
British empire 5.7 1,263
France 9.1 909
Germany 23.5 4,000
Italy 14.5 870
Japan 28.2 1,130
USA 1.5 992
USSR 26.4 5,026
Source: Figures taken from Quincy Wright, A Study of War (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2nd edn, 1965), appendix 12, table 60, p. 672.
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Versailles Treaty to act as a buffer zone against Germany. Negotiations
with Hitler led to the signing of the Munich Agreement by Britain,
Germany, Italy and France, which ceded the Sudetenland back to
Germany on the condition that Hitler would not invade
Czechoslovakia. The Soviet government had made known its willing-
ness to combine with Britain and France to defend Czechoslovakia
against German aggression, but the offer was ignored, and the Soviet
Union and Czechoslovakia were both excluded from the negotiations
at Munich.3 Hitler was surprised by the easy success of his territorial
claim to the Sudetenland, having expected his armed diplomacy to
provoke a confrontation from Britain and France. Neville Chamberlain
returned from Munich on 30 September to a rapturous welcome from
the British public, declaring that his policy of appeasement had guar-
anteed ‘peace with honour’ and ‘peace for our time’. The agreement
reached at Munich by Britain, Germany, France and Italy was that
Czechoslovakia would start to evacuate the Sudetenland on 1 October,
on which date German troops would begin to occupy these territories,
and that this process would be completed by 10 October.4
The Labour Party was less sanguine about the agreement reached
at Munich than the National government. During the Czech crisis the
National Council of Labour had stated that ‘The British Government
must leave no doubt in the mind of the German Government that they
will unite with the French and Soviet Governments to resist any attack
on Czechoslovakia.’5 This position, based on the assumption of collec-
tive action, continued throughout the crisis. However, the possible
military consequences if collective action short of the use of force were
to fail were not explained by the Labour Party. Its position was in
contrast to the Conservative-dominated National government, which
did not even share the assumption of co-operation with France and the
Soviet Union. Labour did not support the terms of the Munich agree-
ment, seeing it as ‘a shameful betrayal of a peaceful and democratic
people’, and urged Chamberlain to discuss the agreement in
Parliament before signing proposals ‘which contemplate the dismem-
berment of a sovereign State at the dictation of the ruler of Germany’.6
During the three-day debate in the House of Commons on the situa-
tion in Europe and the Munich Agreement, Attlee argued that ‘The
events of these last few days constitute one of the greatest defeats this
country and France have ever sustained. There can be no doubt that it
is a tremendous victory for Herr Hitler.’ Munich, he said, left him with
the same emotions he had at the evacuation of Gallipoli, a mixture of
humiliation, relief, and foreboding. He continued:
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We all feel relief that war has not come this time. Every one of us has been
passing through days of anxiety; we cannot, however, feel that peace has
been established but that we have nothing but an armistice in a state of
war. We have been unable to go in for carefree rejoicing. We have felt 
that we are in the midst of a tragedy. We have felt humiliation. This 
has not been a victory for reason and humanity. It has been a victory for
brute force.7
On 5 October the Chancellor of the Exchequer put forward a motion
approving the government’s foreign policy ‘by which war was averted
in the recent crisis and supports their efforts to secure a lasting peace’.
Arthur Greenwood, the Deputy Leader of the Labour Party, put
forward an amendment to this motion, stating that Parliament, ‘while
profoundly relieved that war has been averted for the time being,
cannot approve a policy which has led to the sacrifice of
Czechoslovakia under threat of armed force and to the humiliation of
our country and its exposure to grave dangers’. He called instead for
support for collective security through the League of Nations, and for
the government to initiate ‘a world conference to consider the removal
of economic and political grievances which imperil peace’.8 The House
of Commons then passed the motion of confidence in the govern-
ment’s foreign policy by 366 votes to 144, and the Labour amendment
was rejected by 369 votes to 150.9 Nineteen Conservatives abstained
from voting, including Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, and Harold
Macmillan.10
Only a very few in the Labour Party disagreed with the party’s
position in rejecting the Munich Agreement, most notably George
Lansbury, who had urged further conciliation with Hitler. Philip Noel-
Baker rather cruelly pointed out at the 1941 Labour Conference that
‘The road to war, and I say it with all veneration, was paved with
Lansbury’s good intentions.’11 Lansbury had caused consternation on
the left when he took independent diplomatic action by visiting Hitler
on 19 April 1937 in an attempt to negotiate personally with the
German leader. Lansbury found that ‘The whole talk was as satisfac-
tory as those with Blum and Roosevelt. Hitler treated the interview
very seriously. I think he really wants peace.’ Lansbury felt ‘The discus-
sion was quite a triumph.’12 He reported that Hitler ‘will not go to war
unless pushed into it by others’.13 The German Social Democrats
protested to the Labour Party that they had been ‘amazed to learn’
that Lansbury had ‘undertaken an independent diplomatic action with
Hitler. This step shows neither willingness to help the German oppo-
sition in their bitter struggle, nor understanding for their point of
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view.’ They further argued that Lansbury’s meeting assisted the Nazis
in their propaganda, and gave the impression that Hitler was willing to
come to an understanding.14
After the immediate Munich crisis had passed, the Labour leader-
ship was slightly more cautious in its support for collective action
against the German menace. In its November pamphlet, The Full Facts
of the Czech Crisis, the Labour Party’s official line was that ‘war was not
the alternative’ at the time of the Munich crisis.15 However, still
unhappy at the government’s policy of appeasement towards Hitler,
Hugh Dalton for the PLP proposed a motion of no confidence in the
government’s foreign policy on 19 December 1938. After a debate
that went on until 11.00pm, the motion was defeated by 340 to 143
votes.16 Rather confusingly, Labour continued to oppose conscription,
while at the same time advocating action against Hitler. This exasper-
ated the Conservative rebels, and occurred at a time when ‘public
opinion had been coming round to the idea that Labour, not the
Tories, were the patriots’.17 Labour voted against the National Service
Bill in April 1939, which provided for compulsory military training of
all men aged twenty to twenty-one years, with the National Council of
Labour announcing its ‘uncompromising opposition’ to conscription
in April 1939.18 Attlee later told his biographer that ‘the line he took
against conscription in 1939 was a mistake’, and that the Labour Party
did not realise ‘the ‘extent to which its stand on conscription would be
misinterpreted’. Apart from the ‘various rational objections to
conscription at the time’, the ‘real motive for resisting the idea was
distrust of Chamberlain’, who had previously assured the Labour Party
that conscription would not be introduced in return for its support for
the government’s scheme for voluntary recruitment to the military.19
Attlee had argued at the time that the Prime Minister was breaking the
pledge he had given to the country that compulsory military service
would not be introduced in peace-time; that this would add to ‘the
already widespread distrust of the Prime Minister’; and that rather than
strengthening the armed forces, he would be ‘sowing division in the
ranks’ and undermining the national effort.20 The party’s opposition to
conscription was reaffirmed at the 1939 annual conference in May
when a resolution proposed by the NEC was passed by 1,967,000
votes to 574,000.21 In addition, this resolution, also released as a state-
ment on Labour and Defence, called for the establishment of a Ministry
of Supply, and urged the democratisation of the armed forces through
reforms in conditions and in the appointment and promotion of 
officers.22 At this conference the Labour Party also urged action to face
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the fascist menace, arguing that the military guarantees made to
Poland, Turkey, Greece and Rumania, should be extended to the
Soviet Union, as ‘Moscow is a custodian of peace.’23 Whereas the
Labour Party had criticised Britain’s bilateral alliances for being partly
responsible for the First World War, it was now calling for a strength-
ening of such alliances, particularly an Anglo-Soviet pact.24 The Soviet
Union was seen as a vital ally in any fight against fascism. 
On 18 April the Soviet Foreign Minister, Maxim Litvinov, had
proposed an Anglo-Soviet pact, but Chamberlain had only very reluc-
tantly and belatedly opened negotiations. These culminated in a British
mission to Moscow in the middle of August, by which time Litvinov
had been replaced by Molotov. While these discussions were
adjourned, the German Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, arrived to
discuss a rival German-Soviet pact. The signing of the non-aggression
pact between the Soviet Union and Germany was announced on 23
August 1939, signalling a realignment of Soviet foreign policy. The
Nazi-Soviet pact not only provided Hitler with an assurance of non-
interference from the Soviet Union, and a pledge that neither party
would attack the other or aid any other country or coalition that did
so, but it also divided Poland and the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia
and Estonia between Germany and the Soviet Union.
The Labour Party was shocked to find that the negotiations for the
non-aggression pact had been ‘proceeding secretly and concurrently’
with the discussions between Britain, France and the Soviet Union on
collective action against Germany.25 This development destroyed not
only Labour’s foreign policy regarding German aggression, which was
based on co-operation with France and the Soviet Union to deter
Hitler, but also for some the faith that they had held in the Soviet
Union. Coming after the purges and show trials of the 1930s, Stalin’s
willingness to collude with Hitler reinforced the view that Soviet
communism had been corrupted. Walter Citrine told the TUC annual
conference that the apologists for the Soviet Union have blinded them-
selves for years, while they ‘have seen a dictatorship in Russia as severe
and as cruel as anything that has happened in Germany’.26 However,
some on the left blamed the British and French governments’ exclu-
sion of the Soviet Union in the Munich discussions and their reluc-
tance to enter into negotiations on multilateral treaties with the Soviets
for this development to a greater or lesser extent. They argued that the
Soviet Union feared that it would be ‘double-crossed in the long-run’
by Britain and France, and that it was merely remaining neutral in the
same way that the USA had done during the early years of the First
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World War.27 Nevertheless, Stalin’s rapprochement with Hitler gave
the Labour Party greater opportunity to oppose requests from the
British Communist Party for a united campaign and national front.
This standpoint was reinforced when the Soviet Union invaded
Poland’s eastern territories on 17 September, and again when it
invaded Finland on 30 November 1939. Dalton referred to this latter
act as ‘indefensible’ in the House of Commons,28 while the National
Council of Labour issued a statement on 7 December declaring that
the British labour movement ‘views with profound horror and indig-
nation’ the Soviet government’s ‘unprovoked attack’ upon Finland,
and that ‘Soviet Imperialism has thus revealed itself as using the same
methods as the Nazi power against which the British Working-class is
united in the War now raging.’ In particular, the NEC said that British
labour ‘repudiate utterly’ the claims of the Soviet government to be
the ‘leader of the World’s Working-class Movement, guardian of the
rights of peoples against their oppressors, interpreter of Socialist prin-
ciples, and the custodian of International Peace’.29 Following a request
from the Finnish Labour Party, a delegation was sent to Finland, which
reported back in March 1940 that the Finnish resistance could have
continued the struggle against the Soviet forces for much longer had
they received more assistance from Britain.30 The Soviet invasions of
Poland and Finland marked the ‘severance of the umbilical cord of
socialism’ which had formerly connected the centre and the right of
the Labour Party to the Soviet Union.31 They also resulted in the utter
isolation of those on the left who continued to express support for the
Soviet Union.
Despite the setback of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact, the
National Council of Labour upheld its support in August 1939 for ‘the
obligations undertaken by Britain in defence of the independence of
Poland shall be honoured to the full’.32 On 25 August the National
Council of Labour issued a message to the German people, that ‘We
have no wish to destroy the German people. We have been, we still are,
your friends.’ However, if Hitler attacked Poland, Britain would stand
firmly by its pledge to Poland, despite the German pact with Moscow.
It said that if war came, then Britain and France would command the
seas, cutting off the supply of raw materials and foodstuffs to Germany,
thus lowering the standard of living in Germany even further.33 On 1
September Germany invaded Poland. On 2 September the PLP and
the party’s NEC agreed that Arthur Greenwood, acting party leader
owing to Attlee’s absence due to ill-health, should inform the Prime
Minister that they were ‘prepared to support the fulfilling of the Treaty
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with Poland’.34 The party also voted in support of conscription by fifty-
one to fifteen votes, a reversal of their earlier policy.35 In the House of
Commons that evening, there was as an ‘eruption of revolt’ at
‘Chamberlain’s apparent continued equivocation’.36 When Arthur
Greenwood rose to speak for the Labour Party, the anti-appeaser
Conservative Leo Amery shouted ‘Speak for England, Arthur!’
Greenwood called on the government to end its vacillations ‘at a time
when Britain and all Britain stands for, and human civilization, are in
peril’, to honour its treaty obligations with Poland, and to declare ‘It
is either peace or war’.37 The following morning at 9.00am, the British
Ambassador in Berlin delivered an ultimatum to the German Foreign
Minister, for Germany to withdraw its forces from Poland. This ulti-
matum expired at 11.00am, at which time Chamberlain announced in
a broadcast to the nation that Britain was at war with Germany. In
contrast to the outbreak of the First World War, the Labour Party,
already appalled at the fascist triumphs in Spain as well as Austria and
Czechoslovakia, whole-heartedly backed the use of force to counter
German aggression. The TUC also supported the use of force, passing
a declaration at the annual congress on 4 September in vivid language,
stating that, 
Under its leadership of its Nazi Dictators, Germany has destroyed the
Peace and order of the World. By an appalling act of injustice and ill will
it has once more broken faith with the civilised nations and has deliber-
ately provoked armed conflict in Europe to further its aims of domination
and conquest … No concessions that Poland could have made would have
saved her people from the dismemberment that befell the brave Czech
nation. Nor would compliance with these demands have satisfied the
insane ambition of Germany’s rulers. It would not have saved the Peace
of Europe … The defeat of ruthless aggression is essential if liberty and
order are to be re-established in the World. Congress, with a united and
resolute nation, enters the struggle with a clear conscience and steadfast
purpose.38
The Labour Party embraced the war because it thought that there
was no chance of a peaceful settlement with Hitler. Indeed, it was
‘astonished’ that anybody could expect compromise with dictators,
and stated that ‘We declare once more that we can have no part,
directly or indirectly, in a policy of accommodation, and that the neces-
sary prelude to a just Peace is total victory.’39 However, the party
presented its position in terms of support of international working-
class solidarity, the sanctity of international law, and the expression of
international morality, and said that the party ‘regards victory as the
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only basis upon which the achievement of its ideals becomes possi-
ble’.40 The party thus could present the war as compatible with earlier
foreign policy statements. Attlee said at the 1940 annual conference
that ‘We have to preserve the hope of our movement. Whatever may
be the conditions in capitalist democracies, there is always that hope,
there is always that opportunity; but where Nazism reigns all hope is
gone.’41 In contrast, the ILP refused to support the government in its
war against Germany. At its 1940 annual conference in March, it
adopted a resolution describing the war as imperialist, and urged that
it be brought to an end.42 On 5 December 1940 the ILP tabled a
motion in the House of Commons criticising the government for
failing to organise a conference to negotiate peace. This gained only
four votes, and was massively defeated.43
The Labour Party and the Second World War
While Labour experienced a sense of relief once war had broken out,
believing the use of force to be the only deterrent to Nazi aggression,
some sought to apportion blame for the war to the Conservatives. The
argument was that since the Labour Party was not responsible for
governing Britain, they were not to blame for the war. Guilty Men,
written anonymously by Michael Foot and the journalists Frank Owen
and Peter Howard over a four-day period in June 1940, produced an
excoriating criticism of the government’s policy of appeasement and its
failure to rearm and to prepare for war. In particular, it accused
Chamberlain and his colleagues of sending men into battle ‘without a
chance’, when they were unprepared and did not possess the necessary
weapons and equipment.44 Attlee said at the 1941 Labour Party
conference that, ‘If our policy had been followed, you would never
have had this war.’45 Bevin, on the other hand, took a more magnani-
mous viewpoint about responsibility for pre-war policy:
If anybody asks me who was responsible for the British policy leading up
to the war, I will, as a Labour man myself, make a confession and say, ‘All
of us.’ We refused absolutely to face the facts. When the issue came of
arming or rearming millions of people in this country, people who have
an inherent love of peace, we refused to face the real issue at a critical
moment. But what is the good of blaming anybody?46
The party’s NEC and the PLP had agreed not to join a coalition
government headed by Chamberlain, despite several requests to do so,
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because they distrusted him and lacked confidence in his leadership.
This prevented Labour from being associated with Chamberlain’s fail-
ures, while at the same time depriving the Chamberlain government of
the wider legitimacy it would have gained from the support of the main
opposition party. Furthermore, Labour managed to support the war,
but not the government, without appearing to be undermining the war
effort, which leant credence to the developing perspective that Britain
needed a broader coalition government that included all the political
parties. 
Labour’s statements on the long-term aims of the war in the first
few months of hostilities were often slightly nebulous, as were those of
the government. On 16 November Attlee called on Chamberlain for
discussions on the peace aims of Britain and the Commonwealth, for
‘there is a demand in this country for a closer definition of peace aims’
and ‘The people of this country want to know for what we are fight-
ing’, and ‘just what kind of world it is that the Government in their
minds are contemplating when we have brought this war to an end’.47
The Labour Party laid out its long-term plans in a statement on
Labour’s War Aims in February 1940. This statement was far-reaching
and outlined an ambitious view for the future of international relations,
as well as dealing with specific issues such as French and German secu-
rity. It demanded that any ‘Peace Settlement shall establish a new
Association or Commonwealth of States, the collective authority of
which must transcend, over a proper sphere, the sovereign rights of
separate States.’ In addition, ‘Labour will be no party to imperialist
exploitation, whether capitalist or other. Labour, therefore, demands
that Colonial peoples everywhere should move forward as speedily as
possible, towards self-government.’ For these policies to be successful,
a ‘new world order’ based on socialism and democracy must be
founded, for ‘Lasting Peace depends on social justice within States, no
less than on political justice between States.’48 This statement demon-
strates how the Labour Party embraced the war as an opportunity to
create a better international system in the long term, rather than just
as a short-term calamity that needed to be dealt with.
After a period of ‘phoney war’, when the British population had to
adapt to wartime privations while waiting for the war to happen, and
to prepare for air attacks which did not occur, hostilities intensified.49
Hitler successfully invaded the neutral state of Norway in February
1940 despite the presence of a powerful Royal Navy fleet. By 16 April
German forces controlled much of southern Norway, and despite
initial successes, British and French troops abandoned their positions
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in central Norway at the beginning of May. This military failure acted
as a political catalyst in Britain, and during a dramatic and remarkable
two-day Commons debate on the Norwegian campaign on 7 and 8
May, both Labour and a number of Conservatives called for
Chamberlain to resign as Prime Minister. The Conservative Leo
Amery, quoting Cromwell to Chamberlain, said ‘You have sat too long
here for any good you have been doing. Depart, I say, and let us have
done with you. In the name of God, go.’50 Attlee described
Chamberlain’s litany of failures over Czechoslovakia, Poland, and now
Norway.51 Lloyd George, in what was to be his last decisive interven-
tion in the House of Commons, called on Chamberlain to ‘sacrifice the
seals of office’ for he had been ‘worsted’ by Hitler in both peace and
war, and ‘there is nothing which can contribute more to victory in this
war’.52 On the recommendation of the Labour Party’s NEC, the PLP
agreed, though with some dissentients, to vote against the govern-
ment’s adjournment on the handling of the war.53 This, in effect,
meant a vote of censure on Chamberlain’s leadership. Only 481 out of
615 MPs voted in the division of 8 May, giving a result of 281 votes
to 200.54 Forty-two Conservatives voted with Labour. While this still
gave the National government a majority, it had been reduced to
eighty-one, at a time when the government’s formal majority was 220.
Given the outcome of the division and the vehemence of the proceed-
ing debate, Chamberlain realised he could not sustain the confidence
of Parliament. This was to be the only occasion in the twentieth
century when a majority government was forced out of office by a vote
in the House of Commons.55
On 9 May Attlee and Greenwood visited Chamberlain, and he
‘begged’ them to join a coalition government under his premiership,
to which Attlee replied that this was impossible and that the mood of
the country required a new leader.56 Attlee later wrote with character-
istic understatement that he found ‘It was not a pleasant task to tell a
Prime Minister that he ought to go, but I had no option but to tell him
the truth’.57 Chamberlain also asked whether Labour would join a
coalition government led by someone other than himself, to which
Attlee replied that he would have to consult the party. The party was
duly consulted the following day, which was the first day of the Labour
Party annual conference at Bournemouth, when the NEC decided
unanimously that Labour would serve under a new prime minister.
This decision also had the approval of the General Council of the
TUC. Attlee and Greenwood returned to London immediately, where
they were asked to meet with Churchill. Discussions had been going
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on about the premiership between Chamberlain and Churchill and
Lord Halifax, the two front-runners to succeed him, but Halifax had
said that he felt that his position as a Peer, and thus a member of the
House of Lords rather than the House of Commons, would make it
very difficult for him to discharge the duties of Prime Minister.58 This
meant that the premiership went to Churchill. Churchill formed a
coalition government on 10 May 1940, the day that Hitler invaded
both Holland and Belgium. Labour had agreed to two seats out of five
in the new War Cabinet, to be filled by Attlee and Greenwood, and
one out of the three defence ministries, with A. V. Alexander replacing
Churchill at the Admiralty. Attlee became Lord Privy Seal and Deputy
Leader of the House of Commons, and Greenwood became Minister
without Portfolio. Ernest Bevin, who had been elected MP for
Wandsworth at a bye-election in 1940, became Minister of Labour and
National Service on 3 October. Hugh Dalton headed the Ministry for
Economic Warfare. Morrison became the Home Secretary. Stafford
Cripps was appointed Ambassador to Moscow, which boosted his
profile once the Soviet Union entered the war, and in March 1942 he
headed a mission to India to secure its support for the war effort
against Japan, and to reach agreement on its post-war constitutional
settlement, in which he was unsuccessful.59 In February 1942, Attlee
was formally appointed as Deputy Prime Minister with responsibility
for domestic policy. 
Little has been written about how the Labour ministers got on
with Churchill. It has been suggested that at one point Attlee had said
that Labour would not serve under Churchill.60 Others cast doubt on
whether this happened. Harris says that Attlee in fact preferred
Churchill to Halifax, and ‘did not feel that the Labour Party’s long-
standing distrust of Churchill, mainly because of his behaviour during
the General Strike, was a bar to serving under him in a wartime coali-
tion’.61 Given that Labour did join a Churchill government, this inter-
pretation of events seems the more likely. Churchill says that it was
Chamberlain who implied that the Labour Party would not serve
under him, though this possibility did not seem to worry Churchill,
who says that he still would have formed the strongest government
possible if this had been the case.62 On the whole, Attlee defended the
actions of the coalition government, and called for national unity and
support from the labour movement. This did provoke some criticism
from within the party; for instance, on the eve of the June 1941
conference, Nye Bevan accused the Labour leadership of insisting
upon regarding itself as a junior partner in the government.63 Overall,
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however, this criticism was fairly muted. The issue that was to provoke
the most criticism from within the Labour Party was over the opening
of a Second Front. 
On 22 June 1941, Hitler had invaded the Soviet Union, thus
breaking the non-aggression pact. From this point onwards, the Soviet
Union became an ally in the fight against Nazism, and Stalin called for
the immediate opening of a second major front on the European main-
land in order to divert pressure away from the Red Army, which was
struggling in its fight against the invading German forces on Soviet
territory. From this point onwards, a campaign was waged by the
Soviet Today Society, a communist organisation, to lobby the British
government to open a Second Front, and a series of ‘spectacular’ meet-
ings were held all over the country.64 Within the Labour Party, the
Second Front campaign was led by Nye Bevan, who spoke on plat-
forms with communist supporters, which was against Labour Party
rules. However, Labour ministers within the coalition government
‘were largely unsympathetic to left-wing demands for even more aid to
Russia’.65 During a debate in the House of Commons on the progress
of the war, Labour back-benchers called for a Second Front and for
Britain to provide maximum assistance to Russia, to which Attlee
replied that ‘There would be nothing more stupid … than to make a
futile and dangerous gesture for fear someone should think that you
were not doing your best.’ He went on that the government shared the
public’s concern that everything should be done to support Russia,
and ‘We shall give all we can to Russia, but, remember, it has to come
out of our production, which is not yet adequate for all our own
needs.’66 To some extent the reluctance of Attlee and the other Labour
ministers to get involved in the calls for a Second Front was because,
publicly at least, they left strategic decisions to Churchill. Concern that
the Soviet Union might try to extend its influence over Europe once
Germany had been defeated may also have contributed to their reluc-
tance to appease the calls for more assistance to Russia. Once the
Soviet Union had entered the war on the side of the Allies, its popu-
larity dramatically increased, which was also a cause for concern for the
centre-right leadership of the Labour Party.
Despite the acquiescence over the issue of the Second Front, at
this point the leadership of the Labour Party still argued that it had a
distinct foreign policy from that of the previous National government
or a future Conservative government. In particular, this was over their
vision of the post-war world, of a ‘new world order’ based on ‘social-
ism and democracy’.67 The NEC said that, ‘The Labour Party reaffirms
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its conviction that there is no road to enduring Peace save by the
growing acceptance of Socialist principles. No peace, therefore, which
does not aim at a Socialist reconstruction of international society can
be accepted by the Labour Party as adequate.’68 Within the Labour
Party, ‘the war was considered to have accelerated important changes
that would ultimately rebound to Labour’s advantage’, as increased
planning and state intervention became accepted by the population.69
Indeed, Attlee made a point of asserting that ‘the Labour Party was not
only supporting the government of the day in the cause of security and
justice but was in the war to fight for its own existence and its own
vision of what society should be’.70 This applied not only to Britain,
but also to the international arena, where Attlee said that ‘the world
that must emerge from this war must be a world attuned to our
ideals’.71 In particular, it was argued that the post-war settlement
needed to include international economic planning, for the world was
‘a single economic unit’. This needed to be combined with the estab-
lishment of an international organisation ‘possessing many powers
hitherto exercised by a competing anarchy of national sovereignties’.72
The party focused on outlining Labour’s policies for after the war,
setting up a committee to study the problems of post-war reconstruc-
tion on 6 August 1941, and drawing up Labour’s blueprint for the
post-war international order. In the spring of 1942, the NEC issued an
interim report on The Old World and the New Society, which was
discussed in regional conferences. This declared that the revolutionary
impact of the war meant that the ‘old world’ of 1939 was dead, and its
ideas were ‘already obsolete’. In terms of international relations,
national sovereignty would have to be given up, with a new, much
stronger version of the League of Nations forming a superstructure
through which a new World Society could be formed, founded upon
democratic Socialist ideas.73 At the 1942 annual conference, the NEC’s
resolution on the international situation gave far greater emphasis to
collaboration with the Soviet Union, both ‘in victory and peace’.74
At the 1943 annual conference delegates called for a more specific
statement of post-war aims. Consequently the NEC appointed Hugh
Dalton to prepare one. Dalton, who had been instrumental in shifting
Labour to support rearmament, was determined to impress his
personal views on the statement. He saw to it that he was named to
prepare each revision of the document, though he was forced to accept
substantial additional sections written by Harold Laski and Noel-
Baker.75 This document, The International Post-War Settlement,
argued that,
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[W]e must begin, without delay, to build a World Order, in which all
people unite to pursue their common interests. We are confident that the
vital interests of all nations are the same. They all need Peace; they all need
security and freedom; they all need a fair share in that abundance which
science has put it into our power to create.
The document also emphasised the need for ‘the closest possible
Anglo-American-Russian co-operation’. However, it moved away from
traditional Labour Party policy in that it saw the basis of a future world
organisation as being a continuation of the relationship between these
three Great Powers, rather than some form of League of Nations.
Pacifism had been proved to be ‘an unworkable basis of policy’.
Instead, ‘Strength is essential to safety and, as we now know, there 
are terrible risks in being weak. It is better to have too much armed
force than too little’. This was a rejection of Labour’s policy for 
much of the 1930s. Joint occupation of Germany was suggested as ‘a
practical experiment in an international force’. It did sound a more
traditional note with its argument that ‘The international political
organisation must establish the binding force of international law’, 
its call for a World Court of International Justice, and its call for 
disarmament to be a major object of a future international political
organisation. The document also called for new forms of international
economic organisation, ‘new international institutions and agreements
to plan relief and rehabilitation, to organise abundant world-wide 
food supplies, to regulate international trading and transport and
monetary relationships’.76 This document contained a clear and new
vision of Labour’s foreign policy, and was actually very prescient 
in many of its propositions, reflecting an understanding of the need 
for a post-war international regime that provided for economic growth
as well as control of military aggression. This held echoes of the
American New Deal, though there does not seem to have been 
much contact between the Labour Party and the American Democrats
at this point. For the Labour Party, these ideas came from a combina-
tion of its socialist faith in economic planning, transferred to the 
international arena, the liberal doctrine of free trade as a tool for
preventing conflict, and its enduring belief in internationalism. The
document on the International Post-War Settlement was approved 
at the 1944 annual conference by an overwhelming majority. However,
when Attlee moved the resolution supporting this document he 
reassured the delegates at conference that the party still believed that
the foundations of international peace could be strengthened through
the spreading of socialist ideas and the application of socialist measures
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in all parts of the world, along with the close association of socialist
parties in all countries.77
One issue that the Labour Party failed to address in their policy
statements on the nature of the post-war international settlement was
that of decolonisation. At the 1942 annual conference a resolution was
passed that called for the abolition of ‘the status of Colony’, and for all
colonial states to be given independence.78 This went further than
previous Labour Party resolutions on colonial policy in that it
proposed independence rather than self-governing Dominion status,
and covered all of Britain’s colonies. However, at the 1943 annual
conference, the NEC then reverted to Labour’s earlier policy position
by stating that India should become a self-governing Dominion, and
that the goal of the whole Commonwealth, in time, should be politi-
cal self-government, while the ‘Colonial Empire [should] now enter a
period of unprecedented development and progress under the guid-
ance of the Mother Country.’79 Labour Party policy on colonial affairs
at this point was underdeveloped and inconsistent. Indeed, the party’s
leadership had ‘lapsed into near silence on colonial reform’ since the
fall of the second minority Labour government in 1931.80 The Labour
Party Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions had produced a
number of reports, most notably its policy statement of 1933, and
published a pamphlet in 1936 which focused on the fears of a rising
inter-imperialist rivalry in Europe.81 These had been largely ignored
within the party. The lack of any coherent Labour Party policy on colo-
nial affairs had begun to be addressed with the establishment in 1940
of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, but to a large extent this was subsumed
during the war years by the focus on the post-war international system,
rather than concern with ending British imperialism as such. However,
the TUC had taken an increasing interest in colonial affairs, and had
established its own Colonial Advisory Committee in 1937. Against a
backdrop of repression following labour unrest in the West Indies, the
TUC had lobbied the government to introduce legislation for the
establishment of trade unions in the colonies, and to introduce reforms
to improve working conditions and working-class living standards. The
TUC also became increasingly involved in advising the Colonial Office
on labour issues, and in setting up educational links with trade union-
ists in the colonies. Trade union leaders such as Citrine and Bevin saw
the work of the TUC as largely supporting the work of the Colonial
Office in terms of guiding colonial labour organisations away from
militancy. Part of the aim was to prevent trade union movements in 
the colonies falling under the influence of communism, and to foster
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non-political ‘responsible’ trade unionism that focused on bargaining
over working conditions rather than agitating for national independ-
ence. After lobbying by the Labour Party and the TUC, the Colonial
Office established a Colonial Labour Advisory Committee in 1942,
which included representatives from the TUC, and the first British
trade unionists were sent to work as advisors on labour relations to the
local administrations in the colonies. In this way, the TUC became part
of the institutional structures for the oversight of colonial trade union
movements.82
While they reassured the Labour Party of the continuation of the
leadership’s belief in international socialist solidarity, involvement in
the wartime coalition was having a profound effect on Labour’s leaders
such as Attlee and Cripps. Their perspective was shifting away from
their earlier support for a ‘socialist’ foreign policy, while the already
more realist outlook of Bevin and Dalton was further consolidated.
Bullock explains that ‘By joining the coalition the Labour leaders had
recognized that for them, as much as for Churchill and the Tories,
there was an overriding national interest, a concept which many in the
Labour Party had traditionally rejected, in theory at least, as incom-
patible with loyalty to internationalism and irreconcilable with the class
war.’83 This did not, however, mean that deciding on which strategy 
to pursue was unproblematic or without debate. There were huge
arguments within the British coalition government, and between the
British, the United States, the French and the Soviet Union, over 
strategy. Issues that were particularly contentious included whether to
give priority to the Pacific War or to Europe; whether to pursue a
Mediterranean strategy; and when to launch a Second Front. To a large
extent, the Labour Party remained quiet on these issues, restricting
their pronouncements on foreign policy to the outlining of their post-
war aims, though the Second Front was a particular issue to many
because of a sense of solidarity with the Soviet Union. At the wartime
Labour Party annual conferences, the NEC put forward statements
and reports outlining Labour’s position on the war, which took the
place of the usual resolutions on foreign and defence policy, thus limit-
ing debate on the prosecution of the war. 
However, behind the scenes, from 1943 onwards the Labour
government ministers were actively involved in planning British post-
war foreign policy. Attlee was particularly influential in discussions on
the future of Germany and the post-war settlement. In 1943 Churchill
made him chair of all the War Cabinet sub-committees dealing with
British post-war international policy, namely the committee on
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armistice terms, which was replaced by the committee on armistice
terms and civil administration, and the committee on the post-war
settlement, which also included Bevin. Regarding suggestions for a
joint Allied occupation of Germany, Attlee advocated extensive social,
political and economic changes within Germany in order to reorient it,
rather than just limiting the size of its army or prohibiting the produc-
tion of aircraft, as had happened following the First World War.84 More
generally, he also advocated a much closer relationship with the USA
as part of the post-war settlement, arguing that Britain would be
unable to meet all its possible European and imperial commitments
without military support from the USA, particularly within the context
of an expansionist Soviet Union.
During the last few months of the war, Attlee and the Labour
ministers became increasingly involved in the development of the post-
war international settlement. For Labour Party members, their expec-
tations of change in both British foreign policy and in international
relations intensified as victory, and the prospect of a general election,
approached. Denis Healey, then on the left of the Labour Party, told
the annual conference which was held in May 1945, just before the
election, that,
The crucial principle of our own foreign policy should be to protect,
assist, encourage and aid in every way the Socialist revolution wherever it
appears … If the Labour Movement in Europe finds it necessary to intro-
duce a greater degree of police supervision and more immediate and
drastic punishment for their opponents than we in this country would be
prepared to tolerate, we must be prepared to understand their point of
view.85
At this conference, Bevin tried to restrain such sentiments, by asking
the party ‘not to bury its head in the sand.’ If Labour won the elec-
tion,
You will have to form a Government which is at the centre of a great
Empire and Commonwealth of Nations, which touches all parts of the
world, and which will have to deal, through the diplomatic, commercial
and labour machinery with every race and with every difficulty, and every-
one of them has a different outlook upon life.86
However, the phrase that was remembered was Bevin’s claim that 
‘Left understands Left,’ subsequently taken to be a reference to 
the Soviet Union, though Bevin had actually been talking about the 
left in France. Attlee, who had recently returned from the difficult
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negotiations of the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations,
told the conference that ‘I am afraid sometimes people think that if
only we get the nations together they will accept our ideas’ but that it
was not so easy as this.87 He was less sanguine than previously about
the prospects for world peace and international organisation. Indeed,
he and Bevin were far more moderate in their claims about a Labour
government having a new approach to foreign policy than most of the
rest of the Labour Party. 
The 1945 general election 
Foreign policy was not at the forefront of the Labour Party’s
campaign, and people were far more interested in the parties’ plans for
repairing war-torn Britain than in their plans for British foreign policy.
It was found that ‘The issues with which the electors felt vitally
concerned were domestic issues in the popular, non-political, sense of
the term.’ Foremost of these was housing. A poll taken by the British
Institute of Public Opinion during the election campaign that asked
‘what questions do you think will be the most discussed in the General
Election?’ found that 41 per cent of people answered housing, while
only 5 per cent said international security.88 One interesting aspect of
the campaign was that Attlee and Bevin expressed hope that the agree-
ment on foreign policy by the wartime coalition could be continued
into peacetime. Bevin declared that ‘The foreign policy being pursued
at the moment was devised by the Coalition Government, not by the
Tory members alone, but by a combined effort and is based upon
collective security, a policy for which Labour has always stood. As long
as that object is vigorously pursued, then Labour will find an opportu-
nity of co-operating with all other parties.’89 Furthermore, the 1945
Labour Party election manifesto, Let Us Face the Future, did not
promise a socialist foreign policy. Rather, it stated that ‘We must
consolidate in peace the great war-time association of the British
Commonwealth with the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.’90 This hardly
differed from the Conservative Party’s manifesto, which stated that
‘Our alliance with Soviet Russia and our intimate friendship with the
U.S.A. can be maintained only if we show that our candour is matched
by our strength’, and that, ‘Our prevailing hope is that the foundations
[of peace] will be laid on the indissoluble agreement of Great Britain,
the United States and Soviet Russia.’91 The only other Labour Party
comment referring to the Soviet Union was, ‘Let it not be forgotten
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that in the years leading up to the war the Tories were so scared of
Russia that they missed the chance to establish a partnership which
might well have prevented the war.’92 The Labour Party, it was implied,
could handle the Soviet Union, unlike the Conservatives.
This criticism did not commit the Labour Party to any ‘socialist’
foreign policy. While the Conservative manifesto gave greater empha-
sis to the British empire and to defence than the Labour one, the lack
of comment by the Labour Party meant that it was left with greater
freedom of action later on. In fact, Churchill himself had reassured the
House of Commons, when he announced that Attlee would accom-
pany him to the Potsdam conference in July, that he and Attlee ‘have
always in these last few years thought alike on the foreign situation and
agreed together’. At the conference ‘there will be an opportunity for it
to be shown that, although Governments may change and parties may
quarrel, yet on some of the main essentials of foreign affairs we stand
together’.93 That the Labour Party leadership was likely to take a
strong line on the Soviet Union became clear at Potsdam. James
Byrnes, the US Secretary of State, noted that ‘Britain’s stand on the
issues before the (Potsdam) conference was not altered in the slightest,
so far as we could discern, by the replacement of Mr. Churchill and Mr.
Eden by Mr. Attlee and Mr. Bevin. This continuity of Britain’s foreign
policy impressed me.’ Byrnes also wrote that at the first meeting with
Attlee and Bevin, Bevin’s manner towards the Soviet demands for East
Prussia ‘was so aggressive that both the President and I wondered how
we would get along with this new Foreign Minister’.94
In contrast, those on the Labour left had been busy setting as
much distance been a Conservative and a Labour foreign policy as
possible. Laski argued that Attlee could not commit the Labour Party
to support unconditionally any decisions made by Churchill at
Potsdam: ‘When we win this election, we want to be free in Socialist
terms to make our policy for our own Socialist purposes.’95 Therefore,
the Labour Party could not be committed to any decisions made at
Potsdam, which would not have been debated by the party NEC or the
Parliamentary Labour Party, for ‘Labour has a foreign policy which in
many respects will not be continuous with that of a Tory-dominated
Coalition. It has, in fact, a far sounder foreign policy.’96 Of course,
hardly anyone on the left actually expected Labour to win. Possibly, for
many, it was the case that it was better to lay out a socialist foreign
policy in principle, because they would not have to put one into prac-
tice. The general election of 5 July 1945, much to the party leaders’
amazement, resulted in not only a Labour victory but also a Labour
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landslide. Labour won 393 seats and 47.8 per cent of the vote. The
Conservatives won 213 seats and 39.8 per cent of the vote. The Liberal
vote collapsed to 9 per cent, and they gained a meagre twelve seats.97
The Labour Party had been helped by the strength of the vote received
from servicemen overseas, and from those in the electorate for whom
this was their first chance to vote, the last election having been held in
1935. It was a ‘very surprised’ Clement Attlee who went to
Buckingham Palace to form a government on 26 July 1945.98 Bevin
the trade union leader, who was expecting the post of Chancellor, was
appointed as Foreign Secretary. Dalton the Labour Party intellectual,
who had expected this post due to his interest and knowledge in
foreign affairs, was appointed as Chancellor.99 The next day Attlee and
Bevin left for the Potsdam conference, the last major Allied conference
of the war, replacing Churchill in the negotiations. At this conference
an Allied Council of Foreign Ministers was established, consisting of
representatives from Britain, the USA, the Soviet Union and France, to
draft peace treaties with Germany and Japan. 
Both at the time and subsequently, people have been surprised not
only that Bevin was made Foreign Secretary, but also that he turned
out to be so knowledgeable and adept at it. He was the illegitimate son
of a farm-worker who left school at eleven.100 He had joined the
Marxist Social Democratic Federation, but subsequently developed a
hatred of communists. He made a name for himself as a union activist,
and was the driving force behind the formation of the Transport and
General Workers Union in 1922, becoming its General Secretary. This
was the largest union in Britain, and came to be remarkably powerful.
Bevin’s antipathy to communists was due in particular to what he saw
as the ‘attempt by the Communists to break up the Union that I
built’.101 He spent much of the 1920s and 1930s defending ‘his’ union
against communists. Along with Walter Citrine, he took a leading role
in moving the Labour movement to a position of supporting rearma-
ment in the late 1930s. Therefore, he had had years of dealing with
recalcitrant trade unionists, and in dealing with his overseas counter-
parts within the very active and buoyant international trade union
movement. He was a forceful individual who did not suffer fools
gladly, and anyone who opposed him was seen as a fool or as an enemy.
Bevin was not only the first foreign secretary in a majority Labour
government, but he is, to date, the longest-serving Labour foreign
secretary.
The Second World War marked a decisive break with the past for
the Labour Party, as ‘The pessimistic mood of the post-1931 period,
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coloured by talk of class struggle and division, was swept away in the
crisis of national survival.’102 It pointed to the way that Labour govern-
ments in the future would approach foreign and defence policy.
Labour had rejected appeasement as it did not think that there was any
chance of a peaceful settlement with Hitler, thus ending its flirtation of
the 1930s with pacifism, and its traditional rejection of the use of force.
The war also seemed to vindicate the necessity of policies that Labour
had been advocating, such as state planning. It produced a changed
ideological climate that made socialism more acceptable, and ideas
such as equity and social justice both at home and abroad more preva-
lent. Unlike the Conservatives, the Labour Party spent much of its
time thinking about what would happen when victory was won, and
the party’s apparatus of committees focused on developing ideas about
the future international order. Labour wanted nothing less than the
radical restructuring of British society, and the radical restructuring of
the international order that had brought about both the world wars.
Their vision of a post-war international order was to be based on the
acceptance of the idea of subordinating national sovereignty to world
institutions and obligations, and on the need for international
economic planning. Within the coalition government, Attlee had a
significant input into the development of the post-war settlement,
especially over Germany. The Labour government ministers were
actively involved in planning British post-war foreign policy, whilst the
Labour Party planned for their version of the post-war world, based on
a complete overhaul of international relations. While Attlee had at first
encouraged this perspective, by the end of the Second World War he
was distancing himself from some of his earlier claims of a new world
order based on socialism and democracy, and calling for the party to
have rather more cautious ambitions for both the new world order and
the future of British foreign policy. However, by then there was a
distinct divergence between the expectations of the Labour Party
membership and the expectations of the very top of the Labour Party
leadership, and this was to become the main issue of contention for the
Attlee government.
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Chapter 7
The Attlee governments
The election of a majority Labour government in 1945 generated great
excitement on the left. Hugh Dalton described how ‘That first sensa-
tion, tingling and triumphant, was of a new society to be built. There
was exhilaration among us, joy and hope, determination and confi-
dence. We felt exalted, dedication, walking on air, walking with
destiny.’1 Dalton followed this by aiding Herbert Morrison in an
attempt to replace Attlee as leader of the PLP.2 This was foiled by the
bulky protection of Bevin, outraged at their plotting and disloyalty.
Bevin apparently hated Morrison, and thought of him as ‘a scheming
little bastard’.3 Certainly he thought Morrison’s conduct in the past
had been ‘devious and unreliable’.4 It was to be particularly irksome for
Bevin that it was Morrison who eventually replaced him as Foreign
Secretary in 1951.
The Attlee government not only generated great excitement on
the left at the time, but since has also attracted more attention from
academics than any other period of Labour history. Foreign policy is a
case in point. The foreign policy of the Attlee government is attractive
to study because it spans so many politically and historically significant
issues. To start with, this period was unique in that it was the first time
that there was a majority Labour government in British political
history, with a clear mandate and programme of reform. Whereas 
the two minority Labour governments of the inter-war period had had
to rely on support from the Liberals to pass legislation, this time
Labour had power as well as office. It was also seen as the first time that
Labour could really try its hand at international affairs, and certainly
Labour’s supporters expected a new, more internationalist, socialist
and ethical foreign policy from their government. Second, this period
was remarkable in that Labour’s demand for a new world order, based
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on a post-war settlement that included international economic plan-
ning and the creation of a more powerful version of the League of
Nations to provide a collective security superstructure, appeared to
have been met. A new international regime was emerging, largely
through Anglo-American collaboration, based on the International
Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (World Bank), which had been agreed at the Bretton
Woods conference of July 1944, and the United Nations, which had
been established on 26 June 1945. These developments reflected
Labour’s vision outlined in its 1942 and 1944 policy documents, The
Old World and the New Society and The International Post-War
Settlement, for a new multilateral system of organisations to regulate
international relations and the world economy, though the leadership
of the party made no mention of any intention to subordinate national
sovereignty once in power.5 Labour’s vision coincided with America’s
concern for an international regime that provided for international
economic growth through the spread of free trade, buttressed by
domestic economic growth, and for a collective security mechanism to
mitigate the more deleterious effects of balance-of-power politics.6
During the last eighteen months of the war, Attlee, Bevin and Hugh
Dalton, who had become the President of the Board of Trade in 1942,
had become increasingly involved in the development of the post-war
international order. While Winston Churchill had felt that questions of
the post-war settlement should not distract attention from the prose-
cution of the war, it had been the Labour ministers who had responded
to the American plans for the establishment of a multilateral regime.7
These men also embraced the new economic thinking embodied by
Keynes, who had been a crucial figure in the agreements reached at
Bretton Woods. Thus, Labour’s ideas for a new, more regulatory,
framework for international relations coincided with those of the
Roosevelt and Truman administrations, even if they differed somewhat
in their ideological origins, and helped shape the post-1945 interna-
tional economic order.
Third, this is an interesting period to study in terms of Britain’s
changing role in the world. Britain had been the only victorious
European state in the Second World War, which reinforced the
perspective that it was a world leader, and a great and triumphant
power. However, it was at this point in time that it became apparent
for the first time that Britain’s pre-eminent position in the world was
being replaced by the United States, and that Britain was, whether it
really wanted to or not, retreating from its previous imperial position.
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The great power manoeuvring of the European states was being
replaced by the burgeoning contest between the Soviet Union and the
USA, the Cold War, in which British foreign policy was to play a more
minor, but still significant, role. 
There are two main approaches in the extensive literature on the
Labour governments’ foreign policy between 1945 and 1951. The first
is a fairly uncritical approach to what was seen as a surprising degree of
realism demonstrated by the Labour ministers, and praise for Bevin in
particular in his role in involving the United States in a defensive
alliance against the Soviet Union. This is the approach taken in the
work by Bullock, Morgan, Ovendale and Pelling.8 The second is a
highly critical approach, seeing the 1945 Labour government as
dashing the hopes of those on the left for a new, more internationalist
and socialist approach to foreign policy. It presents the Attlee govern-
ment’s foreign policy in terms of a missed opportunity and even a
betrayal of the left. This viewpoint can be found in the work of Saville,
Schneer and Weiler.9 This chapter tries to retain a balance between the
two approaches, a difficult task made harder by the fact that only a
selection of issues can possibly be covered in an overview of this nature.
The chapter focuses on two major areas of foreign policy: first, the
withdrawal and consolidation of the British empire; and second, the
Anglo-American relationship and the emergence of the Cold War. It
also outlines the opposition from within the Labour Party towards the
government’s foreign policy, before finishing with some analysis of
Labour’s defence policy within the context of competing demands for
scarce resources. First, however, it is necessary to point out the context
within which the 1945 Labour government had to develop and imple-
ment foreign policy, that of economic crisis. 
The Attlee government’s foreign policy developed within the
context of an immediate economic crisis, a recurring theme for Labour
governments. During the war defence expenditure had risen from
£626 million in 1939 to a peak of £5,125 million in 1944.10 Britain
had used up its financial reserves to finance the war effort, and its
manufacturing base had been disrupted. Exports of UK products had
fallen from £471 million in 1938 to a low of £234 million in 1943,
though had risen to £399 million in 1945.11 It owed debts to India,
Canada and Australia totalling £3,567 million as a result of materials
supplied during the war for which payment had been deferred.12
Millions of homes had been destroyed by German bombing. The USA
halted Lend-Lease, the system of American financial aid that had done
much to sustain the British war effort, abruptly at the end of the war,
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which added to the economic problems. The balance of payments
deficit had risen from £70 million in 1938 to £875 million in 1945.13
The national debt had risen from £7,247 million in 1939 to £21,473
million in 1945.14 Britain managed to negotiate a loan from the USA
in 1946, but not on very favourable terms. This situation was
compounded by the severe winter of 1947, which resulted in coal
shortages. Furthermore, the Labour government was aiming for an
export-led recovery at a time of shortages of raw materials and of full
employment. This increased the need to demobilise troops as soon as
possible. Home consumption was kept low in order to divert goods for
export and allow high levels of investment. There was a convertibility
crisis in 1947, and sterling had to be devalued in September 1949 by
30 per cent.15
In addition to this immediate economic crisis, Britain’s relative
economic decline meant that it could no longer afford to service its
massive empire, and was over-extended in its foreign and defence
policy commitments. While the leaders of the Labour government
recognised that Britain’s power – particularly its economic power – had
diminished as a result of nearly six years of war, they did not fully
comprehend the extent of its weakened position and the long-term
implications Britain’s leaders, both Labour and Conservative, contin-
ued to maintain that the UK had a leading role in world diplomacy and
that Britain was still a great power. Attlee did seek to persuade his
Cabinet colleagues that only by reducing global military commitments
could economic recovery at home proceed, as there was a shortage of
manpower combined with a balance-of-payments deficit.16 But the
problems of maintaining Britain’s world role within its straightened
economic circumstances did not appear to greatly diminish the objec-
tives of British foreign policy, which were to maintain the Common-
wealth structure; to ensure that the Middle East and Asia were ‘stable,
prosperous and friendly’; to maintain a special relationship with the
United States of America; to consolidate stability in Western Europe;
and to resist the expansion of Soviet communism.17 However, it was
not possible to achieve all these objectives at once, in particular because
Britain did not have the resources to implement its global objectives.
Labour and the British empire and commonwealth
When the Labour Party came to power in 1945 one of the major chal-
lenges it faced was how to deal with the British empire. This territory,
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made up of colonies such as India, Sierra Leone, Hong Kong, and
Commonwealth states such as Canada and Australia, was as extensive
as it had been at the height of Britain’s power in the world, and mani-
festly could no longer be maintained. At the end of the war, British
troops were stationed in over forty countries across Europe, the
Middle East, Africa and Asia, as shown in Table 7.1. There was massive
pressure for rapid demobilisation, which was harder for a Labour
government to resist than a Conservative one given Labour’s tradi-
tional rejection of conscription. Furthermore, it was difficult to argue
for the need for large-scale troop mobilisation when Britain did not
have a history of keeping a large army during peacetime. While Britain
ended the war with over five million troops, this was rapidly cut to 3.5
million by December 1945 and to under one million by March 1948.  
Labour’s policy towards the empire/Commonwealth was based
on maintaining a close association with the white Commonwealth
states such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, on
foreign, defence and trade policy. Care was sometimes taken to inform
these states of developments in Britain’s foreign policy, and to try to
secure their support, for example over Britain’s role in Greece.19 This
policy was combined with partial decolonisation. 
There were a number of reasons for cutting back on Britain’s
imperial commitments. First, it was clear that the growing cost of
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Table 7.1—Countries where British forces were stationed in 1945
Europe Africa Middle East Asia Americas
Austria British Somalia Aden Burma Bermuda
Belgium Ethiopia Cyprus Hong Kong British Guyana
Britain Gambia Egypt/Suez India British Honduras
France Ghana Jordan Indonesia Falkland Islands
Germany Kenya Libya Japan Jamaica
Gibraltar Mauritius Muscat/Oman Malaysia/
Greece Nigeria Palestine Singapore
Italy North Rhodesia Trucial States
Netherlands South Rhodesia
Sierra Leone
South Africa
Tanganyika
Uganda
Source: Table taken from David Sanders, Losing an Empire, Finding a Role: British
Foreign Policy since 1945 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), p. 50.
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maintaining the empire could not be met and that it was a practical and
financial impossibility to keep British forces in so many parts of the
world. Second, Britain was under increasing pressure from its allies, in
particular the United States, to dismantle an empire that was seen as
increasingly anachronistic in the post-war world. Third, the growing
strength of nationalist movements in Egypt, parts of West Africa and
Asia, and of course India, added to the problems of maintaining British
rule. Fourth, the Labour Party’s tradition of anti-colonial policy and
rhetoric meant that it had high expectations to meet, both from these
nationalist movements, and from Labour’s supporters at home.
Particular individuals had been very interested in colonial questions,
such as Hardie, Attlee, Cripps and Arthur Creech Jones, who was
Colonial Secretary from 1946 to 1950, and the Labour Party had
devoted considerable attention to colonial issues at various points in
the past. In 1940, the Fabian Research Bureau had established a Fabian
Colonial Research Bureau, which worked hard to develop a credible
policy towards the empire/Commonwealth, and which had a consid-
erable impact on the development of the Attlee government’s colonial
policy. In the case of India, Labour had a historic commitment to inde-
pendence  going back to its 1918 general election manifesto where the
party had called for ‘freedom’ and the right of self-determination.20
Members of the Labour Party had also lobbied when in opposition for
independence for India, and some had links with leaders there such as
Nehru. Labour ministers were sensitive to charges of exploitation of
the British empire, and in particular were aware of the opportunities
for the Soviet Union to use such an accusation for propaganda
purposes against a British socialist government.21
On the other hand, senior ministers such as Bevin were strongly
committed to the British empire, and had not won power in order to
dismantle it. Morgan notes that ‘Attlee, while capable of penning
pungent Cabinet papers which called for imperial retreat and disen-
gagement and the removal of outlying British bases in the new era of
long-range air power, was also able to respond to the call of empire.’22
Bevin had told the 1945 annual Labour Party conference that ‘You will
have to form a Government which is at the centre of a great Empire
and Commonwealth of Nations, which touches all parts of the world.’
He was scornful of those in the Labour Party who felt that a socialist
government could change the fundamental principles of British foreign
policy, for ‘Revolutions do not change geography, and revolutions do
not change geographical need.’23 For Bevin, the empire was not only a
fundamental part of Britain’s history, but also at the heart of its destiny.
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There was the enduring belief that Britain was still a great power, and
as its empire was the most obvious manifestation of its great power
status, this should be protected in order to prevent a loss of prestige
which would lead to a decline in Britain’s influence more generally.24
In addition to this, ministers and many civil servants in the Foreign
Office and the Colonial Office favoured development projects for the
colonies rather than immediate British withdrawal, which, it was
argued, would result in political anarchy and economic mismanage-
ment. The empire provided Britain with valuable bases around the
world, and with access to economic resources and markets, which
might be lost if Britain were to withdraw. There was also concern that
the Soviet Union would move into any vacuum left by Britain’s with-
drawal, which must be avoided at any cost. Bevin had told Byrnes at a
meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow in December
1945 that, ‘Soviet policy was disturbing. It looked as if the Russians
were attempting to undermine the British position in the Middle East.’
He said that, ‘just as a British admiral, when he saw an island, instinc-
tively wanted to grab it, so the Soviet government, if they saw a piece
of land, wanted to acquire it.’25
The result of these contradictory motivations was that Britain
actually expanded its influence in areas like the Persian Gulf, which had
important oil fields, and Cyrenaica, part of the former Italian colony of
Libya. The Labour government also actively aided the restoration of
colonial rule in French Indo-China. Britain maintained its position in
other parts of the empire, for example the Caribbean. In the case of
Malaya, the government resisted the communist insurgency, though
this situation was not resolved until the end of the 1950s.26 On the
other hand, by 1950, Britain had granted independence to Burma,
Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), and India and Pakistan. There were also plans
for Sierra Leone, Uganda, Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), Nyasaland
(Malawi) and Zanzibar. It is not the intention here to analyse the
Attlee government’s hand-over of independence to its former colonies
as detailed accounts already exist.27 However, it is worth noting certain
aspects of the withdrawal from India and Palestine, as the former was,
and is still, generally seen as a success, while the latter, at the time and
subsequently, has been regarded as a failure.
Owen notes that ‘The ending of British rule in India has been
regarded as one of the most decisive achievements of the Attlee gov-
ernments.’28 Morgan that ‘The independence of India, in particular,
became a beacon of freedom for emergent nationalist movements, and
a kind of model for peaceful British withdrawal.’29 Their perspective
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overlooks the fact that by 1945 independence for India was becoming
impossible to resist. The British army would not have been able to
quell the nationalist movement in India, and some troops may have
mutinied if they had been ordered to attempt to do so, as they
expected to be demobilised as quickly as possible and had come to see
continued British rule in India as politically and morally anachronistic.
Labour’s 1945 general election manifesto had contained a commit-
ment to independence for India, and the party had repeatedly passed
resolutions at conference committing it to independence for India
throughout the 1930s and early 1940s. Therefore, the main problem
for the Attlee government was not so much whether to grant inde-
pendence for India, but how this was to be done, given the communal
divisions between Hindus and Muslims. Partly as a result of these divi-
sions, independence was brought forward, and was granted on 15
August 1947. Partition, with the formation of two separate states of
India and Pakistan, was accompanied by intense communal violence.
While Churchill lamented Britain’s withdrawal from India, there was
very little protest from the Conservative Party over it, and it was widely
accepted by the public as the retreat from India had long been antici-
pated. The area where British withdrawal did cause protest in Britain
and abroad was Palestine, and this has subsequently been seen by some
as Bevin’s major foreign policy failure. Avi Shlaim refers to the ‘inex-
cusably abrupt and reckless fashion by which the British government
chose to divest itself of the Mandate for Palestine’.30 Certainly Bevin
was criticised simultaneously as being anti-Semitic and as deserting
Britain’s commitment to an independent Palestine by giving in to 
pressure for a Jewish homeland. However, just as many authors overly
emphasise the success of the role that the Labour government played
in granting independence to India, they apportion too much blame to
the Labour government, and to Bevin in particular, over its handling
of Palestine.
Palestine had become a British mandated territory in 1920 under
the auspices of the League of Nations. Britain gave up its mandate 
in 1947 and withdrew its troops in May 1948. The manner in which
this happened, without any resolution of the competing claims 
for territory, was seen as a humiliation for Britain, which had an on-
going commitment both to the resident Arabs of Palestine and to the
immigrant Jewish population. Tensions between both were intensified
by the desire for a massive Jewish exodus from Europe to the area
following the Holocaust, which Bevin tried to delay as he feared the
consequences of immediate mass immigration. Because of this, Bevin
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(and much of the Foreign Office) was seen as pro-Arab and suspected
of anti-Semitism. The issue caused tension between Britain and the
United States, with President Truman urging the creation of an inde-
pendent Jewish state as soon as possible. Britain, however, had long
been committed to preserving the state of Palestine and granting it
independence under the conditions of its mandate. Bevin feared that
the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine would lead to both immedi-
ate and prolonged conflict in the Middle East. It would be seen as a
betrayal of Britain’s responsibilities towards the Palestinian people, and
would undermine Britain’s relations with Jordan and Iraq (which had
also come under British control by the League of Nations mandate in
1920) and cause tension with Egypt, where 100,000 British troops
were stationed at the Suez Canal. It would also undermine Britain’s
relations with the wider Muslim world, which were extensive due to its
Commonwealth connections. As Britain was unable to resolve the
conflict, and its recommendation for a bi-national state had been
rejected, it returned its mandate to the UN in 1947. The UN recom-
mended the partition of Palestine between the Palestinians and the
Jews, but both groups also rejected this proposal. Britain withdrew its
troops on 14 May 1948, leaving the Jews and the Arabs to settle the
matter themselves.31 David Ben-Gurion immediately declared Israel’s
independence under his premiership, and President Truman unilater-
ally recognised the new state of Israel. Intense fighting followed, in
which the de facto state of Israel was able successfully to defend itself
from attack and make further territorial gains, creating hundreds of
thousands of Palestinian refugees in the process. Britain’s withdrawal –
carried out in spite of, and partly because of, the tensions in the area –
was seen to have been an ignominious end to its role in Palestine. It
was even noted in the House of Commons by Rees-Williams, the
Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, that ‘the withdrawal of the
British Administration took place without handing over to a responsi-
ble authority any of the assets, property or liabilities of the Mandatory
Power. The manner in which the withdrawal took place is unprece-
dented in the history of our Empire.’32 The Labour government’s
inability to resolve the Palestinian situation was a failure, but it was one
to which previous British governments, an array of British politicians,
the actions of other states and the intransigence of both the
Palestinians and the Jews all contributed, and which the UN was also
unable to resolve. It was also a failure that arose out of Britain’s inabil-
ity to impose a solution on the combatants because of its lack of
resources in terms of both military power and political influence.
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Palestine is not the only area of criticism of the Labour govern-
ment’s colonial policy, with some authors pointing out that the Labour
government continued the tradition of developing policy that was
economically beneficial to Britain while taking advantage of the
resources of its empire, in particular through the working of the ster-
ling area dollar pool.33 This meant that certain colonial countries
within the sterling area – whose currencies were fixed to the British
currency – paid dollars into a central pool of gold and dollars held by
the Bank of England, in exchange for sterling. However, this occurred
in part because of Britain’s economic problems, in particular its
balance-of-payments deficit and need for dollars, rather than through
the implementation of a traditional imperial foreign and economic
policy, and because Labour never really accepted the consequences 
of Britain’s straightened circumstances. Bevin was convinced that
Britain was, and should remain, a major force in international politics,
admonishing Michael Foot during a debate on foreign affairs and 
the preparation of a peace treaty with Germany in the House of
Commons that,
His Majesty’s Government do [sic] not accept the view … that we have
ceased to be a great Power, or the contention that we have ceased to play
that role. We regard ourselves as one of the Powers most vital to the peace
of the world, and we still have our historic part to play. The very fact that
we have fought so hard for liberty, and paid such a price, warrants our
retaining that position; and, indeed, it places a duty upon us to continue
to retain it. I am not aware of any suggestion, seriously advanced, that, by
a sudden stroke of fate, as it were, we have overnight ceased to be a great
Power.34
However, while Bevin viewed foreign policy as the maintenance of
Britain’s great power status in the world, many in the Labour Party
were calling for a new approach to foreign policy based on interna-
tional socialist co-operation rather than power politics.
Keep Left and opposition to the Attlee government’s
foreign policy
One of the biggest challenges faced by the Attlee government was the
expectations of change generated by its landslide victory at the elec-
tion. Many of the rank-and-file of the Labour Party, some of the PLP,
and a significant proportion of trade union activists were to the left 
of the leadership of the Labour government. There were expectations
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of wide-ranging change amongst the Labour Party’s supporters in
foreign policy as much as domestic policy. The tension between left
and right within the Labour Party and wider labour movement affected
perceptions on all policy areas, but ‘by far the most contentious areas
of policy within the Labour Party itself were foreign affairs and
defence’.35 In the House of Commons ‘criticism came more frequently
from the Labour left-wingers than from the Conservative benches’.36
The wartime experiences of the Labour leadership meant that figures
such as Attlee had moved from a position of emphasising that ‘There
is no agreement on foreign policy between a Labour Opposition and 
a Capitalist Government’,37 to emphasising the need for continuity 
and stability in foreign policy. However, tensions within the wider
party over issues such as Britain’s relationship with Soviet Russia and
capitalist America, of internationalism versus balance-of-power politics,
and of continued high levels of defence expenditure during the post-
war peace, had not been resolved.
At the 1946 Labour Party annual conference, out of six resolu-
tions on foreign affairs, only one was positive, and that was on the
United Nations. One resolution regretted the ‘Government’s apparent
continuance of a traditionally Conservative Party policy of power 
politics abroad’, and urged ‘a return to the Labour Party foreign policy
of support of Socialist and anti-Imperialist forces throughout the
world’.38 Criticism was made of the lack of change in Foreign Service
personnel; over the barriers of Jewish immigration to Palestine; of the
continued diplomatic relations with the Franco regime in Spain; and
over relations with the Soviet Union.39 All the critical resolutions 
were either withdrawn before being voted upon, or, like the one above,
were defeated, but they still carried a worrying message to the govern-
ment, representing the growing campaign for a ‘Third Force’ in
foreign affairs. 
The repeated protest from the left of the PLP was that, ‘It is felt
that when our policy meets with such hearty approval from the
Opposition, there must be something wrong with it. It is felt that if the
Tories applaud it, it cannot be a Socialist Foreign Policy.’40 Instead, the
advocates of a Third Force called for a foreign policy which would
‘chart a middle way between America and Russia’, as Britain’s ‘historic
role’ was to ‘become the leader of a Third Force in world affairs, polit-
ically democratic, economically socialist, capable of mediating between
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.’.41 The frustration with Bevin’s foreign
policy reached a climax when in November 1946 fifty-seven back-
bench MPs tabled an amendment to the Debate on the King’s Speech,
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laying out the government’s legislation for the coming year. Richard
Crossman, speaking on behalf of them, expressed,
the urgent hope that His Majesty’s Government will so review and recast
its conduct of International Affairs as to afford the utmost encouragement
to, and collaboration with, all Nations and Groups striving to secure full
Socialist planning and control of the world’s resources and thus provide a
democratic and constructive Socialist alternative to an otherwise
inevitable conflict between American Capitalism and Soviet Communism
in which all hope of World Government would be destroyed.42
After the debate, which included a strong defence from Attlee on
behalf of Bevin who was in the United States at the time, Crossman
backed down and unsuccessfully tried to withdraw this amendment.
While none of the Labour MPs voted in favour of it, eighty-two of
them showed their disapproval of the government’s foreign policy by
abstaining from the vote.43 Bevin responded to this episode at the
1947 Labour conference by accusing these rebels of stabbing him in
the back. He went on, somewhat disingenuously, ‘I do say that if you
are to expect loyalty from Ministers, the Ministers – however much
they may make mistakes – have a right to expect loyalty in return. I
grew up in the trade union, you see, and I have never been used to this
kind of thing.’44
There was also a growing level of discontent being expressed by
the left of the trade union movement, again particularly over foreign
policy. At the 1946 TUC conference, only one resolution was
forwarded on foreign policy, but this was highly, and extensively, criti-
cal of the government. This came from a communist member of the
Electrical Trades Union, and stated that ‘This Congress views with
serious concern aspects of the Government’s foreign policy.’ This
concerned policy regarding Greece, Spain, de-Nazification in
Germany, and the Soviet Union, since ‘the isolation of the Soviet
Union, along with the tying of the economy of Britain with that of
Capitalist America is in our view extremely dangerous’.45 This resolu-
tion was defeated by 3,557,000 votes to 2,444,000. However, it suffi-
ciently annoyed the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, that he made
direct reference to it in his speech to the Congress, saying the resolu-
tion was ‘filled with the kind of misrepresentation to which we have
become accustomed from the members of the Communist Party, their
dupes and fellow travellers’.46 The number of critical resolutions being
forwarded, combined with criticism from the left of the PLP, caused
alarm to the Labour leadership. Denis Healey, the Labour Party’s
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International Secretary from 1946 to 1951, noted later that ‘commu-
nist influence in the Labour Party and unions remained a major 
obstacle in my task of winning support for the Government’s foreign
policy’.47
One particular concern for the labour leadership was the applica-
tion in 1946 by the CPGB to affiliate to the Labour Party. This was,
as expected, rejected at the Labour Party’s annual conference. On
Healey’s suggestion, Herbert Morrison successfully moved an amend-
ment to the party constitution to prevent the situation arising again.48
This stipulated that political organisations ‘having their own
Programme, Principles and Policy for distinctive and separate propa-
ganda, or possessing Branches in the Constituencies, or engaged in the
promotion of Parliamentary or Local Government Candidatures, or
owing allegiance to any political organisation abroad, shall be ineligi-
ble for affiliation to the Party’.49 The aim was ‘to end the possibility of
communist affiliation once and for all’.50 As Seyd notes, since individ-
ual membership of the party was not possible for anyone belonging to
an organisation which was deemed ineligible for party affiliation, this
constitutional change also ‘provided the Party leadership with the
means to control the extent of organised factionalism within the
Party’.51
This factionalism, organised and unorganised, was a problem for
the government. There was a gap between the expectations of the
rank-and-file of both the Labour Party and the unions and their
respective leaderships. There was also continuing dissent from the left-
wing back-bench MPs, who in May 1947 produced the pamphlet Keep
Left, which by 1950 had sold 30,000 copies. Written by Richard
Crossman, Michael Foot and Ian Mikardo, Keep Left was critical of the
government’s domestic, and, in particular, foreign policy, repeating the
call for a Third Force. Members of the Keep Left Group included
Barbara Castle and Tom Balogh, and after 1950, Fenner Brockway.
Richard Crossman chaired its meetings, and was the driving force
behind the group.52 However, the Keep Left Group was careful not to
appear to be allying itself with the communist left, and made a point of
criticising the Soviet Union while expressing the desire for co-opera-
tion with it. No MP who was concerned about their future political
career within the Labour government could afford to be accused of co-
operating with the Communist Party. The Keep Left initiative, though
significant, was to be short lived, for the arguments over foreign policy
collapsed with the announcement of Marshall Aid in the summer 
of 1947. Once the Soviet Union had refused to participate in the
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Marshall Plan, it became impossible for the continuation of protest
over Bevin’s foreign policy for parliamentarians. Crossman stated in
the House of Commons that it was the Marshall Plan that changed his
opinion over the government’s policies: ‘I will be frank. My own views
about America have changed a great deal in the last six months. Many
members have had a similar experience. I could not have believed six
months ago that a plan of this sort would have been worked out in
detail with as few political conditions.’53 Thus, the Keep Left rebels
came back within the fold, muting their criticism over foreign policy,
coming to accept the economic necessity of Marshall Aid, as relations
with the Soviet Union deteriorated and avoiding accusations of being
a ‘fellow-traveller’ became increasingly imperative. Cliff and Gluckstein
have noted that ‘Keep Left holds the record as the shortest-lived left
rebellion in the history of Labour. Marshall Aid from America killed it
stone dead.’54 This is not quite true, for the group did continue to
meet until 1952, but certainly it had lost most of its impetus. Only a
handful of ‘hard left’ MPs continued with their criticism of Bevin’s
foreign policy, most notably Konni Zilliacus, D. N. Pritt, and John
Platts-Mills. They were among the six MPs who were either margin-
alised, expelled by the PLP or denied support for re-election by
Labour’s NEC.55
Morgan has argued that Bevin’s foreign policy led to ‘an astonish-
ing series of redefinitions, even revolutions, in Labour attitudes
towards the world outside’. This required a change in attitudes on the
left towards the US, and, ‘Most shattering of all, for British socialists
committed to a sentimental tenderness for fellow socialist regimes from
1917 onwards, a feeling rekindled by the victories of the Red Army
during the war, it implied a stern, unrelenting hostility to the Soviet
Union.’56 However, this study argues that this shift in Labour’s foreign
policy actually occurred during the second half of the 1930s. It was the
Spanish Civil War that destroyed the Labour Party’s stance on pacifism
and non-intervention, and the rise of Hitler that had paved the way for
the acceptance of rearmament and the use of force. The Soviet Union
had long been viewed with suspicion by many in the leadership of the
party, and the Nazi-Soviet pact and the Soviet invasion of Finland had
reinforced this viewpoint. When the Soviet Union joined the allies, this
did generate a new wave of hope amongst some sections of the Labour
Party that it could forge a new relationship with Russia after the war,
but not with government ministers such as Attlee, Bevin and Dalton.
They were more focused on working towards the same vision of a post-
war multilateral world based on international institutions as the USA,
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even if this vision arose from very different motivations. The actions of
the Soviet Union in refusing to co-operate with Marshall Aid and the
developing Cold War meant that this was now accepted by the bulk of
Labour’s supporters.
Britain, America and the Cold War
One of Bevin’s major foreign policy concerns in the immediate post-
war period was that the USA would return to an isolationist position.
This would be problematic for Britain in three ways. First, Labour’s
vision of a multilateral world order required leadership from America.
Second, in terms of a great power rivalry between the UK and the
Soviet Union; whilst the Labour Party had stressed during the 1945
election campaign that it alone could handle the Soviet Union, the
Labour government was well aware that it could not handle what it
perceived to be an expansionist Soviet Union on its own. Third, Bevin
and other ministers were also aware that Britain was not likely to be
able to meet all its commitments to maintain stability in Europe, the
Middle East and Asia. Thus, Bevin’s aim was to maintain the ‘special
relationship’ that had developed from the alliance between Britain and
America during the Second World War, and to involve America in
European reconstruction as closely as possible.
The situation in Greece was a case in point. Although never part
of the British empire as such, Greece had long been considered within
the British sphere of influence, and was seen as strategically important
in that it intersected lines of communication with the British empire in
the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East. Greece had been
polarised politically since the First World War between a largely liberal,
republican left and a conservative, monarchist right. This had intensi-
fied during the 1930s. In 1936 there was an army coup under General
Metaxas, and then Greece was invaded and occupied by the Axis
powers during the Second World War. Some of its unpopular right-
wing government went into exile, as did the King, who based himself
in London. Some of the right-wing stayed in Greece and collaborated
with the Germans. Britain supported the underground resistance in
Greece, the National Liberation Front (EAM), which included the
communist and non-communist left organisations, and the affiliated
National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS). This gained in strength 
to the extent that it seemed likely to win power in the event of an 
election. At first Britain supported EAM and ELAS, but soon became
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concerned about the influence of the communists within it and so
helped nurture the much less popular non-communist resistance, and
in 1943 Britain swapped her support to it. British troops landed in
Greece in October 1944. These troops found themselves not only
fighting the Germans, but also trying to prevent civil war from break-
ing out.57
Britain’s policy at the end of the Second World War towards
Greece was to support any government as long as it was not commu-
nist. Churchill had been pressing for elections and a plebiscite to be
held as soon as possible, followed by British withdrawal from Greece.
British policy towards the conflict in Greece had been very unpopular
with the Labour Party, and both the party and large sections of the
Greek population expected a change in policy, thinking that a Labour
government would have a more positive attitude towards the
Republicans.58 However, to a large extent Bevin continued Churchill’s
policy. In August he produced a memorandum on Greece recom-
mending to the rest of the Cabinet that the elections and plebiscite
should be held as soon as possible, even though the conditions for free
and fair elections did not exist within the on-going conditions of threat
and violence. The reasons for Bevin’s recommendations were that
continuing conflict in Greece would undermine the whole of Britain’s
Middle East position;59 that until the Greek elections were held, ‘we
are hampered in pressing for free elections in other Balkan countries’;60
and that Britain would not be able to withdraw its troops from Greece
until these elections were held. 
The Labour government’s actions towards Greece were very
unpopular in the Labour Party, and provoked protest from party
members and from within the PLP. Bevin also found that his foreign
policy was being questioned within the government itself. His view 
was that,
The Mediterranean is the area through which we bring influence to bear
on Southern Europe, the soft underbelly of France, Italy, Yugoslavia,
Greece and Turkey. Without our physical presence in the Mediterranean,
we should cut little ice with those States which would fall, like Eastern
Europe, under the totalitarian yoke. We should also lose our position in
the Middle East.
Thus, it was ‘essential’ that Greece remained ‘with us politically’.61
However, Attlee wrote to Bevin while he was on a trip to New York in
November 1946, laying out his concerns over foreign policy. While he
reassured Bevin ‘that there is not much in the complaint that there
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have not been full discussions of Foreign Policy in the Cabinet’, he
went on that,
I think we have got to consider our commitments very carefully lest we
try to do more than we can. In particular I am rather worried about
Greece. The Chiefs of staff are suggesting that we must keep our forces
there for at least another year. I cannot contemplate the financial and mili-
tary burden with equanimity. The political and economic situation in
Greece shows no improvement. They seem to be unable to get a satisfac-
tory government nor can they do anything but quarrel amongst them-
selves. Meanwhile we have to accept a good deal of criticism. I feel that
we are backing a very lame horse.
Attlee reminded Bevin that ‘I have as you know, always considered that
the strategic importance of communications through the
Mediterranean in terms of modern warfare is very much overrated by
our military advisers’, and that ‘I am beginning to doubt whether the
Greek game is worth the candle.’ Furthermore, he did not think that
the countries bordering Soviet Union’s zone of influence, namely
Greece, Turkey, Iraq and Persia, could be made strong enough to form
an effective barrier, and ‘We do not command the resources to make
them so.’ Instead, Attlee suggested that Bevin try to reach an agree-
ment with Russia that these countries become a neutral zone. He
concluded ‘that we have got to be very careful in taking on military
obligations in Greece and Turkey when the U.S.A. only gives
economic assistance’. He complained that ‘There is a tendency in
America to regard us as an outpost of America, but an outpost that
they will not have to defend. I am disturbed by the signs of America
trying to make a safety zone around herself while leaving us and
Europe in No Man’s Land.’ His final instruction to Bevin was to find
out what the Americans ‘are prepared to do’, but that ‘we should be
careful not to commit ourselves’.62
This letter from Attlee effectively questioned and challenged
Bevin’s whole foreign policy stance, recognising the problems inherent
in Britain propping up countries in the Mediterranean when it did not
have the resources, and questioning Britain’s relationship with the
USA and the Soviet Union. As far as Bevin was concerned, the Soviet
Union was expansionist and had to be stopped whatever the price.
Attlee then spoke to Hector McNeil, then a Minister of State at the
Foreign Office, who wrote to Bevin in New York asking him if he
could ‘try to obtain some more definite indication as to what the
Americans propose to do for Greece and Turkey’. McNeil warned
Bevin that ‘I think I should tell you that in my opinion the whole 
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question of our policy towards Greece and Turkey is in the melting
pot, and that there is a very great reluctance here to contemplate a
continuation of our military, financial and political commitments in
Greece.’63
Bevin was enraged. He replied that ‘I cannot embark on a discus-
sion with Mr. Byrnes on the basis suggested in your telegram. If our
policy is under reconsideration it is useless for me to raise Greece and
Turkey with him.’ Furthermore, McNeil’s warning that the policy
towards Greek and Turkey was in the melting pot ‘has come to me not
only as surprise but as a shock’.
The policy of the Government has been based hitherto on the assumption
that Greece and Turkey are essential to our political and strategical [sic]
position in the world and I have constantly had that assumption in mind
in my conversations both with the United States of American and Russia,
and it has been one of the underlying assumptions in our negotiations for
the peace treaties … I really do not know where I stand.64
Bevin was not prepared to compromise his position on Greece and the
Middle East. This shows a hardening in his position, because he had in
fact questioned the government’s Middle Eastern policy himself early
on in the Attlee government, sending a memo to the Cabinet members
in August 1945 requesting their views on the issue. He had asked his
colleagues ‘to consider the fundamental question of whether we are to
continue to assert our political predominance in the Middle East and
our overriding responsibility for its defence, or whether, alternatively,
it is though to be essential on financial and man-power grounds that
we should seek the extensive assistance of other Powers in the defence
of the Middle East’.65 By 1946 he had become convinced of the strate-
gic importance of the Middle East, and of the role that Greece played
as an access route to it. However, he had also came to the conclusion
that Britain did not have the resources to continue its involvement in
Greece, and did turn to the Americans for support. The result was the
Truman Doctrine and the policy of containment, as Truman pledged
that the USA would ‘support free peoples who are resisting attempted
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures’. Truman
linked aid to Greece and Turkey to the wider fight against communism
in order to shock Congress into approving his policy of providing
support for these countries and reverse America’s traditional policy of
non-intervention in European affairs.66
The Truman Doctrine was followed by a speech by the Secretary
of State, George Marshall, on 5 June 1947 in which he argued that
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Europe’s political stability depended on its economic stability. He said
that ‘It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to
do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world,
without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace’.
It was up to the Europeans to come forward with a common
programme of their aid requirements.67 Bevin publicly welcomed the
‘inspiring lead’ given to Europe in Marshall’s proposal.68 However,
privately doubts were expressed about Britain being included on the
same basis as continental Europe in any Marshall Aid programme.
While Britain was prepared to accept American leadership, it was not
prepared to be treated as just another European country. At the first
meeting with William Clayton to discuss the Marshall Plan, Stafford
Cripps, by then the Chancellor of the Exchequer, pointed out ‘that
there was a difference between the U.K. and other European countries
because of U.K. trade with non-European countries’. Bevin argued
that, 
if the U.K. was considered just another European country this would fit
in with Russian strategy, namely, that the U.S. would encounter a slump
and would withdraw from Europe, the U.K. would be helpless and out of
dollars and as merely another European country the Russians, in
command of the Continent, could deal with Britain in due course.69
Furthermore, the British government did not want to go into the
program and ‘not do anything’, since, it was felt, this ‘would sacrifice
the “little bit of dignity we have left”’.70 However, Clayton and other
US policy-makers refused to accept that Britain should be treated
differently from the rest of Europe, even though Bevin emphasised
that Britain was in a unique position to assist in economic revival
because of the British empire.
Despite this disagreement between Britain and the USA, events
were to move quickly. Bevin met with his French counterpart, Georges
Bidault, to discuss a first response to the embryonic Marshall Plan offer
on 17–18 June. Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, joined them on
27 June. When Molotov arrived, he found that Bevin and Bidault had
already set some of the terms for involvement in the plan, which
included treating all the recipient states as part of an economic bloc,
thus accepting the multilateral focus of the American offer. This, as
Bevin and Bidault presumably realised, would not be acceptable to the
Russians, as it would mean opening up the Soviet economy to Western
inspection. This would have revealed the full extent of the Soviet’s
economic weakness, which was not known in the West at this time.
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Subsequently, Molotov walked out of the Paris talks after three days, in
a fanfare of negative publicity. Bevin and Bidault were presumably
relieved, as they had both told the US Ambassador to Paris, Jefferson
Caffery, ‘that they hope the Soviets will refuse to cooperate’ as their
participation would greatly complicate things.71 Albania, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Finland, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia
also went on to refuse to participate in the Marshall Plan.
It has been argued by some on the left that the USA used the
Marshall Plan to swing Britain towards the American sphere of influ-
ence and so alter relations between Britain and the Soviet Union.72
However, the leaders of the British government had taken a more
suspicious stance towards the Soviet Union even before the Second
World War was over. This cautious approach to the Soviet Union
continued with the election of a Labour government, led by Attlee,
Bevin and Dalton who were staunch anti-communists. During 1945
and the first half of 1946, the Americans had in fact resisted what they
saw as British attempts to forge an Anglo-American front against the
Soviet Union, which included members of the British Embassy making
discrete efforts to toughen the American government’s attitude
towards the Kremlin.73 Certainly the British Ambassador in
Washington was concerned that the Russians have ‘found themselves
until now in a position where they can manoeuvre at will between the
divergent attitudes of Britain and the United States’. Britain has
‘tended to be caught in a squeeze play between an expansionist Soviet
Union and a United States anxious to compose its own differences
with the Russians without due regard for the consequences upon
ourselves’. Indeed, the USA should stop ‘shilly-shallying’ around, as
‘The one means of bringing the expansionist moves of the Soviet rulers
to a satisfactory halt is to confront them with a joint Anglo-American
aggregate of power’. The US government would have to abandon its
traditional fear of being accused by its own public of ‘ganging up’ with
the British empire against the Soviet Union. Indeed, ‘there seems to be
no harm in discreetly exercising our powers of persuasion along these
lines on policy-shaping Americans at all levels’.74
By the spring of 1946, the American position had changed.
According to Gaddis, the turning point in American policy towards 
the Soviet Union changed in late February and early March of that
year. Up until then, attitudes towards the Soviet Union had developed
on an ad hoc basis, with little consistency besides the assumption of
shared basic interests in peace and stability.75 It was not until after
Kennan’s Long Telegram of 22 February 1946 that the US fully
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started to reconsider its position vis-à-vis co-operation with the Soviet
Union.76
Having helped push for the change in the American position
towards the Soviet Union, the British government then had to explain
to them why it was not being more anti-Soviet in its rhetoric. One of
the key reasons for this situation was that the public, and members of
the Labour Party, did not share the anti-communism being voiced by
the central organs of government, and still regarded the Soviet Union
with appreciation for its role in the Second World War. An overt anti-
Soviet stance at this point would have created a backlash in the party,
which interpreted internationalism as including a strong relationship
with the Soviet Union, and might have interpreted an anti-Soviet
stance as a rejection of internationalism. Anstey points out that the
Foreign Office had the problem of trying to satisfy public opinion in
the UK and US at the same time; while the American public was
becoming increasingly hostile towards the Soviet Union, the British
public still largely desired an alliance with Russia, and so ‘aligning rhet-
oric with reality simultaneously on both sides of the Atlantic became
increasingly difficult. An answer of sorts lay in educating the British
public to adopt a tougher stand, and in informing American officials of
the nature of the Foreign Office’s predicament.77
While Bevin asked the press to take a tougher anti-Soviet line,
Waldemar Gallman, a minister at the American embassy in London,
reported the predicament to the American Secretary of State, George
Marshall, that,
Foreign Office officials directly charged with Soviet affairs have recently
and repeatedly indicated that while there is no change in substance of
United Kingdom policy towards USSR, every move must be carefully
considered and planned from point of view of protecting Bevin from
Labour Party rebels … in light of Labour rebellion Bevin and Foreign
Office now take greater pains to avoid creating impression he is ganging
up with the United States against Russia.78
Part of Bevin’s problem was that the viewpoint of many Labour Party
supporters on foreign policy was to the left of the government’s. Since
the Labour Party had in the past emphasised its commitment to inter-
national socialist co-operation, and had presented the wartime alliance
with the Soviet Union as part of a fight against fascism and for
working-class values, even a cold war against the Soviet Union was
such a volte-face that care had to be taken on how it was presented to
the public. In addition, many on the left of the Labour Party blamed
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Soviet intransigence on its fears of invasion from the West, and its
experience of Western intervention to undermine the Soviet revolu-
tion, interpreting Soviet actions as defensive rather than offensive.79
Bevin was helped in this by the Soviet Union’s entrenchment of its
power in the East. In September 1947 representatives of the commu-
nist parties of the USSR, Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, Poland, France, Italy and Yugoslavia met in Poland to create
the Cominform. At this meeting, Zhdanov, the Secretary of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s Central Committee, made his
famous ‘two-camps’ speech. He argued that Western policies, and
especially the Marshall Plan, had split the world into two opposing
camps, with the ‘antidemocratic’ camp led by the imperialist United
States, and the other ‘democratic’ camp led by the Soviet Union.81 The
Cominform was to act as an information bureau, designed to co-ordi-
nate the activities of the communist parties and smooth out differences
between them. While Yugoslavia resisted Soviet attempts to centralise
control, a series of bilateral treaties were imposed upon Eastern
European states during early 1948. In February 1948 a communist
coup in Czechoslovakia ousted the coalition government, and the
Berlin blockade began in June 1948. This all provided the Labour
government with the evidence they needed for their antipathy towards
the Soviet Union, and the Cold War became fact rather speculation.
The establishment of the Cominform also provided Labour with a
perfect excuse for rejecting any co-operation with the CPGB, and
launched its own anti-communist campaign.81 This reflected an
increased willingness from the government by spring 1947 publicly to
confront their left-wing critics rather than trying to placate them.82
The Labour back-benchers’ Keep Left was soon countered by Healey’s
Cards on the Table, an official Labour pamphlet which sought to rebut
the criticisms of Bevin’s foreign policy. This stated that ‘The idea that
we should have extricated ourselves from the quarrel between Russia
and the USA does not make sense; during the period under review,
Britain was the main target of Russian hostility, while until a few
months ago America was an undecided spectator.’ It argued that it was
‘both undesirable and impractical’ for Britain to remain completely
independent of both Russia and the US after the War since ‘Britain
herself was too weak to cut herself off from American aid.’83 The argu-
ments in Cards on the Table were reinforced by the unfolding external
events of the Marshall Plan, which provided concrete evidence of the
difficulties of finding common ground with the Soviet Union. The
realities of an increasingly fraught international situation in which it
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was impossible for Britain to maintain some kind of ‘Third Force’ or
middle way bolstered Bevin’s policy of closer relations with the USA.
Defence policy
The Labour government’s immediate defence policy had been based
on providing armed forces to back up British foreign policy, which
included forces in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and East of Suez,
within the context of cutting the defence expenditure projections to
the £500 million per annum which had been agreed by the wartime
coalition government.84 Initially Attlee acted as Defence Secretary, but
with the creation of a separate Ministry of Defence in 1946, he
appointed A. V. Alexander to the post of Minister of Defence. Defence
policy lacked any overall direction as the Chiefs of Staff had been
concerned with winning the Second World War, not planning for the
post-war peace. It was also at the centre of a growing division within
the Cabinet, as Attlee and his Chancellor of the Exchequer, Hugh
Dalton, wanted military cut-backs in the light of the economic crisis,
while Bevin and Alexander maintained the necessity of continued mili-
tary capacity.85 At the beginning of 1946 Dalton argued that there
should a sharp drop in expenditure on defence, as the economic
picture ‘was a very gloomy one’ as Britain was going to be nearly one
million men short of the minimum required to revive its export trade.
He was very worried by the large military expenditure overseas, and
felt that Britain could not possibly afford to continue in this way.86
Bevin, on the other hand, said that he was nervous of any material cut
in the armed forces before the June negotiations with the Soviet Union
and the United States, and ‘It might be more economical to keep
another 100,000 men for a few months if by so doing we avoided
much more expensive trouble later on. It was necessary to weigh up
whether our future prosperity depended more upon a satisfactory
clearing up of the international situation in the coming year, or upon
an additional build-up of our productive capacity.’87 Because of the
shortage of troops due to demobilisation, it was agreed in 1946 that
conscription would continue for the time being. This was particularly
unpopular within the rank-and-file of the Labour Party and trade
union movement, given their traditional opposition to conscription,
and given the manpower shortages in Britain at this time.
The developing Cold War over the next couple of years served to
support Bevin’s perspective. At a Cabinet meeting on 5 March 1948
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Bevin argued that Soviet activities in Czechoslovakia and Finland
‘showed beyond any doubt that there was no hope of reaching a satis-
factory settlement’ with the Soviet Union and ‘that resolute action
must be taken to counter the Soviet threat to Western civilisation’. This
involved reviewing existing levels of defence expenditure and of the
defence measures that would be needed if diplomacy with the Soviet
Union failed, launching a propaganda drive to rebut Soviet propa-
ganda that continuously condemned British foreign and defence
policy, and completing the North Atlantic Treaty negotiations as a
matter of urgency.88 On 4 March 1947 Britain had signed the Treaty
of Dunkirk, a defensive pact with France against an attack from
Germany. This was enlarged on 17 March 1948 with the Treaty of
Brussels, signed by Britain, France and the Benelux countries, commit-
ting them to collective defence against any armed attack for fifty years.
Part of the rationale for this treaty was to help President Truman
convince the American Congress that Europe was willing to contribute
to its own defence, and that the US could therefore join Western
Europe in a military alliance. The Labour government feared that if
war did break out with the Soviet Union, there would be little chance
that either Britain or Europe collectively would be able to resist the
Red Army. Thus, Bevin wanted to ensure long-term American military
support for Western Europe. A series of Anglo-American talks were
held at the end of March 1948 to discuss a collective defence agree-
ment for the North Atlantic, at which a draft treaty was agreed upon.
The impetus for this North Atlantic Treaty was increased by the Berlin
blockade of June 1948, when the Soviet Union blocked the entry of
goods by rail and road from the West into West Berlin in protest
against US efforts to centralise the administration of economic policy
in the Western sectors of the city. Since Berlin was in the Soviet zone
of control, this effectively cut West Berlin off from the rest of the
world. In response, Bevin proposed to the British and American Chiefs
of Staff that they airlift supplies to both the military and civilian popu-
lation in Berlin using transport planes.89 At the same time, Bevin
agreed to the stationing of American B-29 bombers, which were
capable of carrying atomic weapons, in British bases. Not until 1951
was it made clear that the USA would have to seek permission from
Britain before launching an atomic attack from bases in the UK. 
While the political division of Europe had occurred during the
period from the summer of 1948 to the spring of 1949, the division of
Europe into two defensive blocs at the heart of the bi-polar, Cold War
world occurred during the period of the Berlin blockade. This ended
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in May 1949. On 4 April 1949 the USA, Canada, Britain, Belgium,
Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Norway and Portugal signed the North Atlantic Treaty of Mutual
Assistance. This in effect committed America to guaranteeing West
European defence, for an armed attack against one member state was
to be considered as an attack against all. This was then institutionalised
into the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). In the House of
Commons, Bevin was careful to present the treaty as a defensive move,
resulting from the failure of the United Nations to prevent Soviet
aggression in Eastern Europe, saying:
[N]o such arrangement as the North Atlantic Treaty would have been
found necessary at all if the effectiveness of the Security Council as an
instrument for ensuring the immediate defence of any member against
aggression had not been undermined by the Soviet use of the veto, and
by other actions of the Soviet Government … That is why we have signed
this Treaty; because we must have security and because we have learned
by bitter experience that we cannot get it at present through the Security
Council.90
The treaty was passed by an overwhelming majority in the House of
Commons, with only six MPs, four Labour and two Communist,
voting against it.91
Despite the growing Anglo-American alliance, Britain was reluc-
tant to be too reliant on its allies for its defence needs, and so the 
decision was made in secret, by Attlee, Bevin and four other members
of the Cabinet Defence Committee on 8 January 1947, for Britain to
develop an independent nuclear strategy. This decision was made
without the knowledge of the rest of the Cabinet, Parliament or the
Labour Party. It was made for two reasons. First, for strategic purposes:
if other states had so dangerous a weapon, then Britain would 
need it to deter or retaliate, otherwise Britain would become too
dependent on its allies for its defence needs. Second, to halt the image
of decline by demonstrating that Britain was still a world power, for
‘Nuclear weapons seemed to be the way by which a medium-sized, but
technically advanced, nation could retain great power status.’92
However, these aims were undermined somewhat by the continued
reliance on the US for technology and weapons to maintain Britain 
as a nuclear power. Much to Britain’s chagrin, the Soviet Union was
the first in the race between the two nations to test an atomic bomb,
doing so in August 1949. The first British atomic bomb was not
exploded until October 1952, by which time Britain’s nuclear strategy,
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decided in secret, was becoming a highly politicised issue for the
Labour Party.
Labour won the election of 23 February 1950, but with a much-
reduced majority of only five seats. The government seemed to be
suffering from a lack of direction and energy, at a time when interna-
tional affairs were becoming increasingly tense. The outbreak of the
Korean War, when in June 1950 North Korean tanks crossed the
thirty-eighth parallel into South Korea, saw another rethink about
defence expenditure, galvanising Attlee and Chancellor Stafford Cripps
to agree to extra defence provisions. Cripps felt that ‘on general
economic grounds’ the most that Britain could commit to defence
over the next three years was £950 million per annum. But, this ‘could
not be provided without some reduction in Government expenditure,
some additional taxation, or some reduction in capital investment or a
combination of all three’. The Cabinet approved Cripps’ proposals for
increased expenditure as ministers pointed out that ‘the fact was that
our forces were insufficiently equipped to meet the dangers with which
we were now faced. It was abundantly clear that we must spend
substantially more on defence.’ It was decided that Britain would
inform the US that ‘We considered on general economic grounds an
annual expenditure of £950 million on defence was the most we could
afford in 1951–52 and in the following two years.’93 Labour’s defence
and foreign policy were criticised at the Labour Party conference, to
the extent that Bevin felt it necessary to speak on behalf of the NEC’s
report on the international situation, despite his failing health. At what
was to be Bevin’s last conference appearance, he spoke in defence of
the NEC’s report on the international situation, saying that Labour’s
foreign policy was based on collective security through the United
Nations. He argued that they must give the UN the necessary power
and defence arrangements so that aggression could never succeed, for
‘A few failures by the aggressor will mean … the triumph of peace over
the sadistic desire for war and destruction.’94
Ernest Bevin’s health had been failing for some time, but he
wished to continue as Foreign Secretary until the next election, which
would not be far off given Labour’s small majority. Attlee, however,
felt that the post was now too demanding for Bevin. On 9 March
1951, the day of Bevin’s seventieth birthday, Attlee requested that he
resign. Both worn-out and devastated at his loss of power, he died on
14 April.95 Herbert Morrison replaced him, but remained Foreign
Secretary only until Labour’s election defeat in October 1951.
Morrison’s Principle Private Secretary at the Foreign Office has said
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that ‘This relatively short period amply sufficed to show up his inade-
quacy for the job’ and that ‘One unexpected complication was
Morrison’s extraordinary ignorance of most of the Foreign Office
problems of the moment.’96 The choice of Morrison to be Bevin’s
successor was unusual in that Morrison did not have any particular
experience of foreign affairs, nor had he demonstrated any particular
flair for dealing with such policy issues. It perhaps reflected the declin-
ing health, vigour and power of the government and its leading
members, though at the time the appointment was ‘widely
acclaimed’.97 Certainly Morrison’s brief time at the Foreign Office was
marked by failure both at home and abroad to maintain the influence
that Bevin had achieved. Morrison did not have the influence with the
Americans that Bevin had had, nor did he have as much influence
within the Labour Party. Foreign and defence policy was again becom-
ing highly politicised and contentious within the Labour Party, partic-
ularly over the issue of British rearmament.
The result of the increased defence expenditure was that cuts
would have to be made in public spending. The rather inexperienced
Hugh Gaitskell, who had taken over as Chancellor on 19 October
1950, proposed in the spring of 1951 that charges be introduced in the
National Health Service for teeth and spectacles. This rather prosaic
choice of spending cuts was to result in a very embarrassing debacle.
Nye Bevan, who was upset at Gaitskell’s appointment as well as this
particular decision, resigned in protest, and Harold Wilson and John
Freeman joined him.98 Many in the party felt that Labour had gone
back on a commitment to one of their most popular policies, free
health care, as well as feeling that the commitment to such a huge rear-
mament policy would undermine the British economy. The party was
demoralised, Bevin was gone, and Attlee was unwell and unable to
exert his leadership to contain the row. The Gaitskell/Bevan split was
to permeate the Labour Party until 1957, with foreign and defence
policy being the main issue of contention. This all occurred as the
Labour government was seen to be stalling, exhausted from its years in
power, with its main achievements now in the past.
When the Labour Party assumed power in 1945 there were high
expectations of what it could achieve in international affairs. However,
the government found that there was a disjunction between what it
saw as Britain’s leading role in the world, and Britain’s ability to meet
its existing foreign and defence requirements. Despite trying to cling
to its role as one of the ‘big three’ of the wartime alliance, it was
becoming clear that Britain’s power was declining, in particular in 
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relation to the power and reach of the US. The Attlee years saw a
period of retrenchment from the empire, which was to be continued,
though reluctantly, by successive post-war governments. Britain’s hasty
withdrawal from Palestine in particular reflected a pragmatic and even
unpropitious response to a difficult problem. The central conundrum
that had to be faced was how to cut back expenditure while continu-
ing to have as powerful a role in the world as possible. Somewhat
surprisingly given the focus of sections of the party on the inter-linking
of economic and political issues, the Labour Party was often just as
reluctant as its opponents to admit to Britain’s decline, or to be open
about its inability to afford a world-wide role in security issues. Its
response to its problems was to turn to the USA for support, as Britain
could no longer afford to maintain its world role unaided. As Porter
puts it, ‘[Britain’s] superstructure had come to rest on someone else’s
base.’99 Bevin in particular predicated his foreign policy on a close rela-
tionship with the US, as America’s involvement in Europe became
institutionalised through the Marshall Plan and NATO. To a certain
extent the Labour government’s foreign policy of 1945–1951 was
Bevin’s foreign policy, with Attlee allowing him a remarkable degree of
freedom. No other Labour foreign secretary has had the impact that
Ernest Bevin had, either on Labour’s foreign policy or Britain’s role in
the world. However, while Bevin was implementing what he saw as
Labour’s foreign policy, his critics on the left felt that the party had
wasted its opportunity to change the nature of British foreign policy.
The battle against the Labour Party’s pacifism in the early 1930s; the
battle for rearmament in the face of the threat from Hitler in the late
1930s; disgust at the Nazi-Soviet pact; and experience of coalition
government, meant that there had already been a remarkable shift in
attitudes of the Labour leadership away from socialist internationalism
and towards balance-of-power politics. For these men, Labour’s inter-
nationalism was being met through the new post-war regime based on
the UN and the institutions of the Bretton Woods agreement, and
through Britain’s remaining global commitments. For them, interna-
tional solidarity did not mean co-operating with the Soviet Union.
However, for many in the rank-and-file of the party, their hopes for a
post-war Labour foreign policy were based on a continuation of the
wartime alliance with the Soviet Union, and internationalism and
international solidarity meant working with Russia, not capitalist
America. The criticisms over the Labour government’s foreign policy
were muted by the onset of the Cold War, but they never really went
away, and this period saw the division between left and right of the
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party on foreign policy solidify into a division between Atlanticists and
those suspicious of the USA, which continues to this day.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
The nature of Labour’s foreign policy remains under-analysed and
under-theorised. This is partly due to an academic division of labour:
academics who study the Labour Party come from a domestic politics
background, while International Relations scholars tend to focus on
the state, and not party politics. It is also because the Labour Party
itself has had great difficulty theorising and analysing the nature of its
ideological stance on foreign policy. The differing ideological streams
of the Labour Party, outlined in the previous chapters, have compli-
cated attempts to produce overall analyses of Labour’s view of foreign
policy. In addition, the Labour Party itself has tended to see particular
foreign policy problems discretely.1 Thus, there is no major work by
the party on the theoretical basis of its foreign policy; instead there are
many speeches and documents that relate to specific responses to
concrete situations, sometimes couched within the context of Labour’s
view of Britain’s role in the world. However, it is possible to delineate
an outline of the main theoretical perspective of a Labour Party foreign
policy. To date, this has been done within the context of developing a
typology of a ‘socialist’ foreign policy. The most interesting attempts
to do this are by Michael Gordon in Conflict and Consensus in Labour’s
Foreign Policy: 1914–1965, Kenneth Miller in Socialism and Foreign
Policy, which examined the period up to 1931, and Eric Shaw, who
focused on the Attlee governments.2
This study takes a different approach from that of Gordon, Miller
and Shaw, and argues that as far as foreign policy was concerned, it is
not clear that the Labour Party ever had any socialist ideology as such.
Sections of the Labour Party did at times offer a socialist critique of
some of the liberal internationalist assumptions of the party’s foreign
policy perspective, which sometimes combined with the more radical
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liberal critiques, but the socialist standpoint only usually had minority
support within the party, certainly from 1937 onwards with its accept-
ance of rearmament in the face of a rising European fascist threat.
Labour sought to offer an alternative to the traditional, power politics
or realist approach of British foreign policy, which had stressed national
self-interest. This alternative was internationalism, which stressed
cooperation and interdependence, and a concern with the international
as well as the national interest. In this, the most important influence
on Labour’s foreign policy were liberal views of international relations,
but Labour’s internationalism also arises from certain meta-principles
of Labour’s ideology, which have influenced Labour’s external princi-
ples and policies as much as its domestic ones. These are a belief in
progress and change, influenced by the Enlightenment tradition with
its teleology of progress, and an optimistic view of human nature. This
view of human nature has been influenced by Kant and Rousseau
rather than Hobbes, and can be extrapolated to the nature of relations
between states. This is that human nature is capable of positive,
rational, co-operative, fraternal and moral thought and action. Man is
naturally sociable, and is capable of solidarity with the rest of mankind,
and this solidarity overcomes national boundaries. If people are capable
of behaving rationally and co-operatively, then so too are states as they
are governed by such people. Systems of production such as capitalism
might encourage militarism and conflict, but this is due to the system
of production rather than a system of sovereign states. 
The principles of Labour’s foreign policy
Internationalism is the over-riding principle upon which Labour’s
foreign policy has been based. The party has had a commitment to
internationalism throughout its history, and internationalism has been
espoused by Labour leaders from Keir Hardie to Tony Blair.
Internationalism, broadly defined, is the desire to transcend national
boundaries in order to find solutions to international issues. However,
there are different strands of internationalism, and it is not a world-
view that is the preserve of the Labour Party. Much of the party’s
thinking on internationalism was shaped by radical liberal thinking,
and has also been influenced by a Christian-socialist, Nonconformist
streak amongst party members. Leonard Woolf noted that
‘Historically, the Labour Party inherited its foreign policy from
Cobden and Bright through Gladstonian liberalism.’3 In addition,
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internationalism does not necessarily provide clear policy solutions in
the face of particular policy problems. Internationalism is an impulse
that can be used to prescribe non-intervention in the pursuit of peace,
or intervention for military or humanitarian means. This is because as
a concept, internationalism is very vague, and has sometimes meant
different things at different times in history. Despite the problems of
definition, for the purpose of this study it is possible to outline a frame-
work that helps us analyse the nature of Labour’s foreign policy
through the concept of internationalism. At the heart of this frame-
work is the fundamental belief that while states are sovereign entities,
the peace and stability of any one state and the peace and stability of
the international system as a whole are inexorably linked. 
The Labour Party’s own particular brand of internationalism is
largely in line with a Kantian perspective, and this has emphasised
certain aspects of internationalist thought.4 These are, first, that while
states operate in a system of international anarchy, fundamental reform
of the system is possible because states have common interests and
values. This change is only likely to be secured through the construc-
tion of international institutions to regulate economic, political and
military relations between states. Second, linked to this is a sense of
belonging to an international community, and each state has a respon-
sibility to work towards the common good of the international system,
to work in the ‘international’ interest rather than purely in what it
perceives to be its national interest. Third, international policy and
governance should be based on democratic principles and universal
moral norms. Fourth, collective security is better than secret bilateral
diplomatic treaties or balance-of-power politics, which are self-defeat-
ing in terms of generating conflict. Fifth, armaments and arms races
can destabilise the international system, and the proliferation or arms
should be limited, the arms trade regulated, and disarmament, in prin-
ciple, is desirable. In addition to these five largely liberal international-
ist principles is one additional socialist aspect of Labour’s international
thought, and this has been a belief in international working-class soli-
darity, especially with socialist states. 
Within the Labour Party there have always been divisions over
how these principles should be interpreted, which of them should be
prioritised, and which were achievable in the real world. Tensions have
existed ‘between those believing in the need to transform international
relationships by pursing principled positions involving cooperation and
harmony between states and those observing the competitive nature of
international politics and concluding that realism rather than idealism
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must be the guide’.5 Thus, for some in the Labour Party, collective
security should be sought through the United Nations, whereas for
others, collective security is assured through the establishment of
NATO. For some in the Labour Party, disarmament is a tenet of faith,
and should be sought at all times, whereas for others, disarmament 
is desirable in principle but unrealisable in practice because of the
potential danger of aggressor states. For some, the use of force and
military intervention is to be avoided in the pursuit of peace, whereas
for others, the use of force and intervention is sometimes the ‘right’
thing to do for humanitarian reasons as well as being a valuable
instrument of foreign policy in the longer-term pursuit of peace. The
acceptance of a near pacifist position in the early 1930s when it was still
believed that the League of Nations could deter aggression; the shift in
opinions about the validity of non-intervention with regard to the
Spanish Civil War; to the acceptance of rearmament and military
strength in the late 1930s when it became clear that the League of
Nations could not deter the threat of fascism, were all different ways of
interpreting the principles of Labour’s internationalism, rather than a
rejection of them. 
The first of the two principles highlighted above are closely inter-
twined; namely the belief in the reform and regulation of the system
through international institutions. It was the belief in internationalism
and an international community that underpinned Labour’s call for an
‘international authority to settle points of difference among the nations
by compulsory conciliation and arbitration, and to compel all nations
to maintain peace’.6 This led Labour to support the establishment of
the League of Nations following the First World War, and to pursue its
League of Nations policy under Ramsay MacDonald and Arthur
Henderson in the 1929–31 minority government, even if the party was
at times critical of the form that the League of Nations took and the
way that it operated. Belief in the international community was even
written into the Labour Party’s constitution, with the commitment
‘for the establishment of suitable machinery for the adjustment and
settlement of international disputes by conciliation or judicial arbitra-
tion and for such other international legislation as may be practicable’.7
The Labour Party was the most wholehearted supporter amongst the
British political parties for the establishment of international organisa-
tions to regulate and arbitrate world affairs, and it spent the years
during the First and Second World Wars thinking about the post-war
settlement and the maintenance of peace through international insti-
tutions. Indeed, during the Second World War the party argued in its
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report The Old World and the New Society that national sovereignty
would have to be given up, with a new, much stronger version of the
League of Nations forming a superstructure through which a new
World Society could be established, founded upon democratic Socialist
ideas.8 A new international organisation was required, ‘possessing
many powers hitherto exercised by a competing anarchy of national
sovereignties’.9 The party’s document on The International Post-War
Settlement argued that,
[W]e must begin, without delay, to build a World Order, in which all
people unite to pursue their common interests. We are confident that the
vital interests of all nations are the same. They all need Peace; they all need
security and freedom; they all need a fair share in that abundance which
science has not put it into our power to create.10
This commitment to internationalism has continued throughout the
twentieth century with Labour’s commitment to international agree-
ments and regulation, and has been particularly noticeable more
recently in the speeches of Tony Blair, where he has repeatedly stressed
that ‘We are all internationalists now, whether we like it or not.’ This
is because ‘Interdependence is the core reality of the modern world.’11
In recent years, internationalism has also been linked with the Labour
Party’s embrace of globalisation, as ‘We recognise that globalisation
demands a new internationalism, and our internationalism recognises
that we cannot deliver our domestic programme working alone in the
world.’12
These elements of internationalism have been present throughout
the whole of the Labour Party’s history. However, while they provide
the guiding principles behind Labour’s foreign policy, they do not
necessarily imply policy solutions to concrete problems, and so are the
backdrop to many of Labour’s internal splits over international policy.
In addition, Labour’s commitment to internationalism has sometimes
been in conflict with its view of Britain’s role as a leading international
actor. Labour has been just as reluctant as its opponents to give up the
trappings of a world power. It was the Attlee government that decided
to go ahead with the atom bomb, and Labour has retained the
commitment to an independent nuclear deterrent for all of the post-
war period apart from the periods of 1960–61 and 1983–89. In terms
of Britain’s imperial role, the Commonwealth was seen for both the left
and the right of the party as a means of continuing British influence,
and carried an implicit assumption of Britain’s leadership.13 Indeed, the
Labour Party has often emphasised that a Labour government can give
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Britain ‘the moral leadership of the world’,14 and be a ‘force for good
in the world’.15 Throughout the twentieth century Labour has stressed
the potential for Britain to play a leadership role in international disar-
mament (including nuclear disarmament) and control of the arms
industry. During the Cold War Labour emphasised the role that Britain
could play in acting as a bridge between East and West and resolve
deadlocks between the two. This moral imperative has been high-
lighted at various times by all sections of the party. Richard Taylor
argues that,
[The] Labour left belief in Britain’s ‘moral lead’ stemmed in part from the
long tradition of quasi-pacifist internationalism which had formed a
persistent minority dimension of the Labour left from the early years of
the ILP onwards … And yet this tradition embodied also a moral nation-
alism, a position stemming from the nineteenth-century radical ideologi-
cal framework, emphasizing the importance of national sovereignty,
parliamentary democracy, and the rights of free individuals and free
nations to determine their futures.16
Thus, Labour’s commitment to working in the international good, to
work in the ‘international’ interest rather than purely in what it
perceives to be its national interest has often been based on the idea of
Britain’s leadership in the world. This reflects the context within which
the Labour Party developed, as well as its tendency to have a mission-
ary zeal to reform and shape the world in its likeness, which has some-
times been at odds with its commitment to working through
international institutions.
This belief in Britain’s moral leadership role under a Labour
government not only arises from the fact that the party developed
within the context of Britain as a superpower, but also reflects the third
of its principles of internationalism, namely that there are universal
moral principles. For Labour, domestic and foreign policy are seen as
parts of a whole, as inextricably linked, and as impacting on each 
other. Arthur Henderson said that there is an ‘intimate’ connection
between Labour’s home and foreign policy.17 Policies pursued exter-
nally should help, or at least not hinder, the kind of society being build
domestically. In addition, principles valued domestically, such as
democracy and human rights, should be reflected externally and
pursued in relations with other states. Keir Hardie, when criticising 
the suppression of trade union action and the introduction of martial
law in South Africa in 1914, argued that the Liberal government
should refuse to condone the actions of the government in South
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Africa. ‘They had to realise that the cause of democracy was the same
everywhere, and if they tolerated injustice and oppression in any part
of the earth, sooner or later it was bound to come home to them-
selves.’18 The key to international peace was social justice at home and
abroad. This was strongly emphasised during the Second World War,
with Attlee arguing that ‘the world that must emerge from this war
must be a world attuned to our ideals’.19
Linked to the idea of universal moral norms is a belief in a demo-
cratic foreign policy, and a rejection of secret diplomacy. This was an
issue that was particularly popular within the Labour Party in the years
before and after the First World War. At the 1912 annual conference a
resolution was unanimously agreed that ‘protests against secret diplo-
macy and urges that no treaty, agreement, understanding, or entente
be entered into with any foreign Power by any person whatsoever on
behalf of the British State until such proposals shall have been brought
before the House of Commons’.20 This became a staple demand for
the Labour Party. Ramsay MacDonald, in Labour and International
Relations, argued that ‘A difference between the democratic system of
foreign policy and an aristocratic one is that under a democracy we
always strive for co-operation, under an aristocracy we only prepare for
war. Co-operation on the one hand, militarism on the other.’21 This
view was further entrenched by the involvement of Liberals such as E.
D. Morel in the Labour Party. The Union of Democratic Control saw
the outbreak of the Great War as the failure of diplomacy, arguing that
the Foreign Department was ‘avowedly and frankly autocratic’.22 They
saw the war as the failure of diplomacy, and ‘Instead of taking advan-
tage of the marked growth in the pacific inclinations of the peoples of
the world’, statesmen ‘have insisted on encouraging between the
Governments of Europe the most deadly and determined competition
in preparation for war that the world has ever known’.23 The Labour
Party itself saw the war as the result of ‘Foreign Ministers pursuing
diplomatic polices for the purposes of maintaining a balance of power’,
and condemned Sir Edward Grey for committing ‘without the knowl-
edge of our people the honour of the country to supporting France in
the event of any war’.24 It was one of the achievements of the 1924
minority Labour government that it fulfilled its manifesto pledge to
open secret diplomatic agreements, by announcing that it would inau-
gurate a new practice of laying all treaties with other nations on the
table of the House of Commons for a period of twenty-one days, 
after which the treaty would be ratified. This would strengthen the
control of Parliament over the conclusion of international treaties and
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agreements, allow discussion of them, and ‘By this means secret
Treaties and secret clauses of Treaties will be rendered impossible.’25
The 1929–31 Labour government also advocated a democratic
foreign policy. While Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald and Foreign
Secretary Arthur Henderson had their differences over policy, exacer-
bated by their mutual dislike and distrust of each other, both believed
in the role of public opinion. Henderson argued that ‘the public
opinion of nations has always been ahead of what the Governments
were prepared to do’.26 Linked to this was the view that the Foreign
Office was the preserve of the upper-class elite. Both secret diplomacy
and ‘the oligarchical character of foreign services increased the likeli-
hood of armed conflict’.27 Following both the world wars there were
calls for the labour movement to be given a direct voice in foreign
policy, as world affairs were seen as too important to be left to the
diplomats and politicians. Again, Labour has not always stuck to the
principle in practice, and has carried out its own secret negotiations, for
example, on the establishment of US bases in Britain, and the devel-
opment of nuclear weapons. 
A related aspect of the belief in a democratic foreign policy was
that democratic states were more peaceable than authoritarian ones,
and the greater the democratic control over foreign policy-making, the
more rationally and peacefully a state would behave. As a consequence,
democratic states were far less likely to go to war with each other, and
democratic governments would have more to lose from conflict, an
early form of the ‘democratic peace’ theory developed by Doyle.28
Hence, states had much to benefit from good relations with other
states, and from encouraging democracy in other states. This was
stated in Labour’s Memorandum on War Aims, written by Ramsay
MacDonald, Arthur Henderson and Sidney Webb at the end of the
First World War. This declared that the establishment of lasting 
peace was the principal war aim of British Labour, and ‘As a means to
this end the British Labour Movement relies very largely upon the
complete democratisation of all countries’.29 The modern equivalent
for the calls for a democratic foreign policy has been an acceptance 
that public opinion has a role to play in foreign policy, and that the
foreign policy-making should include some kind of an input from 
non-traditional foreign policy circles, such as non-government organi-
sations.
Linked in with the belief that international policy and governance
should be based on democratic principles and universal moral princi-
ples, has been the fourth aspect of Labour’s internationalism, that
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collective security is better than secret bilateral diplomatic treaties or
balance-of-power politics, which are self-defeating in terms of generat-
ing conflict. The League of Nations, it was hoped, would by-pass the
need for balance-of-power politics, and Labour had envisaged a
League that was ‘so strong in its representative character and so digni-
fied by its powers and respect that questions of national defence sink
into the background of solved problems’.30 The belief in collective
security was one of the reasons that Labour tended to vote against the
government’s defence estimates. Labour’s position following the First
World War was that the party, ‘whether in power or in opposition,
supports some expenditure on Armaments’, but that it ‘believes that
the present expenditure could be drastically reduced’. The party line
was that,
Support of some expenditure on armaments is based on the assumption
that the Covenant of the League [of Nations] is taken seriously. The plea
that our forces are used only to maintain peace, if not hypocritical, means
that we repudiate the use of force to press purely British claims … Our
policy is the maintenance of peace: the pre-war policy was the pursuit of
national advantage.31
The party’s attitude towards the nature of the armed forces was that a
national military capability was only acceptable to the extent that it
formed part of an international military force that could be used for
international intervention, under the control of the League of Nations,
in the last resort. As shown in Chapter 4, support for collective secu-
rity against aggression lay behind Labour’s League of Nations foreign
policy in the second minority government. The failure of the League
of Nations over the Manchurian crisis in 1931 discredited the League
somewhat, and started to undermine the belief in the system of collec-
tive security that had been developed with the Covenant of the League
of Nations and the Geneva Protocol. The Labour Party came very
close to briefly embracing pacifism instead of collective security as its
leaders, Lansbury, Attlee and Cripps, rejected the existing system of
international relations and advocated their own visions of Labour’s
foreign policy. For Attlee, this was based on a system of pooled secu-
rity through a new organisation, such as a world commonwealth,
which could provide collective security through an international mili-
tary force. The tensions over whether to continue with support for
collective security or adopt a more pacifist position lead to the resig-
nation of George Lansbury from the leadership of the Labour Party 
in 1935, and paved the way for the acceptance of British rearmament
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in the face of threat of fascism in the second half of the 1930s. As
outlined in Chapter 6, the Munich crisis galvanised the Labour Party
into urging collective action with France and the Soviet Union against
Hitler, and a renewed call for collective security through the League of
Nations. Labour’s 1944 policy document, The International Post-War
Settlement, which was largely written by Hugh Dalton, went so far as
to say that pacifism had been proved to be ‘an unworkable basis of
policy’. Instead, ‘Strength is essential to safety and, as we now know,
there are terrible risks in being weak. It is better to have too much
armed force than too little.’32 The experience of the Second World War
led to a further shift away from international collective security and
towards a more traditional balance-of-power politics, as exemplified
through Britain’s role in Greece, and an Anglo-American alliance insti-
tutionalised through the establishment of NATO in the face of the
threat posed by the Soviet Union within the context of the developing
Cold War.
The fifth principle of Labour’s internationalism has been one that
has been strongly influenced by both Labour’s liberal and socialist
heritage, and this has been its belief in ‘anti-militarism’. This has been
manifested in many different ways. It includes a commitment to collec-
tive security, arms control, regulation of the arms industry, opposition
to conscription, support for arbitration, and a suspicion of the use of
force as a foreign policy instrument. These commitments were partic-
ularly strong in the years just before and just after the First World War
and in the early 1930s. Annual conference regularly passed resolutions
condemning militarism and war. Many in the party believed that war
could be avoided through the avowed rejection of armaments and the
use of force. The preparation for war was seen as one of the major
causes of war, as this destabilised the international system by causing
suspicion between states. As Marquand puts it, the Labour Party had
‘inherited the anti-militaristic attitudes of the nineteenth century
Radicals who were its real intellectual ancestors’.33 It was strongly
influenced by the pacific outlook of the Independent Labour Party,
who believed that ‘War is the result of the preparation for war.’34
According to Arthur Henderson, ‘The alternative to the arms race and
Armageddon is to make a reality of the collective peace system to
which we are bound by solemn treaty obligations …’ And, ‘An integral
part of the peace-keeping system is the obligation to reduce and limit
arms.’35 The arms trade in general should be regulated and limited as
the production and sale of arms was part of the problem. In particular,
it was argued that the profit motive of capitalists and the production of
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weapons and subsequent arms races resulted in conflict. In this way
war, militarism and capitalism were related: war was a result of
economic factors as much as political or diplomatic ones. 
Again, here was an example of Labour’s international perspective
being determined by both radical liberal and socialist perspectives. J. A.
Hobson, a radical Liberal economist who later joined the Labour
Party, published a study on imperialism in 1902 that was to have a
major impact on the way the party thought about the international
system. He argued that the under-consumption of capital domestically
led to the need for capitalists to export surplus capital by investing
profits abroad, and this resulted in war, militarism and a ‘spirited
foreign policy’.36 Furthermore, ‘Imperialism makes for war and for
militarism, and has brought a great and limitless increase of expendi-
ture of national resources upon armaments. It has impaired the inde-
pendence of every nation which has yielded to its false glamour.’37
Hobson provided an explanation for international relations and the
causes of war for both Labour and the radical Liberals, as well as
impacting on the Marxist understanding of international conflict
through the subsequent study by Lenin on Imperialism, the Highest
Stage of Capitalism. This perspective also tied in with Norman Angell’s
work, The Great Illusion, which explained that the motivation for the
international rivalry in armaments was due to the view that military
and political power gave a nation commercial advantage, and the 
illusion that it was to a state’s economic advantage to subjugate a
weaker one.38
Labour’s anti-militarist tendencies manifested themselves in a
number of ways. First, there was a commitment to controlling the
proliferation of weapons, especially weapons of mass destruction,
through multilateral negotiations. Labour supported the organisation
of disarmament conferences domestically and internationally, and
presented itself as the party able to reach agreement internationally.
The 1929–31 Labour government had called for a World Disarm-
ament Conference to be convened by the League of Nations, and it
was Arthur Henderson who was subsequently invited to be the 
president of it, for which he received the Nobel Peace Prize. Labour’s
disarmament impulse was multilateral rather than unilateral – the
policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament briefly embraced in the early
1960s and again in the 1980s was unusual, and not the norm.
Second, Labour sought ways to control the arms trade, sharing the
view of the Liberals that trading in arms leads to militarism and hence
war. However, the party has always faced the problem that the arms
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trade was a major British employer. Third, Labour expressed the desire
on many occasions to cut defence budgets. It was Labour Party prac-
tice up until 1937 to vote against the government’s defence estimates
(apart from when they were in power). Despite this, some still lobbied
ministers to build arms in their constituencies. For example, Sir
Thomas Inskip, who was the Minister for the Co-ordination of
Defence, said in the House of Commons in 1936 that MPs from both
the front and back-benches had ‘besought me to place orders for
munitions of war in their constituencies’.39 This was at a time when the
Parliamentary Labour Party voted against increases in the defence esti-
mates. Fourth, the Labour Party rejected compulsory national service
and conscription. Numerous resolutions were passed at annual confer-
ences on compulsory national service alone.40 Conscription during
wartime was only accepted reluctantly.
Labour when in power, however, tended to view Britain’s need for
a strong military in much the same way as its opponents did. To some
extent, it had to be more hard-line when in government than the
Conservatives because of its apparent weakness in the eyes of the elec-
torate on the issue of defence. Thus, while Labour’s instinct has been
for anti-militarism, its policies have not. For instance, it was Ramsay
MacDonald who initially blocked the signing of the Geneva Protocol;
it was Labour who urged a policy of rearmament in the face of threat
posed by Hitler; and it was Labour who escalated defence expenditure
in peace time in the late 1940s and the beginning of the 1950s.
While some of the Labour Party’s members have held pacifist
views, it never whole-heartedly embraced pacifism. The party vehe-
mently denounced militarism in the run-up to the outbreak of the 
First World War, but once war was declared the party’s policy was to
support the government and not threaten the war effort. As was
discussed in Chapter 3, the party flirted with various forms of pacifism
in the early 1930s, but this was rejected in the face of the rising threat
of fascism. Certainly the party has tended to be against the use of force
while in opposition, seeing it as resulting in war, but this policy was
discredited by the failure of the non-intervention pact on the Spanish
Civil War. Resolutions were forwarded on occasion that called for
support for a general strike if Britain were about to engage in war in
order to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, within the context of
similar action being taken overseas,41 but this was never adopted as
formal party policy. The most common form of expression of anti-mili-
tarism has been in resolutions to conference condemning the actions
of governments in encouraging war through the pursuit of traditional
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power politics and through the destabilising effects of the arms trade
and arms races.
In addition to the above five ‘internationalist’ principles is one
additional aspect of Labour’s internationalist thought that is a direct
result of its socialist heritage, and this has been a belief in international
working-class and socialist solidarity. A belief in international socialist
solidarity underlay British socialist thinking from the start, but has
been manifested in different ways over the years. This was expressed in
Labour’s early years through a commitment to the international social-
ist and trade union movements. As outlined in Chapter 3, the Socialist
Internationals provided the Labour Party with the opportunity to join
like-minded socialist parties in a common cause, and a forum within
which discussions on foreign affairs and the causes of war were of
central importance. It was within the context of the Second
International that the divisions within the British Labour Party
between those who supported the calling of a general strike and mass
popular resistance to prevent the outbreak of war and those who did
not, were played out. However, the International also demonstrated
the inability of socialist parties to transcend national loyalties in order
to reach the goal of international solidarity, with the Second
International collapsing with the outbreak of the First World War in
August 1914. This, in turn, lead to a renewed belief in the importance
of the international socialist movement, and to the commitment to
international socialist co-operation and the establishment of an inter-
national body for the socialist parties being written into the Labour
Party’s constitution in 1918. The Internationals also provided social-
ists with the opportunity to institutionalise divisions within their ranks,
with the Second International deciding to exclude anarchists and anti-
parliamentarians from its meetings during its first congress in Paris in
1889, and competing for power against the Communist, or Third,
International, after it was reconvened in 1920. 
Another example of international solidarity in action has been the
numerous appeals by the Labour Party to their members to lobby and
to raise money for labour movements overseas. In 1913 an appeal was
launched in the name of international solidarity following a request
from the Bulgarian and Serbian Socialist Parties ‘to assist our fellow
workers in the Balkans’ in the hardships they were enduring as a result
of the Balkan war.42 Unlike internationalism as such, socialist interna-
tionalism has been ‘an interventionist doctrine, holding that it was a
duty of the oppressed in one nation to aid those in another’, what
could be called ‘popular solidarity’.43 The Spanish Civil War caused
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huge divisions within the Labour Party and wider labour movement,
and led to the rejection of the position of pacifism that the party had
been moving towards in the early 1930s. The policy of non-interven-
tion, which was pursued by the National government, and officially
supported at first by the Labour Party leadership, was bitterly resented
by many in the party. Aid for Spain campaigns sprang up around the
country, and of course some in the labour movement expressed their
solidarity for Spain by joining the International Brigades. However, the
Spanish Civil War demonstrated clearly the dilemmas that Labour
faced in reconciling its views on non-intervention, anti-militarism and
international working-class solidarity.
A third aspect of Labour’s international socialist solidarity arose
with the advent of the Russian Revolution and the establishment of the
Soviet Union. Arthur Henderson noted that ‘[T]he international
outlook of the rulers of the Soviet Union is based on the fundamental
belief of all Socialists everywhere that the ultimate guarantee of peace
must be the drawing together of the nations of the world into 
one Commonwealth, and that this can come about only through
Socialism.’44 Events in Russia radicalised the Labour Party internally, 
in that it provided a socialist ‘utopia’ for those on the far left to look
to, work with and emulate. The establishment of the Bolshevik regime
also provided a communist foe for those on the centre and centre-right
of the labour movement to be fearful of, thus deepening existing 
divisions between the revolutionary and the parliamentary left. This
tension was given an added dimension when the British Socialist Party,
along with some smaller parties, formed the Communist Party of 
Great Britain on 1 August 1920. The instructions from Moscow were
for the CPGB to affiliate to the Labour Party and convert the bulk of
the party to the communist cause. Before the Bolshevik Revolution,
the issue of whether party members were Marxists was a matter 
for individuals; after it became a matter of party unity and control.
Externally, the establishment of the Soviet Union added a new 
dimension to Labour’s foreign policy, for while in theory Labour
wanted to work with the Soviet Union, in practice the party leadership
saw the Soviet Union as a threat. The party’s 1936 document on
British Labour and Communism pointed out that the sympathetic
interest that British labour had shown in the Soviet Union ‘has been
qualified by growing resentment against Russian effort through the
Communist Inter-national to establish and finance revolutionary
Communist Parties in other countries with the object of destroying
existing democratic industrial and political Labour Movements, and 
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of bringing about the overthrow of the existing social system by
violence’.45
The Russian Revolution also had a particular impact on Labour’s
thinking on foreign policy in that it provided a major issue of
contention between Labour and its Liberal and Conservative oppo-
nents. British foreign policy towards Russia following the revolution of
October 1917 was based on non-recognition of the Soviet Union, and
limited intervention. The Labour Party bitterly opposed this, seeing it
as the cause for bad relations between the Soviet Union and Europe,
for ‘By maintaining troops against Russia, the Allied Governments
violate in their most flagrant manner the right of the Russian people to
dispose of themselves … They are thereby multiplying the reasons for
civil war in Russia.’46 The Labour Party launched a manifesto in
January 1920 that called for the ‘Complete raising of the Blockade and
a complete peace with Russia.’ It also called for full recognition of the
Soviet government, while pointing out that ‘Such a formal recognition
of a Government would no more imply moral approval of it than did
our formal recognition of the Tsar’s Government.’47 One of the main
actions of the first Labour government of 1924 was to recognise the
Soviet Union. However, Labour was suspicious of the Soviet Union,
and large sections of the party quickly came to see it as a source of
conflict in foreign policy, most obviously during the Attlee govern-
ments and the developing Cold War, as Ernest Bevin worked to involve
the United States in a defensive alliance against the Soviet Union. This
position was never fully accepted by many in the party, for whom co-
operation with the Soviet Union was the touchstone of international
socialist solidarity.
Finally, another aspect of Labour’s international socialist solidarity
has been a concern more generally with the international working
class. Feelings of kinship with workers overseas were engendered not
only from a socialist belief in the need for international working-class
solidarity, but also from the impact of Nonconformist beliefs in the
brotherhood of man. This led to a concern with imperialism and of
conditions in the British empire. The Independent Labour Party
proposed a resolution at the first annual Labour Party conference in
1901 that referred to imperialism as a ‘reversion to one of the worst
phases of barbarism’, which ‘is inimical to social reform and disastrous
to trade and commerce, a fruitful cause of war, destructive of freedom,
fraught with menace to representative institutions at home and abroad,
and must end in the destruction of democracy’.48 Feelings of kinship 
for workers overseas led to Labour Party support for nationalist 
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movements and for national self-determination, which was often at
odds with Labour’s belief in Britain’s continuing world and imperial
role. Indeed, Labour’s policy on colonial affairs was usually confused
and always inconsistent, calling at times for self-government and
Dominion status for India but not other countries; calling at times for
self-government for all the colonies; and sometimes going further by
demanding the ‘freedom’ or complete independence for the colonial
states. It was usually assumed, however, that Britain’s colonies, even if
they were given independence, would choose to remain within the
Commonwealth, and ‘under the guidance of the Mother Country.’49
To conclude, while there are many problems inherent in analysing
the nature of Labour’s foreign policy, it is possible to identify certain
key principles. Overall, Labour has had an internationalist world-view,
and within this internationalist perspective, it has emphasised six key
issues: first, that fundamental reform of international relations is possi-
ble through the establishment of international institutions to regulate
the anarchic international system; second, that states belong to an
international community, and have a commitment to work in the inter-
national interest rather than just the national interest; third, that inter-
national policy should be based on democratic principles and universal
moral norms; fourth, that collective security is better than secret bilat-
eral diplomatic treaties or balance-of-power politics; fifth, that arma-
ments and arms races can destabilise the international system, and that
the proliferation of arms should be limited, the arms trade regulated,
and that disarmament, in principle, is desirable. In addition to these
five largely liberal internationalist principles is one additional socialist
aspect of Labour’s international thought, and this has been a belief in
international working-class solidarity, especially with socialist states.
However, the Labour Party has suffered from severe and recurring
intra-party conflict over its foreign policy, because these principles can
sometimes conflict, and are open to a range of interpretations in terms
of policy solutions to particular problems. In addition, Labour has
often found itself unable to transcend national barriers in order to meet
its commitment to internationalism. These themes will be continued in
the second volume of this study, which begins with the Labour Party’s
loss of power in 1951, and which will also assess the contribution that
Labour’s particular world-view and foreign policy doctrine has made to
the nature of British foreign policy.
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